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Abstract 
Vagueness and ambiguity in natural language pose a challenge for formal theories of 
linguistic meaning because by definition they challenge two core assumptions: (i) that 
formal meanings can be formulated within a classic two-valued logic; and (ii) that an 
efficient communicative system maintains one-to-one mappings from meaning 
representations to pronounced lexical items (Kennedy 2011; 2019). At least as far back as 
Partee 1988, many, few, much and little have been characterized as ambiguous and vague 
quantifiers. Furthermore, their status as generalized quantifiers has been challenged 
(Barwise & Cooper, 1981; c.f. Herburger 2000). This dissertation uses many as a test case 
to explore particular formal linguistic tools that capture the apparent ambiguity, and 
vagueness of this class of quantifiers, and in formal accounts of meaning more generally. 
This dissertation offers a pragmatic-semantic account of their vagueness and ambiguity, 
and maintains their status as generalized quantifiers. To do so, structured meanings 
(Krifka 1995; 2001) denote licensing questions in Discourse trees (Büring 2003; 
Ginzburg 1997), which in turn provide the abstract functional content of the comparison 
class to the anaphoric Focus operator (Rooth 1992; von Fintel 1994) which composes 
with a relative, proportional determiner and a gradable degree morpheme at LF (Romero 
2015b). This account captures the Focus-dependent interpretations of utterances 
containing determiners like many, whilst maintaining a single conservative, relative, 
proportional lexical entry for many, from which other senses are pragmatically derived. 
Two critical claims are made in this dissertation: (i) ambiguity stems from the 
interpretation of a many-utterance dependent on Focus-marking; and (ii) vagueness stems 
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from the gradable, relative and proportional compositional semantics of many. Evidence 
from acceptability judgement experiments where the context and prosodic emphasis were 
manipulated failed to find clear evidence that Focus-marking alone can categorically 
disambiguate many. However, evidence from two speeded truth-verification experiments 
supports the denotation posited here. Thus, this work provides insight into formal 
mechanisms that can capture vagueness without abandoning a classic logic, and adds to 
the growing literature that emphasizes the importance of pragmatic and non-linguistic 
reasoning for linguistic production and comprehension, while leaving open a fully 
articulated account of the ambiguity of many. 
Committee: Justin Bledin, Geraldine Legendre, Justin Halberda, Barbara Landau, Kyle 
Rawlins 
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1. Introduction 
We can use natural language to equivocate, communicate uncertainty, play with 
double entendre, and speak in vague generalities. But such uses of language pose hard 
problems for theorists attempting to capture logically precise, binary truth-conditions. 
Moreover, theorists’ understanding of how best to formally represent ambiguity and 
vagueness could have practical implications for the ever-increasing importance for 
Natural Language Processing and human-machine interaction. This dissertation posits a 
denotation for the supposedly ambiguous, vague quantifier many that is neither 
ambiguous nor vague. Instead ambiguity and vagueness are derived from the interaction 
of the semantic specification of meaning and the pragmatic contexts in which it is uttered. 
This dissertation tackles the issues of ambiguity and vagueness using many as an 
illustrative case study. Many has been characterized as an ambiguous and vague 
quantifier, along with few, much, and little (Cohen 2001; Herburger 2000; Kennedy 2011; 
2019; Partee 1988; Romero 2015a, 2015b; Solt 2011; 2015)1. Vagueness and ambiguity 
pose important theoretical challenges to standard semantic theories of logically specified 
truth-conditions because they raise questions about the validity of using classical binary 
logic in the specification of truth-conditions (c.f. Kennedy 2011; 2019; Parsons 1973; 
                                                 
1 This dissertation focuses on the quantificational determiner uses of many. However, many appears in 
other semantically and syntactically distinct uses, e.g. as an adjective: 
i. The many students who attended the lecture… 
ii. There were too many students. 
It remains for future work to determine whether the account developed here can be extended to these other 
uses, modulo semantic types (but see Solt 2015 for a promising analysis that bears a promising similarity to 
the approach adopted here, suggesting that this may be feasible). However, Solt 2011 suggests that due to 
their distinct distribution these uses warrant distinct semantic types and therefore may not be amendable to 
this analysis. 
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Solt 2011 a.o.), the nature of knowledge representation and how it relates to judgements 
about vague predicates, and why we are even inclined to make judgments on seemingly 
boundary-less meanings (Fara 2000; Kennedy 2011; 2019). However, given their 
prevalence in natural language, developing a fully articulated, formally specified account 
of the pragmatic and semantic knowledge and the cognition that supports the 
comprehension and production of ambiguous, vague quantifiers will provide valuable 
theoretical insight into principled ways of capturing ambiguity and vagueness with 
current, well-established linguistic theory, and how interfaces with other conceptual and 
perceptual systems affect linguistic judgements. In short, a better understanding of 
ambiguous, vague quantifiers could strengthen researchers’ ability to investigate and 
understand a core question in cognitive science: how humans produce and comprehend 
language, especially in cases of ambiguity, vagueness, ignorance and/or uncertainty.  
This dissertation investigates ambiguous and vague quantifiers, exemplified by many, 
in an attempt to address the following issues. 
Theoretical Questions: 
What is the best way to capture the vagueness and ambiguity of many and similar 
quantifiers? 
a. Is the ambiguity of many the result of distinct denotations? If so, what are 
they? If not, why does many appear ambiguous?  
b. Is the vagueness of many the result of something encoded directly in the 
denotation? If so, what is the nature of this representation? If not, what is 
the denotation of many, and how and why does it appear vague? 
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To preview the account developed in this dissertation, the apparent ambiguity of 
many arises because of differences in information structure in distinct contexts of use that 
change the contents of a contextual parameter, the comparison class, in the composition 
of many-utterances. The contents of this comparison class can be transmitted either 
linguistically (as in the contextualizing paragraphs used in the experiments in Chapter 3) 
or perceptually (as in the dot arrays used in the experiments in Chapter 4). Different 
interpretations of many-utterances arise based on the structure and contents of this 
comparison class. Therefore, there is only one underlying lexical denotation for many.  
In addition, the account developed in this dissertation similarly claims that the 
apparent vagueness of many also arises because of differences in information structure in 
distinct contexts, which provide distinct contents to the comparison class of many. 
Therefore, many itself is not vague, rather the vagueness of many-utterances arises from 
the composition of a many-utterance with this contextual determined comparison class. 
Moreover, the verification of a many-utterance can be evaluated via representations of 
approximate magnitudes (the Approximate Number System; Dehaene 1997; c.f. Solt 
2011). The lexical denotation of the quantifier relates the proportion of items under 
discussion to relevant alternatives in the comparison class, either linguistically provided 
(e.g. via paragraphs in Experiments 1 and 2) or perceptually provided (e.g. with displays 
of dots in Experiments 3 and 4). In short, the experiments described in the second part of 
this dissertation, investigate the following empirical questions: 
Empirical Questions: 
Experiments 1 and 2 investigate whether: 
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a. the apparent ambiguity of many does not necessitate an analysis that relies 
on multiple lexical denotations of many; rather can the various 
interpretations of many be shown to arise dependent on manipulations to 
the information structure – signaled via a particular prosodic contour – of 
the discourse in which many is uttered? 
Experiments 3 and 4 investigate whether: 
a. the denotation of many is relative and proportional, but critically the 
boundaries of its truth-conditions are clearly defined; that is, can the 
vagueness of many be attributed to a verification strategy which requires 
the comparison of multiple sets, the cardinalities or proportions of which 
are context dependent? 
The sections that follow first describe how ambiguity is typically characterized and 
diagnosed by linguists. They then explore relevant examples of many-utterances and 
review previous accounts of many, to illustrate how and why many has justifiably been 
characterized as ambiguous, but ultimately why such an analysis is not fully justified by 
the data and potentially unnecessary. The same is done for vagueness. First, a description 
of how it has been characterized and diagnosed in the past is provided. The next section 
reviews relevant many-utterances and how previous accounts of many have capture this 
vagueness. Ultimately, this dissertation agrees with accounts that denote many with a 
comparison of proportions in a given context, which predicts precise truth-conditions, but 
predicts that the value of those conditions shift depending on context, thereby giving rise 
to an apparently indeterminant boundary, and hence judgements of vagueness. 
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1.1. Ambiguity 
1.1.1. Characterizing and capturing ambiguity 
This and the following sections present data and review the literature concerning 
ambiguity and vagueness along with extant accounts of ambiguity and vagueness in 
quantifiers like many. These data illustrate the various ways in which these so-called 
ambiguous, vague quantifiers can be interpreted and how they differ from other kinds of 
quantifiers.  
Ambiguity, generally speaking, is the case in which a lexical item can be mapped to 
multiple, different meanings – following the standard assumption in semantics that 
denotations are mappings between lexical items and some meaning (Kennedy 2011; 
2019; a.o.). Kennedy 2011 and 2019 reviews two widely used diagnostics for this kind of 
semantic ambiguity. 
The first diagnostic, the contradiction test, is exemplified in (1) and (2), both adapted 
from Kennedy 2019. 
(1) ?? Lily’s mother is Sterling’s father’s sister. Since Lily is a girl, she is Sterling’s 
cousin, but not his cousin. 
(2) Sterling’s cousin is funny, but she isn’t funny. 
In English, (1) is read as a contradiction. Since English does not mark gender on the 
word cousin, there is only one meaning of cousin, resulting in the oddness of (1). 
Therefore, cousin is not semantically ambiguous in English. In contrast, there is an 
interpretation of (2) that is not a contradiction – critically relying on the two meanings of 
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funny (e.g. ‘odd’ and ‘humorous’), demonstrating that funny is semantically ambiguous in 
English (i.e. it has more than one meaning). 
The second diagnostic, the identity of sense test, is exemplified in (3) and (4).  
(3) Sally swept the tile, but not the carpet. 
(4) ?? Sally swept the competition, but not the chimney. 
Parallelism in ellipsis essentially restricts the space of interpretation, necessitating a 
parallelism in sense. In these examples, (3) does not result in oddness because the same 
sense of sweep, i.e. to use a broom, can be maintained across both clauses. In contrast, (4) 
seems odd because the sense of sweep in the two clauses cannot be the same; in short, to 
sweep a competition means to win all the available prizes, whereas to sweep a chimney 
means to clear debris from a chimney. This kind of alternation, or regular polysemy, 
could in principle be captured by positing lexical ambiguity – a distinct denotation for 
each sense, capturing the specific arguments and their roles (e.g. patient vs. instrument). 
Alternatively, this alternation could be captured by positing that these argument roles are 
semantically underspecified – so that either an instrument or a patient can compose with 
one and the same lexical entry for the verb sweep. The latter approach maintains the 
intuitively close relationship between these various senses, i.e. whether the verb describes 
the physical motion of removing debris from a surface with a tool, or the more figurative 
sense where the verb describes the act of removing opportunities for competitors to win. 
In contrast, the former captures the distinct senses in a transparent way. 
Formally speaking, there are a number of ways in which ambiguity can be captured 
each of which have their relative strengths and weaknesses depending on the particular 
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kind of ambiguity to be accounted for: structurally distinct logical forms (LFs) can be 
used to capture scope ambiguity and homonymy; type-shifting operations that derive 
distinct truth-conditions, or denotations, can be used to capture cases of polysemy; and 
positing underspecified lexical denotations that only gain full specification during 
composition or interpretation have been used to capture the relationship between 
homonymy and regular polysemy, as well as other devices like metaphor and metonymy 
(Kennedy 2011; 2019). Critically, in all these approaches, ambiguity is captured by a 
many-to-one mapping from representation (syntactic or semantic) to pronunciation; this 
maintains the standard semantic assumption, that truth-conditions are representations of 
meaning within a two-valued logic. As the data below show, many appears to be 
homophonous across at least four different interpretations, suggesting that distinct logical 
forms (LFs) or semantic types could be at play here. However, the data below also point 
to a critical role for prosodic emphasis in this ambiguity, which is cashed out as context 
sensitivity in Chapter 2. 
1.1.2. Ambiguity of many 
Given these diagnostics, we can consider why previous literature has characterized 
many as ambiguous. Initially, many does not appear to pattern like other ambiguous 
items, based on the results of the contradiction and identity of sense tests, as (5)-(6) 
illustrate. 
(5) ?? Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize, but not many Scandinavians 
have won the Nobel Prize. 
(6) Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize, but not Andorrans. 
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Recall that if the lexical item of interest gives rise to a contradiction in a coordinated 
structure as in (5), this is taken as evidence that that lexical item is not ambiguous, 
because if there was another meaning or sense available the contradiction would not 
arise. Since (5) is intuitively contradictory, this suggests that many may not be ambiguous 
in the same was as funny is in (2) above. Recall that if the elided material in the second 
clause of (6) has the same sense as the first clause, and does not give rise to oddness, this 
is taken as evidence that the item of interest is not ambiguous. Since (6) does not give rise 
to an odd judgment, this suggests that many is not ambiguous in the way sweep or funny 
are in (2) and (4) above. Therefore, the results of both these diagnostics suggest that the 
apparent ambiguity of many is not the result of accidental polysemy (e.g. ‘ha-ha’ funny, 
and ‘odd’ funny), or of regular polysemy (e.g. sweep with a broom or sweep the 
competition).  
Despite the results of these diagnostics, previous accounts of many have described at 
least two different possible interpretations of many-utterances, and characterize this as a 
kind of ambiguity (Barwise & Cooper 1981; Partee 1988; Westerståhl 1985). To illustrate 
the data that gave rise to this ambiguity claim, consider whether the utterance in (7) is 
true or false.  
(7) Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize. 
If we define Scandinavia as Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, then 
roughly, 26 million people live in Scandinavia. As of October 2019, 63 Nobel Prizes 
have been awarded to Scandinavians. Given this information, it hardly seems true to 
assert that a significant proportion of the Scandinavia’s population has won the Nobel 
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Prize, especially considering that these same countries have collectively won 579 
Olympic Gold medals over the years, as Table 1-1 summarizes. 
Table 1-1. This table shows total number of Nobel Prizes (of all time, as of October 2019) and total 
number of Olympic gold medals (of all time, as of Winter 2018), that each of the five Scandinavian 





Norway 13 188 5 mil 
Sweden 30 202 9.5 mil 
Finland 5 144 5.4 mil 
Iceland 1 0 0.3 mil 
Denmark 14 45 5.6 mil 
total 63 579  
* according to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Nobel_laureates_per_capita 
† according to http://www.medalspercapita.com 
However, some people judge (7) to be true (e.g. Westerståhl 1985), but critically, on 
the basis of a different interpretation of the utterance. Instead of taking (7) to be asserting 
something about the kinds of prizes or international honors Scandinavians win, 
Westerståhl takes (7) to assert something about the kinds of people who win Nobel 
Prizes, i.e. the number of Scandinavians, compared to people from other regions, who 
have won the Nobel Prize. Under this so-called reverse interpretation, the relevant data 
would be the number of Scandinavian Nobel Prize winners compared to the number of 
winners from other regions, for example as shown in Table 1-2. According to the Nobel 
Foundation, a total of 950 laureates have been awarded since the first in 1901.2 So given 
that and the information in Table 1-2, it would be unfair to say that Scandinavia has the 
                                                 
2 https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/facts/nobel-prize-facts/ 
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largest proportion of laureates, but they certainly have more than some regions, and 
therefore one may3 be willing to accept (7), under this interpretation. 
Table 1-2. The number of Nobel laurates in Scandinavia compared to other relevant regions, for the 
purposes of illustration. 
 Nobel Prizes* 
Scandinavia 63 
South America†  11 
Western Europe‡ 332 
* Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Nobel_laureates_per_capita 
† Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay 
‡ Belgium, France, Ireland, Germany, Luxemburg, Monaco, Netherlands, U.K., Andorra, Spain, 
Portugal 
The key semantic difference between Westerståhl’s 1985 reverse interpretation and 
what will be referred to here as the regular interpretation is the order in which the 
arguments appear to compose with the quantifier (what is referred to as the regular-
reverse ambiguity). In the regular interpretation, the arguments appear to compose in the 
same order as the surface syntax (e.g. the argument structure would be 
many(Scandinavians, win Nobel Prizes)), whereas in the reverse interpretation, they seem 
to compose in the opposite order such that the restriction of the quantifier contains the 
predicate have won Nobel Prizes, and the scope contains Scandinavians (i.e. many(win 
Nobel Prizes, Scandinavians)). So, is many ambiguous, and if so, how? One critical hint 
to this puzzle is the observation that the reverse interpretation only arises, or is only 
felicitous, when Scandinavians is contrastively emphasized (Herburger 2000; see also 
Cohen 2001; Romero 2015b), equated to Focus by some, but not all, authors (Cohen 
                                                 
3 Considering the known comparators (e.g. consider the judgement of (7) if Western Europe had not been 
included in Table 1-2, or if North America, with 408 laureates had also been included). This is relevant to 
the discussion of vagueness to follow. 
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2001; Herburger 1997; 2000; Partee 1988; Romero 2015a; 2015b; Solt 2011; 2015; c.f. 
Hendriks 2004; Tomaszewicz 2016) 
Consider the result of the contradiction diagnostic again, now with a particular pattern 
of prosodic emphasis we can reach an interpretation of (5) that is not a contradiction: (8) 
(here boldface text marks the prosodic contour that indicates a Contrastive Topic, or 
Büring’s 2003 B-accent).  
(8) Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize, but not many Scandinavians 
have won the Nobel Prize. 
Specifically, (7) is not contradictory if we take it to mean that of the people who have 
won the Nobel Prize, many of them are Scandinavian, but of all Scandinavians, not many 
have won the Nobel Prize. So perhaps many is not semantically ambiguous, but rather 
pragmatically ambiguous; the meaning of a many-utterance changes depending on the 
context in which it is uttered. Since the regular and reverse interpretations arise with 
different, distinct prosodic contours, perhaps the apparent ambiguity in the order of the 
arguments of these two meanings can be derived from some property of prosody, or 
Focus, rather than positing two lexical denotations, or stipulating some type-shifting rule 
in order to account for this compositional difference. This is precisely the aim of the 
account that is developed in Chapter 2 and for which experimental support is sought in 
Chapter 3. The rest of this section provides further evidence that many-utterances do 
indeed have either a regular or reverse interpretation depending on the information 
structure of the preceding discourse, signaled by emphasis, and that another kind of 
ambiguity (what is called the cardinal-proportional ambiguity here) arises depending 
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on what the interlocutors know or want to know – i.e. the contents of that information 
structure. This evidence further points to the disambiguating role of information structure 
– the underlying driver of prosodic emphasis, which is claimed to be sensitive to the 
information structure of the preceding discourse; emphasis is one marker of Focus, which 
signals new or newer information (Büring 2003, Schwarzschild 1999). Therefore, the 
following section briefly describes the theoretical notion of information structure and 
how it gives rise to both Focus-sensitivity and prosody.  
To further grasp the way in which many is ambiguous, consider the data in (9) 
(adapted from Romero, 2015b): 
(9) Context: Mary, John and Adam have a friendship predicated mainly on reading 
obscure Scottish authors. After each of them reads a book they place it on their 
bookshelf, the contents of which are as follows: 
Mary: 6 books by Douglas; 3 books by Keath; 6 books by Hings; 3 books by 
McDawn; 1 book by McFire 
John: 3 books by Douglas 
Adam: 2 books by Douglas 
After inspecting the contents of each of their bookshelves without knowing how 
many books each author has written in total, you proclaim:  
a. Mary has read many/some books by Douglas. 
b. Mary has read many/some books by Douglas. 
According to Büring 2003, this Contrastive Topic (CT) prosody (again marked with 
boldface) gives rise to an interpretation that makes reference to other relevant alternatives 
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in the context. Thus, under the intended interpretation of the utterances in (9a) what is at 
issue is the number of books by Douglas that Mary has read, compared to John and 
Adam. In contrast, what is at issue in the utterances in (9b) are the number of books by 
Douglas that Mary has read, compared to books by other Scottish authors. Taking this 
into consideration then, the intuitive meaning of the utterance in (9a) containing many 
would be paraphrased as “Out of Mary, John and Adam, the number of books by Douglas 
read by Mary is sufficiently more than that read by John or Adam (leaving an in depth 
discussion of what ‘sufficiently more’ would be for Chapter 2). Similarly, the meanings 
of the many-utterance in (9b) would be “Of all the books by different authors read by 
Mary, the number by Douglas is sufficiently more than the number of other books by 
other Scottish authors she has read.” For comparison, consider the intuitive meaning of 
some in (9). It is fairly similar, except that ‘sufficiently more’ would be replaced with ‘at 
least one’ (c.f. Barwise & Cooper 1981). Critically however, because the meaning of 
some itself does not contain any relative comparison, the meaning (i.e. the truth-value) of 
the utterance does not change depending on emphasis. Thus, given the data in (9), the 
meaning of many, but not some, appears to differ depending on which alternatives are at 
issue, i.e. based on what is emphasized in the utterance. This an illustration of the 
regular-reverse ambiguity. 
However, another kind of ambiguity is exemplified if you now learn the total number 
of books that each author has written, assuming your goal is to convey something 
meaningful about this information. If we again consider the same utterances in this 
slightly different context, we find a different pattern of judgements: 
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(10) Douglas has written 60 books, Keath 4, Hings 6, McDawn 3, McFire 2 
a. Mary has read many/some all books by Douglas. 
b. Mary has read (F) many/some books by Douglas. 
Now, the intuitive meaning of the many-utterance in (10a) would be paraphrased as “Out 
of Mary, John and Adam, the proportion of books by Douglas that Mary has read is 
sufficiently larger than the proportion read by John or Adam.” Similarly, the intuitive 
meaning of (10b) would be paraphrased as “Of all the proportions of books by different 
authors read by Mary, the proportion of books by Douglas is sufficiently larger than the 
proportion of other books by other Scottish authors she has read.” Given this new 
context, (10b) no longer seems true since Mary has only read 1/6 of all the books that 
Douglas has written, but she has read all four books that Keath has written, half of 
McFire’s oeuvre, and so forth. However, while this new contextual information changed 
intuitions about the truth-conditions for many, those for some do not appear to have 
changed (i.e. both (10a) and (10b) are true so long as Mary has read more than one book 
by Douglas, regardless of what that is compared to). This contrast illustrates one way in 
which ambiguous, vague quantifiers like many differ from first-order, logical quantifiers 
like some. This difference in the pattern of truth-values between the data in (9) and (10) 
illustrate the cardinal-proportional ambiguity. 
To summarize, many and related quantifiers are at least four-ways ambiguous: the so-
called regular ((9a) & (10a)) and reverse interpretations ((9b) & (10b)) arise depending 
on whether a phrase inside the many-phrase is emphasized (the regular interpretation), or 
whether a phrase outside the many-phrase is emphasized (the reverse interpretation) 
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(Cohen 2001; Romer 2015a; 2015b; but see Herburger 2000; 1997; Partee 1988; 
Westerståhl 1985 for alternative accounts). More generally, this regular-reverse 
ambiguity appears to depend on what is at issue, e.g. the number of books read by each 
member of the group, or all the books written by a particular author. The ambiguity 
between a cardinal (as in (9)) and a proportional (as in (10)) arises depending on what 
the interlocutor knows about the context of the utterance. So, in (9a) and (9b) when the 
speaker does not know the cardinality of the set being quantified (all the books by 
Douglas, here; what is referred to as the quantified set here after), no proportion can be 
calculated, and only reference to known whole cardinalities can be made. Once the 
complete, possible cardinality of the quantified set is known, then a proportion can be 
calculated, as illustrated in (10), resulting in the so-called proportional interpretation. 
Distinct lexical denotations have been posited to capture each of these meanings at 
various points in the literature. 
However, the results of the diagnostics from the beginning of this section and the data 
in (9) and (10) suggest that the different meanings of many may not arise from lexically 
distinct denotations or via type shifting rules, as some accounts of this ambiguity would 
posit (e.g. Herburger 19997; 2000; Partee 1988; see Kennedy 2011; 2019; Parsons 1973 
for the theoretical import of such an account). Instead Chapter 2 argues (following 
others, e.g. Cohen 2001; Romero 2015a; 2015b), these facts suggest that the meanings of 
many can be principally and predictably derived based on the pragmatic factors of the 
particular discourse context in which they are uttered, implying that many is not actually 
lexically ambiguous, but rather pragmatically ambiguous.  
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1.2. Pragmatically disambiguating ambiguity: Information structure of 
discourses, Prosody, and Licensing Questions 
As described above, the regular-reverse ambiguity of many-utterances arises 
depending on which element(s) of the utterance are emphasized. This is the distinction 
between the regular interpretations in (9a) and (10a) and the reverse interpretations in 
(9b) and (10b). Westerståhl ‘s (1985) classic example is repeated in (11) (see also Cohen 
2001; Herburger 1997; 2000; Romero 2015a; 2015b) 
(11) Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize. 
a. Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize.  regular 
proportional 
Paraphrase: Of all the things that Scandinavians have won, the 
proportion that have won the Nobel Prize in Literature is larger than 
the proportion of them that have won other honors. 
b. Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize. reverse 
proportional 
Paraphrase: Of all the people that have won the Nobel Prize, the 
proportion of them that have been Scandinavians is larger than the 
proportion of winners from other regions. 
In English, the particular emphasis pattern that gives rise to this difference in meaning 
has been identified as Contrastive Topic, which despite its name, is a type of Focus 
(Büring 2003; Rooth 1992; von Fintel 1994; Wagner 2012). The general consensus in the 
literature is that Focus is used to mark new information in a discourse and introduces or 
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raises the salience of alternatives to the Focused element (see Rooth 1992; Schwarzschild 
1999; von Fintel 1994; but see also Krifka 1995). Focus is typically realized in English4 
with a particular kind of prosodic emphasis (Büring’s 2003 A- and B-accents). Thus, the 
emphasis, or Focus-marking, that appears in utterances like (11a) can only be felicitously 
uttered in a particular context where the new information being contributed by the 
utterance concerns what kinds of internationally recognized honors (i.e. relevant, 
reasonable alternatives to the Nobel Prize) Scandinavians have won. In contrast, the 
emphasis, or Focus-marking, that appears in utterances like (11b) can only be felicitously 
uttered in a particular context where the new information being contributed by the 
utterance concerns who (i.e. relevant, reasonable alternatives to Scandinavians) has won 
the Nobel Prize. If this information is not new or salient, then the utterance will be 
infelicitous in the context, i.e., the alternatives introduced by Focus play an integral role 
in the felicity and interpretation of the utterance.  
Other more general factors also affect felicity, and therefore may also be described in 
terms of information structure. Roberts’ (1996/2012) influential theory of relevance, 
provides a useful framework for describing and explaining why certain utterances are 
judged felicitous or infelicitous in certain contexts. Roberts introduces the notion of 
Question Under Discussion (QUD) and stipulates that an utterance is only felicitous if it 
is relevant to – i.e. answers – the QUD. To this notion of relevance, we may also wish to 
                                                 
4 In other languages, Focus is realized with particles (e.g. Japanese; Kuno 1973) or scrambling (Hungarian; 
Kiss 2008), which provide hints at the syntactic behavior of Focus at LF and how it composes with the 
other elements of these utterances, as discussed in Chapter 2. (NB: Kiss’ work is part of a larger debate 
about whether the properties of Focus and Topic stem from their syntactic behavior or their relationship to 
the discourse information structure. No part of the debate hinges on this line of argumentation, and so the 
pragmatic and semantic behavior of Focus are taken at face value.) 
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add resolvedness – or the degree to which a question answers or settles a question. van 
Rooy 2003 implements this as a utility function that serves to rank relevant answers in 
terms of how well they meet the goals of the interlocutors and other aspects of the context 
(see also Ginzburg 1995a & b). Resolvedness allows us to account for differences in 
felicity depending on the goals of the interlocutors with respect to, e.g. whether an 
answer containing an exact cardinality is expected or whether a many-utterance will be 
enough.   
Combining these notions of relevance and resolvedness, we can posit that many-
utterances are felicitous when they are relevant and resolving answers to the QUD in a 
given discourse context. Given this relationship, QUDs that give rise to a particular 
interpretation are referred to as licensing QUDs. For example, consider the two questions 
and their relevant, resolving answers in (12) and (13).  
(12) A: “How many Scandinavians have won different honors?” 
B: “Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize.” regular 
interpretation 
(13) C: “How many people of each nationality have won the Nobel Prize?” 
D: “Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize.” reverse 
interpretation 
These answers are taken to be relevant and resolving, if we assume that the goals of A do 
not require an exact number as a response. Thus, B provides a felicitous response to the 
QUD posed by A in (12), because B is providing the kind of information being requested 
by A, at the appropriate level of precision; A learns that of the honors won by 
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Scandinavians, some significantly large proportion have won Nobel Prizes as opposed to 
other well-known accolades. Conversely, the answer provided by D in (13) would not be 
felicitous because it is providing information that does not answer A’s question; thus, A’s 
question in (12) is the licensing QUD for the regular, but not the reverse interpretation of 
many. Following the same reasoning, D’s response in (13) is a relevant, resolving answer 
to C’s question, because it offers information about the degree to which different 
nationalities win Nobel Prizes and that Scandinavians win a significantly large proportion 
of them, at the appropriate level of precision. Therefore, C’s question in (13) can be 
thought of as the licensing QUD for the reverse, but not the regular, interpretation of 
many. 
Discourse trees (D-trees; Büring 2003; Krifka 2001; see also Cohen & Krifka 2014) 
offer a formal way of modeling this information structure (the question-answer pairs). D-
trees are tree-like structures that visually represent the hierarchical relations between 
licensing QUDs, and the relevant, resolving answers they license, as illustrated in Figure 
1-1. One major theoretical innovation in this dissertation is to denote these licensing 
QUDs using structured meanings, explicitly linking the information structural content 
of a discourse to the context sensitive composition of a many-utterance (Aloni, Beaver, 
Clark, and van Rooij, 2002; Krifka 1995; 2001). Structured meanings, discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 2, are tuples containing a background function (e.g. 
𝜆 𝑑 . ({|𝑥:  𝑤𝑜𝑛(𝑥,  𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠)|) ≥ 𝑑} in the tree depicted in Figure 1-1) and a 
restrictor set (e.g. DEGREES). By applying the function to the set, one can derive the 
denotations of the relevant, resolving answers to the question which this structured 
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meaning denotes (e.g. ⟦𝑑 − 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑜𝑏𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒⟧ =
 𝜆𝑑′.  (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑵𝑷, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑).  
 
Figure 1-1. This D-tree illustrates how the structure of a discourse can be said to depend on, or be licensed 
by, the QUDs, either implicit or explicit, in the preceding discourse. 
  
This formal structure of structured meanings also resembles that of Focus (i.e. a focus 
element, derived from a background and a restriction on that background, which can also 
be denoted with structured meanings, see Aloni, et al., 2002; Krifka 1995). This 
assumption makes the close relationship between licensing QUDs and Focus (marked or 
otherwise) explicit; in short, the unbound variable in the background function stipulates 
the element that can be marked with Focus. For example, in Figure 1-1 the Big Question 
may be tacitly agreed by the interlocutors, but it is still thought of as a critical 
determinant of the tree’s structure, because the sub-questions must each answer some part 
of the Big Question. On the left of the tree are the utterances from the dialogue in (12) in 
the text above, illustrating how each possible answer (each terminal node) must be a 
minimally contrasting answer to the directly dominating QUD in order to license the 
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emphasis pattern particular to the regular interpretation. On the right branch of the tree, 
the same structure is illustrated, with the structured meaning denotation of the licensing 
QUD from the dialogue in (13) in the text above, and the denotation of the degree to 
which Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize – the critical degree to be compared 
during the full composition of the many-utterance. This shows that by assuming that 
QUDs are denoted by structured meanings, the contents of the discourses’ information 
structure can compose directly with a degree-based denotation of many, described in 
more detail in Chapter 2. Thus, the different interpretive possibilities of many-
utterances, and possibly the prosody thereof, inextricably depend on the information 
structure of a particular discourse context. 
To summarize, two distinct interpretations of a many-utterance can arise, exemplified 
by the distinct paraphrases in (11a) and (11b), depending on the information structure of 
the preceding discourse, each of which is signaled by a unique prosodic emphasis pattern, 
exemplified by the different pattern of boldface in (11a) and (11b). Formally, this occurs 
because of the strict felicity, or licensing, conditions on this emphasis, which is a marker 
of Focus. Because Focus must mark new information, Focus-marking allows us to deduce 
the goals of the interlocutors, what is already known and what is yet to be known in a 
discourse in which utterances like either (9a), (10a), (11a) or (9b), (10b), (11b) are made. 
Chapter 2 will show that once the pragmatic information structure of the discourse is 
carefully characterized, one need only assume a single lexical entry for many; many is not 
ambiguous. The distinct interpretations of many-utterances can be predicted and derived 
based on the preceding discourse. 
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1.3. Vagueness 
1.3.1. Characterizing and capturing vagueness 
Vagueness, distinct from ambiguity, is the case in which the exact boundary between 
truth and falsehood is difficult to determine, not clearly defined, or shifts depending on 
factors like the context, the speaker etc. (Kennedy 2011; 2019). A necessary, although 
not sufficient, condition of vague predicates is their contextual variability – the truth-
value of the predicate critically depends on the context. They also exhibit borderline 
cases – cases where it is not easily determined whether the predicate is true or false of an 
entity in some given context. For example, if a $5 cup of coffee is considered an 
expensive cup of coffee and a $1 cup of coffee is considered cheap (or not expensive), is 
a $4 cup of coffee expensive? Relatedly, vague predicates also give rise to the Sorites 
Paradox, illustrated in (14) (adapted from Kennedy 2019): 
(14) Premise 1: A $5 cup of coffee is expensive. 
Premise 2: Any cup of coffee that costs one cent less than $5 is an 
expensive cup of coffee. 
  Conclusion: Therefore, any free cup of coffee is an expensive cup of 
coffee. 
The paradox lies in the intuitively false conclusion, drawn from two intuitively true 
premises (intuitively, $5 is expensive and so is $4.99, $4.98, and so on).  
The fact that vague predicates give rise to the Sorites Paradox means that vague 
predicates raise some important questions about standard semantic assumptions about 
truth-conditional meaning and how knowledge and cognition interact with linguistic 
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meaning. If there is some point in the iteration through successive values in Premise 2 at 
which we no longer accept Premise 2 (the so-called sharp boundaries claim), then how 
does this square with observations of borderline cases described above? More 
importantly, if there is no sharp boundary, why does a paradox still arise and how are we 
to capture the meaning of vague predicates like expensive, with a traditional binary logic 
(the so-called semantic question)? In addition to this question, Kennedy (2019; 
following Fara 2000) also argues that the Sorites Paradox raises questions about why we 
find it so hard to identify the point at which Premise 2 becomes false, even when we 
know all the relevant facts (the epistemological question); and it raises questions about 
why we are so willing to accept Premise 2 in the first place, i.e. why do vague predicates 
seem to have a wide range of truth-values for which both ‘true’ and ‘false’ judgements 
arise (tolerance), or seem boundary-less (the psychological question). These issues are 
revisited in Chapter 2 after developing a pragmatic-semantic account of ambiguous, 
vague quantifiers. 
There are two widely accepted formal mechanisms for capturing vagueness. 
Supervaluationist approaches (c.f. Fine 1975) assume sharp boundaries but introduce 
supertruth values (and superfalse) which are partial specifications of truth (or falsity). 
According to Fine’s account, the edges of the sharp boundaries of extensions are arbitrary 
and infinitely variable, which is why we experience borderline cases and why we have 
such difficulty in rejecting the second premise of the Paradox. Gradable degree-based 
accounts (c.f. Hackl 2009; Rett 2014; Romero 2015a; 2015b; Solt 2015; a.m.o.) retain the 
classic binary logic, but introduce a new primitive into the ontology: degrees of type d. 
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Degrees are values on scales, the dimensions (units, upper, and lower bounds) of which 
are lexically or contextually specified. Accounts that posit ranges of truth or acceptability 
along these scales can account for tolerance and boundary-less judgements in the Sorites 
Paradox, these linguistic accounts on their own cannot address the epistemological or 
psychological questions that the Sorites Paradox raises. That is, they do not provide 
explanations of what we know about the meaning of a predicate if we cannot determine 
where/when it ceases to be true (even when we know, or think we know, all the relevant 
facts), and what we compute when we represent and process the meaning of vague 
predicates, i.e. what psychological factors make them tolerant and seemingly boundary-
less? To address the epistemological question, an account must describe the nature of 
conceptual representations that linguistic meanings make reference to, or explain how the 
truth-conditions are calculated in such a way that gives rise to indeterminacy and 
imprecision. To address the psychological question, an account must describe the nature 
of the computational processes that operate over these conceptual or perceptual 
representations that give rise to judgements that seem tolerant or boundary-less. The 
account developed in Chapter 2 attempts to answer both these questions. The next 
section briefly reviews evidence demonstrating the vagueness of many. Then, the 
subsequent section briefly previews the account developed in Chapter 2, sketching 
preliminary answers to both the psychological and epistemological questions.  
1.3.2. Vagueness of many 
Given this characterization of vagueness, let us return to the data in (8)/(9) and (10) 
(repeated here as (15) and (16)), and see why many has been characterized as vague, in 
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addition to ambiguous (Cohen 2001; Kennedy 2011; 2019; Romero 2015a,b; Solt 2015, 
a.o.).  
(15) Context: Mary has read 6, John 3, and Adam 2 of the 60 books that 
Douglas has written 
a. Mary has read many books by Douglas. 
(16) Context: Scandinavians have won 63 Nobel Prizes and 579 Olympic gold 
medals; Western Europe has won 332 Nobel Prizes and South America has 
won 11 
a. Many Scandinavians have won Nobel Prizes. 
Considering (15) and (16), we can see that there is no one, set cardinality or proportional 
threshold above which many is true and below which many is false; the truth-values 
depend in part on the alternatives in the context and nature of the entities being 
quantified. Recall that Mary has read six books by Douglas and six books by Hings. 
Under the cardinal interpretation of many, compared to her other two friends, she has 
read more than what they have managed and so intuitively this utterance is true, but this 
does not mean that six items is the boundary between many and not-many. However, if 
we altered the context of the utterance slightly so that we are no longer comparing Mary 
to John and Adam, but instead to either English majors (17b) or Engineering majors 
(17c), and we assume that English majors probably read a lot more obscure Scottish 
authors than Engineering majors, our intuitions about the truth-values of (17) may 
change. We may end up considering alternative individuals who have read hundreds of 
books in the first case, but individuals who have only read tens of books in the latter.  
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(17) Mary has read many books by Douglas, 
a. …compared to John or Adam. 
b. …compared to the English majors at University X. 
c. …compared to the Electrical Engineering majors at University X. 
Moreover, when we recall that Douglas has written 60 books, Keath 4, Hings 6, McDawn 
3, McFire 2, and we now consider the difference in proportions of authors’ oeuvres, our 
judgements also differ about whether six books count as many. This data exemplifies 
what Kennedy 2007 described as an “epistemic uncertainty about where we actually draw 
the line and metalinguistic resistance to treating highly similar objects differently relative 
to the property expressed by the [unmodified form of many]” (p. 42).5  
In addition, referring to (18)-(20) we see that many-utterances in a given context can 
exemplify borderline cases, as in (19). 
(18) If Mary has read 27 of Rowling’s 30 books, Mary has read many books by 
Rowling. 
(19) If John has read 15 of Rowling’s 30 books, John has read many books by 
Rowling. 
(20) If Adam has read 3 of Rowling’s 30 books, Adam has read many books by 
Rowling. 
Finally, many-utterances also give rise to the Sorites Paradox, as illustrated in (21). 
                                                 
5 In natural, everyday use, there are, of course, instances where the cardinality of the quantified set may be 
guessed, estimated, or be relative to the particular entities being quantified or simply subjective, and be 
represented either correctly or incorrectly. This kind of indeterminacy, according to Kennedy (2007; 
2011/2019; see also Zaroukian, 2013)), should be characterized as imprecision – a distinct, but interrelated 
phenomenon – which will not be discussed at length or formally distinguished in this dissertation, although 
many certainly exhibits such imprecision. 
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(21) Premise 1: Of all the Scandinavians who have won prestigious 
international prizes, 16 Scandinavian Nobel Literature Laureates count as 
many Scandinavians having won the Nobel Prize. 
Premise 2: … 15 Scandinavian Nobel Literature Laureates… 
Conclusion: … 0 Scandinavian Nobel Literature Laureates… 
Therefore, many displays the widely accepted characteristics of vague predicates. 
This dissertation follows Cohen 2001 and Romero 2015b by positing that the 
calculation of truth-conditions of ambiguous, vague quantifiers like many compares the 
proportion of quantified items out of all members of the quantified class (e.g. |Douglas’ 
books read by Mary| : |all Douglas’ books|) to the mean proportion of all relevant 
alternatives in the context (e.g. the mean of |Douglas’ books read by John| : |all Douglas’ 
books|, |Douglas’ books read by Adam| : |all Douglas’ books|, etc.). Moreover, values of 
these proportions are amenable to the Focus-marking discussed above. Specifically, when 
Mary is emphasized in (9), the alternative proportions would be as stated, but if Douglas 
was emphasized, the truth conditions would instead compare the proportion of Douglas’ 
books read by Mary out of all Douglas’ books to the mean proportion of each other 
relevant authors’ books read by Mary. In short, the information structure specified by the 
preceding discourse and signaled by the particular Focus-marking determines the 
contents and form of the proportions being compared during the calculation of the truth-
values for many. This provides an answer to Fara’s 2000 epistemological question, we 
‘know’ where the boundary between true and false is for many, but because it constantly 
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shifts depending on subtle differences in the context, it is difficult to characterize and 
judge generally. 
Moreover, the representation of these cardinalities or proportions themselves may 
also account for some of the imprecision exhibited by many. An important question is 
whether this vagueness should be represented in the linguistic denotation, or by some 
other cognitive system which interfaces with the linguistic system?  
Following Solt (2009, 2011; 2015), and Kennedy (2007; 2011; 2019; a.o.), this 
dissertation claims that vagueness is not encoded in the lexical system, but can arise in 
part because the lexical system can interface with other cognitive systems to interpret 
lexical meaning denoted in the mental lexicon. The implementation that is pursued in this 
dissertation, following Romero (2015a & 2015b) and Solt (2011; 2015), posits that many 
relates sets of sets to a point on an infinitely gradable scale of degrees via a silent degree-
morpheme, POS. Degree sets are ordered with respect to some dimension thereby 
forming a scale (Kennedy 2007; 2011; 2019), i.e. rational numbers for ambiguous, vague 
quantifiers like many (Romero, 2015b; Solt, 2009; 2011; 2015). That point, the degree of 
the quantified set, is then compared to an upper bound, or threshold derived from the 
relevant alternatives in the context (the ‘neutral segment’ in Romero’s 2015b terms; 
derived via a function in the denotation of POS at LF). The utterance is true just in case 
the degree of the quantified set exceeds the neutral segment. Such a degree-based 
semantics, assumes that degrees are ontological primitives (like entities, truth-values, 
etc.), of type d. Assuming a degree-based approach provides a clear interface point 
between the linguistic system and the non-linguistic representation of approximate 
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magnitudes. This provides one more source of vagueness and provides an answer to the 
Fara’s (2000) psychological question: this cognitive system that represents approximate 
magnitudes cannot accurately or reliable discriminate small differences in magnitude. 
Therefore, small differences, like the difference between someone reading five or six 
books may not always be judged in reliably distinct ways.  
To summarize, this account assumes that the truth-conditions for many clearly 
demarcate the boundary between true and false. The meaning of many-utterances appears 
indeterminant, tolerant, and boundary-less because the denotation of many entails the 
comparison of two proportional values, which themselves change depending on the 
context. Moreover, many-utterances may also appear vague because they can be verified 
with the noisy representations of approximate magnitudes. The next section briefly 
describes the nature of this system and this interface (see Chapter 5 for more detail). 
1.4. The interface between linguistic and non-linguistic representations 
As hinted to above, language is not a completely isolated cognitive system. In order 
to produce and comprehend the meanings that language attempts to convey, the linguistic 
system must interface with a multitude of other cognitive systems. This is the crux of the 
Interface Transparency Thesis (ITT; Lidz, Pietroski, Halberda, & Hunter, 2011), which 
posits that there are instances when the nature of the linguistic representations strongly 
constrains, or fully determines the way in which non-linguistic cognitive systems are 
engaged in order to verify a linguistic utterance given a particular physical context. To 
interpret quantifiers, interlocutors clearly must make use of such interfaces, specifically 
with some system for representing quantities and individuating sets. As described below, 
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this is the case when people are asked to consider the meaning of most (Lidz, et al., 2011; 
Pietroski, Lidz, Hunter & Halberda, 2009).   
The experiments described in Chapter 4 leverage what we know about the innate, 
non-linguistic system of representing approximate magnitudes, the Approximate Number 
System (ANS; Carey, 2009; Dehaene, 1997; Feigenson, Dehaene & Spelke, 2004) and 
individuating and tracking sets in parallel with visual attention and working memory 
(parallel individuation; Carey, 2009), in order to test the claim made above: that the 
denotation of many requires competent speakers of English to attempt to represent the 
approximate magnitude of each of the relevant, resolving answers to the QUD that 
licenses a particular interpretation of a many-utterance. The representations in the ANS 
are not modality specific; the ANS is a general-purpose quantity tracking or accumulating 
system that can represent, e.g. the approximate number of items in a set of physical 
objects, the approximate count of successive tones, accumulated seconds, etc. – but it 
does so imprecisely (Carey, 2009; Dehaene, 1997). As Lidz, et al., 2011 and Pietroski, et 
al., 2009 demonstrate, two well-characterized properties of these ANS representations 
can be leveraged to experimentally interrogate the proposed denotations of quantifiers. 
First, psychologists know that discriminating two magnitudes in the ANS follows a ratio-
dependent performance curve such that discriminability decreases as the ratio between 
two magnitudes approaches 1:1, i.e. the difficulty of discriminating two magnitudes that 
stand in the same difference ratio to each other will be about the same (e.g. 5 vs. 10 and 
10 vs. 20; Feigenson, Dehaene & Spelke, 2004). In addition, one’s ability to rapidly and 
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automatically individuate sets in parallel maxes out at about three sets (Carey, 2009; 
Halberda, Sires, & Feigenson, 2006).  
The ITT (Lidz, et al., 2011) states that competent speakers of a language are biased 
towards verifying the truth-values of a given linguistic utterance in a way that is 
consistent with a “canonical specification of truth-conditions” (p.227) (i.e. a semantic 
denotation). Given the known limits on ANS representations, Pietroski, et al. (2009) 
reasoned that participants’ patterns of responses to the three different kinds of trials 
exemplified in Figure 1-2 would help determine which of two functionally equivalent 
verification strategies, in (22) and (23), accurately describe the way in which participants 
verified “Most of the dots are yellow.” 
(22) Greater-than [#{x: Dots(x) & Yellow(x)}, #{x: Dots(x) & Yellow(x)}] 
(23) One-to-one-plus [{x: Dot(x) & Yellow(x)}, {x: Dot(x) & Yellow(x)}] 
The participants’ acceptance responses showed that they experienced increased difficulty 
assenting as the ratio between yellow and blue dots approached 1:1, regardless of whether 
the dots were scattered (as in Figure 1-2 A), paired off (as in Figure 1-2 B), or aligned 
and paired off (as in Figure 1-2 C); that is, participants’ responses followed the ratio 
dependent-effects of discriminability, suggesting they used a magnitude based 
verification strategy supported by the ANS ((22)) instead a perceptual matching strategy 
((23)), which would not have involved any representation of magnitude, and would 
therefore have been much easier and more accurate on displays like Figure 1-2 B and 
Figure 1-2 C.  
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In a follow-up experiment, Lidz, et al. (2011), further probed the verification of most-
utterances, by investigating whether most required only the individuation of the 
Quantified Set (e.g. yellow dots in these examples) as the strategy in (24) would suggest, 
or if each set on the trial needed to be individuated, as would be required in order to 
compute the strategy in (25). In addition to the ratio manipulation from Pietroski, et al. 
(2009), Lidz, et al. also manipulated the number different colored sets as illustrated in 
Figure 1-3, reasoning that given the known limits on parallel set individuation, 
performance would show decrements for trials with 3 or more sets if (25) was in fact the 
strategy participants used to verify “Most of the dots are yellow,” but not (24). 
(24) # of yellow dots > # of all dots - # of yellow dots 
(25) # yellow dots > # of red dots + # blue dots 
Figure 1-2. Example arrays from experiments designed to investigate the validity of the Interface 
Transparency Thesis with respect to the hypothesized verification strategy of most (adapted from Lidz, 
et al., (2011). 
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Participants in this experiment again showed the expected ratio-dependent 
decrements in discriminability, but no effects in their responses dependent on the number 
of different colored sets on a given trial. Lidz, et al. took this as evidence that the strategy 
adopted by participants did not require them to individuate each set on the trial, 
supporting the strategy given in (24) above. 
The results of Pietroski, et al. (2009) and Lidz, et al. (2011) together show that in the 
context of rapidly, visually presented stimuli, what psychologists know about the ANS 
can help adjudicate the validity of proposed semantic denotations. The experiments 
described in Chapter 4 similarly aim to leverage the ratio-dependent discriminability of 
ANS magnitude representations and limits on parallel set individuation in order to 
validate the relative, proportional denotation of many proposed in Chapter 2. In these 
experiments, both the ratio of the two magnitudes to be compared (e.g. the quantified set 
and the mean of all the sets) and the number of sets on a trial were manipulated in order 
to test whether participants who were asked to verify a many-utterance indeed attempted 
to individuate each set on the trial in order to compute the relevant mean, as the proposed 
denotation predicts. 
Figure 1-3. Example trials from Lidz, et al. (2011) showing a trial with just 3 different colored sets (left) 
and a trial with four different colored sets (right). 
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1.5. Overview of chapters 
This dissertation provides an account of the class of ambiguous, vague quantifiers 
exemplified by many, and provides some preliminary experimental evidence that: (i) the 
apparent ambiguity of many can in fact be reduced to pragmatic factors rather than 
distinct denotations, (ii) the apparent vagueness of many can also be attributed to 
pragmatic factors, rather than requiring some explicit change to the basic linguistic 
assumption of two-valued truth-conditions. The chapters that follow this introductory 
chapter are briefly summarized below. 
Chapter 2 contains the main theoretical proposal in this dissertation. It provides a 
description of all the pragmatic and semantic components used to account for the context 
sensitive behavior of many. These components include Discourse-trees, licensing QUDs, 
structured meanings to denote licensing QUDs, information structure-dependent Focus, a 
Focus operator at LF, and a decompositional degree-based semantics for many. To 
summarize, this account claims that: the apparent cardinal-proportional ambiguity, and 
the regular-reverse ambiguity arise in a principled, predictable way depending on the 
information structure of the preceding discourse, or context; and the vagueness of many 
arises from the contents of the comparison class defined by, or determined, by the 
licensing QUD, i.e. the information structure of the preceding discourse. 
Chapter 3 describes two experiments designed to test whether participants have 
access to the reverse interpretation via a particular prosodic contour (c.f. Büring 2003) 
i.e. whether distinct truth-conditions arise by virtue of emphasis (Focus) in the 
composition of many-utterances resulting either in the truth-values that arise from the 
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emphasis pattern that gives rise to the regular interpretation or the reverse interpretation. 
To test this, paragraphs were designed with information about proportions of entities that 
made either the truth-conditions of the regular interpretation or the reverse interpretation 
of a many-utterance true. Participants were asked to select the best summary statement (a 
many-utterance with italics consistent with either the regular or reverse interpretations, 
e.g. “Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize,” or “Many Scandinavians have 
won the Nobel Prize.”). In the first experiment, participants read these paragraphs and 
selected between the two many-utterances. In the second experiment participants heard 
audio recordings of the paragraphs and utterances. Assuming participants aim to 
summarize the paragraphs with utterances that evaluate to true, participants who only saw 
‘regular’ paragraphs should overwhelmingly choose to summarize the paragraphs with 
the many-utterance with italics consistent with a prosodic contour that hypothetically 
gives rise to the regular interpretation. Conversely, participants who only saw ‘reverse’ 
paragraphs should overwhelmingly choose the many-utterance with italics consistent with 
a prosodic contour that hypothetically gives rise to the reverse interpretation. These 
results failed to show reliable differences in the rate at which participants chose either the 
regular or reverse many-utterance, regardless of the modality of presentation. However, 
participants were reliably more confident when they chose the reverse utterance after 
reading the ‘reverse’ paragraph. Moreover, a post-hoc Optimality Theory-based analysis, 
suggest that certain semantic constraints on the interpretation of the subjects of the 
predicate in the many-utterance may interact with the information structure, in 
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determining which interpretations are available. These additional semantic factors are 
discussed, and further analyses taking them into account are sketched. 
Chapter 4 describes two experiments designed to test whether participants who were 
asked to verify many-utterances take alternatives in the context into account, and 
compare the proportions of visually presented alternatives in a ratio- and set number-
dependent way, as the relative, proportional denotation of many and the known limits of 
the ANS and parallel set individuation predict. To do so, these experiments were 
designed to force participants to perform this hypothesized comparison process using the 
noisy ANS representations of magnitude, by rapidly presenting (150-600ms) arrays with 
different colored dots (2-5 different colors depending on the trial) of varying sizes, either 
randomly scattered or grouped by color. The rapid presentation and large number of dots 
in each set (i.e. > 5) precluded counting, thereby forcing the use of the ANS and 
perceptual parallel set individuation, ensuring that both ratio- and set number-dependent 
effects in responses could be detected and used to infer the critical contextually 
determined relative proportionality of the proposed denotation for many. In a between-
subjects design, half of all participants were asked to verify “Most of the dots were blue,” 
and the other half “Many of the dots were blue.” Previous work (Lidz, et al., 2011; 
Pietroski, et al., 2009) has shown that when participants are asked to verify most, the 
number of different colors does not alter performance. However, the account of most 
hypothesized and supported by these authors does not posit the same kind of relative 
proportional meaning as the current account of many does. In short, in the same way that 
the truth-values of “Many Scandinavians won the Nobel Prize,” critically depend on the 
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numbers of other individuals of other nationalities who have won the Nobel Prize, the 
truth-values of “Many of the dots are blue,” depends on the number of dots of other 
colors as well. Therefore, it was hypothesized that verification of many, compared to 
most, would show differences in performance (acceptance rate) depending on the number 
of different colored sets present on a given trial. Specifically, participants’ ability and 
therefore willingness to accept the utterance should decrease as the number of different 
colored sets to be tracked increase, reflecting the perceptual systems’ limited ability to 
accurately differentiate more than about three sets at a time (Halberda, Sires, & 
Feigenson, 2006), thereby causing a decrease in accuracy for participants asked to verify 
many, unlike most. Indeed, across both experiments, participants’ willingness or ability to 
assent to “Many…” decreased as the number of dots in the Quantified Set and the 
average of the Alternative Sets approached equity, and as the number of different sets 
increased. Therefore, the results of these experiments support the claim that the 
underlying meaning of many requires the comparison of contextually defined quantities, 
and therefore the vagueness of many-utterances is attributable to this context-sensitivity. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the claims of the theoretical proposal in Chapter 2, and the 
experimental results from Chapters 3 and 4. It then concludes by synthesizing all these 
results and drawing the following conclusions: 
a. Positing a single proportional, degree-based denotation for many, accounts for the 
observed regular-reverse and cardinal-proportional ambiguities by assuming 
particular licensing discourses, the information structure of which can be captured 
by the structured meaning denotation of a particular licensing QUD. Experimental 
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evidence and a further OT analysis, however, suggest that the role of information 
structure and the contents thereof are not the sole determinants of which of the 
possible interpretations of many arise. Rather, the interpretation of a many-
utterance depends on constraints on semantic and pragmatic interpretation, 
syntactic configuration, and prosodic contouring. Therefore, assuming a single 
lexical entry for many may be a fruitful theoretical avenue to explore, but it will 
require much more work to define the full set of constraints that can adequately 
predict how and why a particular interpretation of many arises in a given utterance 
and discourse context. 
b. Positing a relative, proportional, degree-based denotation for many, accounts for 
the observed vagueness because the values of the proportions to be compared 
depend on the content of each of the relevant sets in the context – since the 
contents and cardinality in each of those sets, and the number of relevant sets will 
change depending on the context, there is no one set boundary value for the truth-
conditions of many. Experimental evidence supports this hypothesized context 
dependence by showing that participants do indeed attempt to individuate and 
estimate the cardinality of each set in a given perceptual context when asked to 
verify a many- but not a most-utterance. 
  
 - 39 - 
2. The pragmatics and semantics of many 
2.1. Overview of semantic accounts of many 
As Chapter 1 and previous semantic accounts of many (and related quantifiers like 
few, much, little) have observed, many is ambiguous, vague and most importantly context 
sensitive. Each of these characteristics has been explained in a variety of ways across 
different accounts. This section briefly reviews previous accounts’ observations and 
analyses of these characteristics. 
Ambiguity has appeared in several previous accounts of many in different forms. For 
example, Partee 1988 argued that there are in fact two distinct lexical entries of many – 
the cardinal and the proportional interpretation. The cardinal many, exemplified by the 
second conjunct in (1) and (2), according to Partee is denoted by (3). 
(1) Many linguists are women iff there are many women linguists. 
(2) If many men over 40 were there, then many men over 30 were there. 
(3) |𝐴 ∩ 𝐵| > 𝑛 
These truth-conditions of cardinal many can be paraphrased as “Many (A, B) is true just 
in case the cardinality of the intersection of A and B is greater than some contextually 
defined numerosity, or cardinality.” Thus, if the number of men over 40 counts as many, 
then so should the number of men over 30, since men over 30 are a proper subset of men 
over 40. 
Partee 1988 notes that the denotation in (2) is intersective and persistent (illustrated 
by the acceptability of (1) and (2) respectively assuming the denotation in (3)). However, 
there are several formal properties of generalized quantifiers that the above analysis does 
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not satisfy, thereby calling into question the status of many as a generalized quantifier 
within the logical framework of Barwise and Cooper (1981). Alternatively, Partee’s 1988 
proportional many, with the denotation in (4) does appear to have the desired properties 
(it is intersective and persistent), as exemplified by the unacceptability of (1) assuming 




 ≥ 𝑘 ; 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑙′ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒′𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
(5) If many voters in Amherst will vote for the candidate, then many voters in the US 
will vote for the candidate. 
Using these observations, Partee 1988 suggested that there are two syntactically and 
semantically distinct lexical entries for many: the proportional many that is a generalized 
quantifier ((4)), and the adjective-like cardinal many that is not a quantifier in the logical 
sense ((5)).6  
Another potential ambiguity, however, in the determiner-like many was observed in 
Westerståhl 1985. Westerståhl 1985 considers cases like (6), and proposes a denotation as 
in (7), subsequently coined the ‘reverse’ proportional denotation.  
(6) Context: Of a total of 81 Nobel Prize winners in literature, 14 come from 
Scandinavia.  




 ≥ 𝑘 ; 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒′𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
                                                 
6 While there may well be two semantically distinct types of many, issues surrounding the interpretation 
and use of the adjectival many are beyond the scope of this dissertation proposal. The remainder of this 
proposal will focus on the generalized quantifier-typed determiner many, which it is claimed has an 
inherently proportional meaning that can surface with a variety of interpretations.  
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If we interpret (6) with the denotation in (7), we can paraphrase the truth-conditions 
of (6) as “Many of the winners of the Nobel Prize in literature were Scandinavians.” 
Hence, the name for this interpretation arises from the fact that the arguments appear to 
compose with the quantifier in the reverse order of how they appear in the surface syntax. 
Taken together these accounts propose three distinct denotations to capture three 
observed interpretations of many-utterances. Many appears to be quite ambiguous indeed.  
Yet, the denotation proposed in Westerståhl 1985, like those in Partee 1988, questions 
the status of many as a generalized quantifier because it is not conservative (Barwise & 
Cooper, 1981; Romero 2015a). Moreover, these three distinct denotations do not offer a 
theoretically parsimonious account of the single lexical item many. Does this reverse 
interpretation have a denotation distinct from both (3) and (4) above – a three-way lexical 
ambiguity – or is (7) derived from (4) via a type-shifting rule, implying some kind of 
regular polysemy? The observation that many, few, much, and little are context sensitive 
has given rise to a number of accounts that all attempt to reconcile the apparent 
ambiguity and vagueness of these quantifiers. In these approaches, the context is assumed 
to contain information that specifies a comparison class of relevant alternatives to the 
quantified set (e.g. Americans and Andorrans compared to Scandinavians).  
In addition, previous accounts have also noted the seemingly vague use of many. 
Here vagueness is taken to indicate the difficulty in pinning down exactly what counts as 
many, i.e. what is the cardinality of a set or proportion that counts as many (Kennedy 
2011; 2019). Several accounts (e.g. Cohen 2001; Romero, 2015a; 2015b), have attributed 
this difficulty to the observed context sensitivity of many. In short, vagueness arises from 
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the fact that interlocutors may disagree on exactly what groups of objects are being 
considered, i.e. what counts as relevant members of the comparison class (c.f. Rooth 
1992; Szabolcsi 1986; 2010), which is a critical aspect of accounts such as Cohen 2001, 
Romero 2015b and, indeed, the account developed in this chapter. Others have also 
adopted a gradable, degree-based approach, positing that the vagueness of many can be 
captured with the gradient effects that arise from the continuous, infinite scale of rational 
numbers that form the degrees of many in such accounts (e.g. Romero 2015a; 2015b; Solt 
2009; 2015) 
To preview the account developed in this chapter, the context- (or Focus-) sensitivity 
of many is a critical characteristic. Specifically, context sensitivity, refers to the way in 
which the meaning of many – its truth-conditions and felicity conditions – observably 
change dependent on factors in the discourse context. For example, Cohen 2001, 
Herburger 1997 and 2000, and Romero 2015a and 2015b all acknowledged the role of 
phonological emphasis in disambiguating between the interpretations of many. In short, 
the underlying differences in discourses which license particular patterns of phonological 
emphasis give rise to different values used during the composition and interpretation of 
many. Under these accounts, there is no need to posit lexical ambiguity as proposed by 
Partee 1988 or Westerståhl 1985, instead this context sensitivity determines the different 
derived meanings.  
In Cohen 2001, this phonological emphasis (marked by boldface in the examples 
below) gives rise to different alternative sets (c.f. (9a) and (11a) – the set that contains all 
the relevant alternatives to the focused phrase. For example, in (9) reasonable relevant 
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comparisons to cooks might be waiters, bartenders, and so on, whereas the relevant 
comparisons for (11) might be cooks that did not apply. These comparison classes in turn 
give rise to meanings analogous to the regular proportional and reverse proportional 
meanings, (10) and (8), respectively. Thus, the meaning of the reverse proportional 
interpretation in (8) can be paraphrased as in (9), whereas the regular proportional 
interpretation in (10) can be paraphrased as in (11). The critical difference between 
these interpretations according to Cohen 2001 is the different comparison classes ((9a) 
and (11a)) that arise depending on different phonological emphasis – the same semantic 
denotation of many underlies both interpretations. 
(8) Many cooks applied.      reverse interpretation 
(9) Many that applied were cooks.  
a. Cooks compared to: {waiters, bakers, bartenders, etc.} 
However, as Herburger 1997 and Cohen 2001, point out, this interpretation is actually 
only available with emphasis on cooks, thus (10) can only be paraphrased as (11) and not 
(9). 
(10) Many cooks applied.     regular interpretation 
(11) Many cooks were cooks that applied. 
a. Cooks that applied compared to {cooks that did not apply} 
Cohen’s proposal nicely reduces the ambiguity of many to pragmatic factors, 
motivating the account ultimately pursued in Section 2.3. In addition, his proposal of a 
relative, proportional denotation, given in (12) (where 𝜙 and 𝜓 indicate the arguments to 
be saturated by each constituent phrase in the many-utterance), in part captures the 
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vagueness of many: what counts as many shifts depending on the contents of the 








Therefore, context-sensitivity underlies both the ambiguity and vagueness of many in 
Cohen’s approach. However, Cohen’s account does not address the cardinal 
interpretation. Moreover, the denotation proposed in Cohen 2001 like Westerståhl 1985 is 
not conservative, again calling into question the status of many as a generalized 
quantifier.7  
In another account, Romero 2015b derives a reverse interpretation of many from a 
conservative, generalized quantifier-typed denotation of many. To do so, Romero 2015b 
adopts a degree semantics approach, decomposing many into a generalized quantifier 
over degrees and a degree phrase, the denotations for which are given in (13) and (14), 
respectively: 
(13) ⟦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝⟧ =  𝜆 𝑑𝑑 . 𝜆 𝑃〈𝑒,𝑡〉. 𝜆 𝑄〈𝑒,𝑡〉. (|𝑃 ∩ 𝑄|: |𝑃|) ≥ 𝑑 
(14) ⟦𝑃𝑂𝑆⟧ =  𝜆 𝑄〈〈𝑑,𝑡〉,𝑡〉 . 𝜆𝑃〈𝑑,𝑡〉 . 𝑃 ∈ 𝑄 . 𝐿〈〈𝑑𝑡,𝑡〉〈𝑑,𝑡〉〉 (𝑄) ⊆ 𝑃 
This notion of POS is borrowed from accounts of gradable adjectives like tall, where the 
scale of degrees might be inches or feet. For many, the scale of degrees is assumed to be 
rational numbers. Thus, in adopting a degree-based approach, Romero 2015b captures the 
                                                 
7 The debate concerning whether many should in fact be considered a generalized quantifier is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. This dissertation, like Romero 2015 a and 2015b assumes that many is indeed a 
generalized quantifier, and should therefore have a conservative denotation. 
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vagueness of many by maintaining the relative proportional meaning of Cohen 2001, but 
also placing this comparison process on a continuous, infinite scale.  
Romero 2015b also follows Cohen 2001 (and Herburger 2000) in using emphasis to 
derive the reverse interpretation of many, which she instantiates as association with Focus 
(Rooth 1992). This Focus can either associate with a phrase internal to the phrase in 
which many was base-generated, or with a phrase external to the base-generated many-
phrase. In the former situation, the reverse interpretation arises as shown in the derivation 
in (15): 
(15) Mary has read many books by Douglas F/CT. 
LF: [ [POS C] ] [1[Mary has read [t1-many books by Douglas F/CT]] ~C] 
Comparison class derivation:  
⟦𝐶⟧ ⊆ {𝜆𝑑′.  (
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝒅𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒍𝒂𝒔, 𝑥)}⋂{𝑥: 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦,  𝑥}|:
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝒅𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒍𝒂𝒔, 𝑥)}|
) ≥ 𝑑, 
𝜆𝑑′.  (
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝒎𝒄𝒅𝒂𝒘𝒏, 𝑥)}⋂{𝑥: 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦,  𝑥}|:
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝒎𝒄𝒅𝒂𝒘𝒏, 𝑥)}|
) ≥ 𝑑 … } 
𝐿(⟦𝐶⟧) ⊆ 𝜆𝑑′.  (
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝒅𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒍𝒂𝒔, 𝑥)}⋂{𝑥: 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦,  𝑥}|:
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝒅𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒍𝒂𝒔, 𝑥)}|
) ≥ 𝑑  
In contrast, when Focus associates with a phrase external to the base-generated many-
phrase, the regular interpretation arises, as in (16): 
(16) Mary F/CT has read many books by Douglas. 
LF: [ [POS C] ] [1[Mary F/CT has read [t1-many books by Douglas]] ~C] 
Comparison class derivation:  
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⟦𝐶⟧ ⊆ {𝜆𝑑′.  (
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑠, 𝑥)}⋂{𝑥: 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑(𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒚,  𝑥}|:
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑠, 𝑥)}|
) ≥ 𝑑, 
𝜆𝑑′.  (
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑠, 𝑥)}⋂{𝑥: 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑(𝒋𝒐𝒉𝒏,  𝑥}|:
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑠, 𝑥)}|
) ≥ 𝑑 … } 
𝐿(⟦𝐶⟧) ⊆ 𝜆𝑑′.  (
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑠, 𝑥)}⋂{𝑥: 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑(𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒚,  𝑥}|:
|{𝑥: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘(𝑥)⋀𝑏𝑦(𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑠, 𝑥)}|
) ≥ 𝑑  
The truth-conditions derived by this semantics can be paraphrased as: Mary has read 
many books by Douglas just in case the degree of books by Douglas that Mary has read is 
in the comparison class and is a superset of the degree of the neutral segment. Critically, 
the degree of the neutral segment depends on the contents of the comparison class in the 
context, as the difference in the elements of ⟦𝐶⟧ in (15) and (16) illustrate. Thus, in 
Romero 2015b like Cohen 2001, both the regular and reverse interpretations of 
proportional many can be derived from one conservative denotation simply by assuming 
different Focus-marked patterns of emphasis. While Romero 2015b does address the 
cardinal interpretation of many, she posits a related but distinct denotation for it, given in 
(17): 
(17) ⟦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑⟧ =  𝜆 𝑑𝑑. 𝜆 𝑃〈𝑒,𝑡〉. 𝜆 𝑄〈𝑒,𝑡〉. (|𝑃 ∩ 𝑄|) ≥ 𝑑 
One novel claim in Romero 2015b is that there is an analogous reverse interpretation for 
cardinal many, just as there is for proportional many, derived via the same Focus 
machinery as above.  
Finally, Romero 2015b extends this degree-based approach to most, following on 
from work by Hackl 2009 (see also Solt 2015), claiming that most is simply the 
superlative form of many. In short, the composition and derivation of a most-utterance 
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would proceed as it does for many, save for one critical difference: instead of POS, the 
degree morpheme is now -est, denoted as in (18). 
(18) ⟦−𝑒𝑠𝑡⟧ =  𝜆 𝑄〈𝑑𝑡,𝑡〉. 𝜆 𝑃〈𝑑,𝑡〉: 𝑃 ∈  𝑄. ∀𝑄 ∈ 𝑄[𝑄 ≠ 𝑃 → 𝑄 ⊂ 𝑃] 
This denotation, when composed with a many-phrase like (15) would result in truth-
conditions that can be paraphrased as: Mary has read most books by Douglas just in case 
the degree of books by Douglas read by Mary is a proper superset of every degree set of 
books read by other people (i.e. Q must be distinct from and larger than all the other 
degree sets in P). This account predicts that not only should most have analogous regular 
and reverse readings, it may also have a cardinal and proportional distinction, depending 
on which denotation of many is used. Romero 2015b uses cross-linguistic data to show 
that most in principle does have both regular and reverse readings but apparently only for 
the cardinal denotation of many. However, for syntactic reasons English does not allow 
Focus to associate with a phrase inside the DP where -est was base generated, thereby 
preventing the reverse reading from surfacing. Thus most, like many, is context sensitive, 
but for syntactic reasons most might not have exactly the same profile of interpretations 
as many.  
As Table 2-1 summarizes, while some theorists have posited distinct denotations to 
capture the different observed meanings of many, others have noted that pragmatic 
factors like Focus seem to disambiguate between meanings in principled ways. For 
example, Romero 2015b does somewhat reduce the proposed ambiguity of many, but she 
still assumes a lexical distinction between the proportional and cardinal interpretations of 
many. Without a clear description of how these two manys are related or derived from 
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each other, this apparent ambiguity still poses a challenged to the theory of reference (see 
Parsons 1973). Therefore, after reviewing pragmatic machinery that may offer a more 
principled viewpoint on the role of Focus and information structure in deriving 
alternatives sets, the latter sections of this chapter propose a key innovation, adopting the 
degree-based approach in Romero 2015b that is able to derive the reverse proportional, 
regular cardinal, and reverse cardinal interpretations of many, all from one regular, 
relative, proportional, degree-based denotation of many. 
Table 2-1. This table summarizes the accounts reviewed in Section 2.3 and shows how each account 
captures the ambiguity and vagueness on many. 
 Lexical ambiguity? Vagueness? 
Partee 1988 




Yes, relevant comparison ‘contextually 
defined’ 
Westerståhl 1985 
Yes – regular and 
reverse denotations 
? 
Cohen 2001 No * 
Yes, encoded as a relative comparison 
of proportions saturated by a 
comparison class defined by Focus-
marking on the utterance 
 
Romero 2015b 
Yes – cardinal and 
proportional 
denotations 
Yes, encoded as a relative 
comparison of proportional degree 
sets on a continuous, infinite scale; 
as in Cohen, the contents of these 
degree sets are saturated by a 
comparison class defined by Focus-
marking on the utterance 
* For the purposes of this dissertation; However, Cohen 2001 does discuss an absolute denotation, 
similar to those proposed by Partee 1988, where the proportion on the right side of the relation is an 
absolute value determined by context, e.g. what counts as many on average. 
2.2. Pragmatic factors 
As has been discussed above, many can take on several different interpretations, and 
at least some of these interpretations appear to depend on pragmatic factors like where 
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emphasis appears in the utterance and what counts as relevant alternatives to the 
emphasized phrases in a particular context. While several of the semantic accounts in the 
previous section point to these pragmatic factors, they stop short of laying out formal 
mechanisms for capturing the behavior of these factors in a principled way. Below are 
reviewed several pieces of literature addressing in turn, a formal theory of discourse 
structure that then enables a description of what kinds of information can be contained in 
a discourse (Section 2.2.1), and how the structure and content of a discourse can specify 
relevant alternatives and license a particular interpretation of a many-utterance. Then 
Section 2.2.2 discusses how information structure licenses phonological emphasis, and 
Section 2.2.3 discusses the semantic effects of information structure, or Focus, 
introducing a semantic approach to the denotation of questions, which is a critical piece 
of the analysis in Section 2.3 and the main theoretical innovation of this dissertation. 
2.2.1. Formal accounts of discourse: Structures and Participants 
This dissertation follows other researchers in making certain simplifying assumptions 
in order to formally describe discourses (c.f. Ginzburg 1997), namely: a turn consists of 
only one move (either one assertion or one question) – this model does not have the 
machinery to explain how a turn with more than one move can be accommodated into a 
participant’s representation of the discourse; furthermore, perfect communication is 
achieved between discourse participants after every turn, i.e. the content of each turn is 
faithfully accommodated by all participants.  
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A discourse participant, intuitively, is anyone involved in a discourse. For simplicity, 
assume there are only ever two people involved in a dialogue, so that at any given time 
one is the hearer and one is the speaker. The D(iscourse)-trees shown below reflect an 
utterance of the answer to an immediately preceding question. According to Ginzburg 
1997, each participant is endowed with the ability to represent key elements that together 
serve to define the formal structure of a discourse, depicted in Figure 2-1. The 
participant’s GAMEBOARD includes elements about the discourse structure and where 
the participants sit in that structure, including what has been discussed previously in the 
discourse (FACTS, in Figure 2-1) what is currently under discussion (QUD in Figure 
2-1), what was just uttered (LATEST-MOVE in Figure 2-1), and also a host of more 
general things pertaining to their internal UNPUBLICIZED MENTAL STATE (e.g. their 
own state of knowledge, their goals in the discourse, as well as potentially representations 
taken from other cognitive systems, like the ANS.).  
Figure 2-1.  Representation of what kinds of information a discourse participant is able to represent. Each 
of these stores could be thought of as a kind of stack (à la Roberts 1996/2012, a.o.). Adapted from 
Ginzburg 1997. 
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Using the terminology above, we can define the structure of a discourse based on the 
information the participant is able to track, i.e. the discourse from their perspective. To 
illustrate this structure, this proposal adopts the formal representation of D-trees (c.f. 
Büring 2003; Krifka 2001; see also Cohen & Krifka 2014). Referring to Figure 2-2, 
discourses can be thought of as tree-like structures, with the highest node representing the 
over-arching goal or the initiating question of the discourse, and each line emanating 
from it representing a possible move (a sub-question or an answer) that would narrow the 
range of possible answers to that larger question. In this way, each node – a ‘state’ in the 
discourse – can be thought of as reflecting what has been uttered before in the discourse, 
encoded by the elements of the participant’s GAMEBOARD and MENTAL STATE as 
described above. As another turn is taken, the contents of that turn (i.e. the FACTS 
asserted, a QUD raised, etc.) are accommodated into the participants GAMEBAORD, 
and the participant ‘moves’ to the next state in the discourse. Every turn links a question-
answer pair, but the question may well be implicit (Stalnaker 1978). Moreover, implicit 
moves may be accommodated into previously built parts of the D-tree in order to support, 
e.g. inferences about a participant’s intended QUD. In short, this accommodation process 
Figure 2-2 A generic D-tree as it relates to what a participant can represent. 
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is a formal means of representing how speakers coordinate their D-trees when, for 
example, things like Gricean quantity implicatures are calculated. Thus, the content of 
each state and each turn naturally can be thought of as coming from the linguistic (or 
otherwise) information uttered (or implied), as discussed further below. 
This formalism also provides the machinery necessary to define the felicity 
conditions of question-answer pairs. For example, relevance can be defined via the 
structure of the D-tree. If we accept the stipulation that only downward moves are 
allowed, we can adapt Roberts’ 1996/2012 definition of relevance to a D-tree structure as 
follows: only nodes immediately dominated by the current state are relevant to the QUD 
of that state, because they are the possible answers to that QUD and the QUDs of the 
states dominating it.  
Building off of this notion, relevant questions can also be resolving questions. As 
Ginzburg 1997 observes, resolvedness actually emerges as a presupposition derived from 
the goal(s) of the participant, e.g. “I wondered about q, so I asked q. She told me that … 
and …etc. This was true. The question q is now resolved, so now I know q.” (p. 25). 
Thus, resolving answers are relevant answers in the D-tree that lead to the participant 
knowing some fact that they previously wondered about. Implicit in Ginzburg’s 
discussion of this issue is the idea that to wonder about something somehow reflects the 
participant’s goals, but Ginzburg does not elaborate much on what goals can be, and 
exactly how goals are manifested in the participant’s representation of the discourse so 
that they are able to give rise to such resolvedness presuppositions.  
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van Rooy (2003) proposes that this context dependency of resolvedness can be 
modeled by defining an expected utility function for actions after learning some fact and 
assuming rational agents want to maximize utility. He then defines a strict order over 
information that then orders all relevant answers to a question in terms of utility in the 
context of a particular decision problem (which he assumes is defined by the Hamblin-
style partition semantics of questions, Hamblin 1973). Thus, in effect, questions set up 
decision problems that have solutions in the form of answers ranked according to the 
utility of the information they provide relative to the decision problem. 
So, goals can be thought of as specifying a particular utility function that ranks 
possible answers. In this way, they play a critical role in the account developed in 
Section 2.3. On the one hand, goals determine the appropriate granularity of an answer. 
That is, they license either a many-utterance or an exact cardinality answer to a “How 
many” question. Additionally, this dissertation posits that goals – in coordination with the 
QUD and the participants’ world knowledge – order the possible answers denoted by a 
“How many” question, essentially delimiting what counts as relevant alternatives to the 
quantified phrase; the comparison class. For example, if a goal specifies that the speaker 
wants information about the three most common, large land-dwelling mammals that live 
in China, rats will be ranked very low in the scale of resolving answers, because they are 
not large for land-dwelling mammals. In short, goals provide a critical tool for defining 
why many-utterances can be relevant, resolving answers to “How many” questions and 
why particular potential answers are not considered relevant alternatives, and therefore 
should not enter into the derivation of meaning for many-utterances.  
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In sum, elements of the participants’ MENTAL STATE and the D-tree affect whether 
a many-utterance is felicitous (or whether a more precise answer is sought), and how 
information relevant to the semantic denotation of many may be represented. The next 
sections discuss the phonological and semantic effects of licensing QUDs, and how the 
values of the variables in the semantic denotation of many are selected from the 
information structure of the preceding discourse, defined by relevant, resolving answers. 
The way these values enter into the composition of the truth-conditions of a many-
utterance is also discussed. Then, the final section considers how these mechanisms work 
in tandem to explain how the various phenomena observed in Section 2.1 arise. 
2.2.2. Formal accounts of Focus and Topic: The phonological signaling of 
information structure 
Before turning to the semantic denotations of licensing QUDs and many, some 
literature on Focus and Topic is reviewed, in order to more clearly define what these 
terms mean and explicate their role in this account. The broad consensus in the literature 
is that the notion of Focus (and its counterpart, Topic) are closely linked to the 
information structure of the preceding discourse (Schwarzschild 1999; Wagner 2012; 
a.o.). In various theories, Focus can be marked with a particular prosodic contour, a 
syntactic location, or a particle (Büring 2003; Choi 1996; Hendriks 2004; Herburger 
2000; Tomaszewicz 2016; Wagner 2012); in some theories these markers effect structural 
changes at LF (Choi 1996; Tomaszewicz 2016; Wagner 2012), in others they introduce 
new material into the semantic composition (e.g. von Fintel 1994; Krifka 1995; Rooth 
1992). Some accounts of the effects of Focus on interpretation treat these issues as one in 
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the same (Büring 2003; Rooth 1992); others separate the prosodic from the semanto-
syntactic (Hendriks 2004; Szabolcsi 1986; Tomaszewicz 2016). The account developed 
here assumes a close relationship between prosody and information structure. However, 
none of the major implications of this account are compromised if this relationship turns 
out to be more tenuous than described here.  
According to Schwarzschild 1999 all pragmatically new information in the discourse 
must be Focus-marked, but not all Focus-marked constituents represent new information. 
To formally achieve this result Schwarzschild proposes two competing, violable 
constraints, and shows that they operate in tandem, with GIVENNESS outranking AVOIDF: 
GIVENNESS: If a constituent is not F[ocus]-marked, it must be GIVEN. 
AVOIDF: F[ocus]-mark as little as possible, without violating GIVENNESS. 
Therefore, Schwarzschild 1999 concludes that Focus-marking can be indicative of 
pragmatically new information, but sometimes appears on old information in the absence 
of any ‘newer’ information to mark. This conclusion suggests that Focus is one 
mechanism by which the congruity of question-answer pairs in a discourse can be 
assessed, and particular prosodic contours8 (e.g. Büring’s 2003 A- or B-accents) belie this 
underlying relation to information structure in the discourse. 
Büring 2003 shows that the B-accent pattern associated with a Contrastive Topic 
(CT) indicates a particular ‘strategy’ in the discourse (Jackendoff 1972) – more 
                                                 
8 In English; in other languages, Focus can be realized with particles (e.g. Japanese; Kuno 1973) or 
scrambling (German & Korean: Choi 1996; Hungarian: Kiss 2008). These facts provide hints about the 
syntactic behavior of Focus at LF and how it interacts with other scope-taking elements as discussed further 
below and in the Discussion of Chapter 3. 
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specifically, CT-marking indicates the form of the question (implicit or explicit) that 
must precede the utterance in the D-tree (Stalnaker 1978), henceforth the licensing QUD. 
Formally, Büring defines a function [ ]CT that when applied to a declarative utterance with 
CT-marking generates a set of alternative questions (the ‘CT-value’) that can be said to 
license that utterance (see also the alternative semantics of Rooth 1992). For example, the 
different CT-markings on (19a) and (19b) below belie differently structured D-trees, 
indicating that different strategies are being pursued in the two different discourses (but 
both discourses are answering the same over-arching question, “Who read what?”). 
(19) a. Q: What did Mary read?   b. Q: What did Mary read? 
  A: MARYCT read Harry Potter.     A: Mary read [HARRY POTTER] CT 
 
CT-value of (19a) A: {What did Mary read, What did Fred read…}  
CT-value of (19b) A: {Did Mary read Harry Potter, Did Mary read Lord of the 
Rings…} 
That is, the question can be thought of as ‘generating’ a particular structure of D-tree, 
and the CT-marking picks out some sub-tree in the D-tree. So again, overt phonological 
stress marking is licensed by, or is anaphoric to (c.f. Rooth 1992, von Fintel 1994), 
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According to von Fintel 1994, the context sensitivity can be equated to the Focus-
marking in an answer, which is anaphoric to elements in the preceding discourse context. 
According to von Fintel 1994, 2004 and Rooth 1992, the Focus operator ~ takes two 
arguments, the constituent or element marked with the B-accent and a proposition and 
produces a set of alternatives to that proposition. For example, in (20), the Focus-marking 
on Mary combined with the presence of the ~ operator at LF produces the anaphoric 
variable C that is now looking for an antecedent of the form ‘x cut Bill down to size: 
(20) Q: Who cut Mary down to size? 
A: [Mary]F cut Bill down to size.  
 
Similarly, von Fintel’s Topic operator ≈ again takes the same two arguments and now 
the anaphoric variable C is looking for an antecedent that is a subset of the set of 
propositions of the form ‘Φ Ps’ (e.g., ‘John Ps’ in (21)). 
(21) Q: What did John do? 
A: [He]T [went home]F.  
Therefore, Contrastive Topic of the kind discussed by Büring 2003 occurs when 
Focus occurs under Topic in the LF of an utterance, as in (22), now there is an anaphor 
A at LF: 
 
A at LF: 
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looking for a set of subsets of the set of propositions of the form ‘John gets to school in 
manner x.’: 
(22) Q: How do students around here get to school? 
A: [[John]F]T usually [walks]F 
Where C14 = {p: ∃x (p= John gets to school in manner x.)} 
Note that this amounts to the same set of propositions derived by Büring’s 2003 [ ]CT 
function, .  
In the account developed below,  
To summarize, phonological realizations of emphasis belie the underlying 
representation of the speaker’s information structures in a discourse: what FACTS they 
think they are introducing as new to the discourse, and what accommodated FACTS 
(from the comparison class generated by the licensing QUD) they wish to contrast or re-
raise. As we will see below, these are important constructs for the interpretation of many-
utterances, but as von Fintel 1994 and 2004 argue the apparent link between pragmatic 
concepts like information structure and quantifiers is not the result of the 
grammaticalized encoding of pragmatic information in the semantic denotation of 
quantifiers, but is instead the result of coincidental anaphoric reference to the same types 
A at LF: 
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of information in the discourse, via the ~ operator at LF. For example, he proposes that 
Focus-marked constituents are anaphoric to the same discourse information as quantifier 
domains (the sister of the quantifier in its base-generated position). von Fintel 1994 
shows that this apparent correspondence between Focus-marked elements and the 
quantifier domains is a mere coincidence, licensed by the underlying pragmatic 
information structure of the discourse, but that no reference to Focus should be necessary 
in the semantic machinery of quantifiers.  
The analysis in Section 2.3 continues in this vein, positing that the prosodic B-accent 
is one way of signaling the presence of Focus-sensitive interpretations, in a spoken 
discourse (Büring 2003). The Focus-sensitive reading is engendered by the ~ operator at 
LF that introduces contents from the information structure in the discourse context into 
the composition (von Fintel 1994; 2004); its presence and effects are detectable just when 
the information structure gives rise to new or contrastive information (Krifka 1995; 
Schwarzschild 1999). However, accounts such as von Fintel’s and Rooth’s all face 
questions about how the contents from the discourse in fact compose with the rest of the 
utterance in the meta-language (e.g. lambda-functions). The following section introduces 
the notion of structured meanings to solve this problem and offers a transparent link 
between licensing QUDs and Focus-marking. Then the following section describes the 
novel account of the regular-reverse ambiguity proposed in this dissertation. 
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2.2.3. The Structured Meaning Denotation of a question: A formal semantic 
account of licensing QUDs of Focus 
As mentioned above, each state in a discourse can be reached by some kind of move, 
and the contents of that state can seemingly enter into the composition of the utterance, 
but in order for this pragmatic machinery to interface with the linguistic content of that 
move, the propositional content of each node must take a particular form. Many of the 
pragmatic approaches summarized above assume a propositional structure to the elements 
of the set denoting a question meaning (as in (19) above), following Hamblin 1973). 
However, the analysis developed in this dissertation seeks to develop a Krazterian-style 
denotation for use in a compositional derivation, i.e. lambda calculus functions. So, in 
order to interface with this denotation, the linguistic information of each turn must also 
be in the form of functions. To this end, this account adopts the structured meaning 
account of question denotations advocated in Krifka 2001 (see also Aloni, et al., 2002 for 
a similar approach). Under this account, the denotation of a question is a tuple comprised 
of the background function (a function that essentially defines the domain of the 
question) and the restrictor (a set of individuals, or the range of the function). An 
example is given in (23): 
(23) Which books did Mary read? =  
<λ x . Mary read x, BOOKS> 
Using the example (23), we can see that the meaning of a constituent question is 
simply a function, and the possible answers can be derived by applying each of the 
elements in the restrictor set, BOOKS, to the function. As an example, assume that the 
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only elements of READ are Harry Potter and Lord of the Rings, then the possible 
answers would be {[Mary read Harry Potter.], [Mary read Lord of the Rings.]}. Note that 
these possible answers are propositionally analogous to the set of questions derived using 
the [ ]CT function in Büring 2003, when applied to the utterance “Mary read Harry 
PotterCT,” as in (24).  
(24) [Mary read Harry PotterCT.]CT =  
{ ⟨𝜆 𝑥 . 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑥, 𝐻𝑃⟩, ⟨𝜆 𝑥 . 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑥, 𝐿𝑂𝑇𝑅⟩ }
 
Figure 2-3. The D-tree for the discourse described in (19) and (24). 
Büring 2003 does not speculate on how exactly this [ ]CT function determines these 
values (Rooth 1992 treats them as presuppositions), but in the analysis proposed here the 
function in the structured meaning of the licensing QUD is defined relative to the goals of 
the speaker, and in turn generates the structure of the D-tree; the terminal nodes of the 
tree are populated by the members of the restrictor set: the relevant, resolving answers.  
Furthermore, the account developed here follows Krifka 1995 (see also Aloni, et al., 
2002), by assuming that the denotation of the Focus operator ~ could also be a structured 
meaning, making the link between licensing QUDs and the interpretation of Focus in 
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Focus operators (e.g. covert ~ or only), partition the semantic representation of an 
utterance into a background and a focused element. Adapting Krifka’s notation, the 
structured meaning of an utterance like (25) with the prosodic marker of Focus here 
signaled by bolded text would be as in (26). 
(25) Mary read Harry Potter. 
(26) ~(〈λ x . Mary read x〉, 𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑆) =
 〈λ x . Mary read x〉 (𝐻𝑃), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑃 ∈ 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑆 
In other words, the Focus operator ~ partitions the elements of the utterance into a 
background function (λ x . Mary read x) and a Focus set, and when the background 
function is applied to the set, it derives a set of functions, one of which is the denotation 
of the utterance itself, with the Focus-marking serving to signal this set membership. 
Note that (26) is exactly the same structured meaning given by the licensing QUD of (25) 
in (23) above, suggesting that licensing QUDs and Focus are one in the same 
phenomenon. 
The account developed below adopts structured meanings to denote the licensing 
QUDs that give rise to the particular information structure that in turn gives rise to 
particular interpretation of a many-utterance. This is the major theoretical innovation of 
the account developed in this dissertation. By virtue of representing the licensing QUDs 
in the preceding discourse as structured meanings, the phenomenon referred to as Focus, 
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can be reduced to or thought of solely in terms of the information structure of the 
preceding discourse.9  
To summarize, Focus-marking, for example Büring’s B-accent in English, can signal 
new information in the discourse. Focus, implemented as a covert operator (~) at LF 
denoted as a structured meaning of the immediately preceding licensing QUD introduces 
a comparison class to the composition of a many-utterance, optionally resulting in the B-
accent during pronunciation (Büring 2003; Krifka 1995; Rooth 1992). The comparison 
class is the set of relevant, resoling answers to the licensing QUD (Roberts 
1996/2012;van Rooy2003; or congruent answers from Aloni, et al., 2002). Hence, Focus 
is licensed by a particular information structure in the preceding discourse context, 
because it is that information structure. In combining these formal tools, the analysis 
developed below provides formally compatible antecedents for the anaphoric ~ operator 
(i.e. propositions with unbound variables) and offers a formal explanation of the close 
relationship between discourse information structure and Focus, as well as how the 
various interpretations of many-utterances are derived from one denotation of many. 
                                                 
9 Assuming that structured meanings can denote licensing QUDs and the semantic structure of Focus, 
suggests that the semantic and pragmatic effects of Focus may simply emerge from the composition of an 
utterance in the context of a particular discourse with a particular information structure. While this 
dissertation leaves further exploration of this issue for other researchers, structured meaning representations 
of Focus could also help disentangle issues of how Focus is marked (prosodically or syntactically) from the 
interpretive effects of Focus explored here (see Hendriks 2004, Hendriks & de Hoop 2001 for other 
suggestions on how to approach this issue). Since this is not the primary aim of this dissertation this issue is 
left aside, and the assumption is adopted that the prosodic B-accent is a reliable marker of the kind of 
Contrastive Topic Focus critical to the regular-reverse ambiguity investigated in this chapter; but 
considering the results of the experiments in Chapter 3, this may be a faulty assumption generally. 
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2.3. Putting it all together: A formal pragmatic-semantic account of many 
This section outlines an account of how the regular and reverse proportional 
interpretations of many can be derived from the same underlying semantic denotation, 
then it extends this account to derive the cardinal interpretation from the same 
proportional denotation, thereby reducing the lexical ambiguity of many to purely 
pragmatic factors. This proposal draws on observations reviewed above (Cohen 2001; 
Herburger 1997; 2000; Romero 2015a; 2015b) that different patterns of prosodic 
emphasis, assumed to mark Focus, differentially give rise to distinct interpretations of 
many. Moreover, the account proposed here follows the accounts reviewed above in 
using Focus to derive multiple interpretations from one denotation. However, the account 
proposed here innovates on the previous accounts by showing that it is possible to derive 
all four of the proposed interpretations of many from one single denotation, by integrating 
the notion of Focus, how it relates to the information structure of a discourse (critically 
including the participants goals and internal knowledge states), and the licensing QUD in 
a discourse. 
The analysis below assumes the denotation of many and the silent degree morpheme 
POS in (27) and (28), inspired by Romero 2015b, but with minor adjustments motivated 
by a fully articulated semantic composition (see Figure 2-6). Specifically, the order of 
the arguments in ⟦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝⟧ was altered so that the degree argument remains 
unsaturated until its composition with ⟦𝑃𝑂𝑆 𝐶⟧ since one major claim here is that the 
value of that degree variable comes from the comparison class derived from the discourse 
information structure, introduced by ~ at LF. 
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(27) ⟦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝⟧ =  𝜆 𝑃〈𝑒,𝑡〉. 𝜆 𝑄〈𝑒,𝑡〉. 𝜆 𝑑𝑑 . (|𝑃 ∩ 𝑄|: |𝑃|) ≥ 𝑑 
(28) ⟦𝑃𝑂𝑆⟧ =  𝜆 𝑄〈〈𝑑,𝑡〉,𝑡〉 . 𝜆𝑃〈𝑑,𝑡〉 . 𝑃 ∈ 𝑄 . 𝐿〈〈𝑑𝑡,𝑡〉〈𝑑,𝑡〉〉 (𝑄) ⊆ 𝑃 
For illustration, the following analysis will make reference to the data points in (29), 
where emphasis is marked by boldface and subscripted F/CT, the truth-conditions that 
arise based on this Focus-marking are paraphrased below the sentence (adapted from 
Herburger 2000, Partee 1988, Romero 2015b, and Westerståhl 1985), and the name for 
the interpretation is provided in italics: 
(29) Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize. 
c. Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize F/CT.  regular 
proportional 
Paraphrase: Of all Scandinavians, the proportion that have won the 
Nobel Prize in Literature is larger than the proportion of them that 
have won other things. 
d. Many Scandinavians F/CT have won the Nobel Prize. reverse 
proportional 
Paraphrase: Of all the people that have won the Nobel Prize, the 
proportion of them that have been Scandinavians is larger than the 
proportion of winners from other countries. 
Recall that a D-tree is a representation of a discourse, representing how questions 
have been raised and answered (Büring, 2003, Cohen & Krifka, 2014; Krifka, 2001). 
Participants each have internal mental states, which represent – among other things – 
goals that specify the level of precision required for an answer to be resolving (c.f. 
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Ginzburg, 1997; Roberts 1996/2012; van Rooy, 2003). This analysis posits that within 
these D-trees, many-utterances are taken to be licensed by – or anaphoric to – dominating 
questions of the form “How many….” Thus many-utterances are relevant (Roberts 
1996/2012), resolving (van Rooy, 2003) answers to “How many…” questions; henceforth 
referred to as licensing QUDs. One critical innovation adopted by this analysis is to 
denote licensing QUDs as structured meanings following Krifka 2001, so that for 
example the licensing QUD in (30) is denoted as (31): 
(30) How many Scandinavians have won different honors? 
(31) ⟨𝜆 𝑑 . ({|𝑥: 𝑤𝑜𝑛(𝑥, 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠)|) ≥ 𝑑}, 𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑆⟩ 
The participant’s world knowledge provides the known alternatives, represented as 
separate sub-trees in the D-tree (Figure 2-4), that are derived by applying the background 
function to the restrictor set of this structured meaning, giving rise to a set of degree 
functions. These functions represent the set of relevant answers to the licensing QUD, 
each represented by one of the terminal nodes in the D-tree. This set of degree sets 
derived from (31) is shown in (32) and the D-tree that licenses it is illustrated in Figure 
2-4: 
(32) ⟦𝐶⟧  ⊆ {𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩
{𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑, 
 𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}
∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑙, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|)
≥ 𝑑 … } 
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Figure 2-4. The D-tree that licenses the regular interpretation, with alternative degree sets (comparison 
class) licensed by (30) and derived from (31). 
Thus, this set of alternatives (the terminal nodes), referred to as the comparison class 
(c.f. Rooth 1992), that is defined by the licensing QUD is the referent of the anaphoric 
Focus operator, and it is in this sense that the licensing QUD licenses one or another 
Focus-marking pattern. That is, the structure of the D-tree – the number and contents of 
the terminal nodes – constrain what Focus can associate with. In short, the licensing 
QUD, by virtue of the comparison class and D-tree it gives rise to, defines the felicity 
conditions of many. To see this, consider the situation in (33). 
(33) A: How many Scandinavians have won different honors? 
B: # Many Scandinavians F/CT have won the Nobel Prize. 
This account predicts that B’s answer is infelicitous given A’s question, which seems 
intuitively correct. This infelicity arises because B’s utterance contains Focus-marking on 
a phrase for which no alternative degree sets exist in the D-tree; there are only sets that 
describe the degree to which Scandinavians have won various honors – there is nothing to 
contrast Scandinavians with. Of course, this discourse can be saved. An alternative D-tree 
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can quickly be constructed by a cooperative participant. This would require A to 
reconstruct or infer the licensing QUD that licenses B’s utterance, i.e. the licensing QUD 
for the reverse interpretation. This reconstructed licensing QUD and its denotation are 
given in (34) and (35): 
(34) How many people of each nationality have won the Nobel Prize? 
(35) ⟨𝜆 𝑑 . ({|𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛 (𝑁𝑃′, 𝑥)|) ≥ 𝑑}, 𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑆⟩ 
This newly constructed comparison class and D-tree are shown in (36) and Figure 2-5, 
respectively: 
(36) ⟦𝐶⟧  ⊆ 
{𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|)
≥ 𝑑, 
𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝐴𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝐴𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑 … } 
 
Figure 2-5. The D-tree that licenses the reverse interpretation, with the comparison class licensed by (34) 
and derived from (35). 
In short, B was answering the question in (34) instead of A’s initial question in (30). 
Under this account, B would be assumed to have world knowledge that only enabled 
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them to generate the comparison class (36), which gives rise to a D-tree as in Figure 2-5, 
and therefore B’s response would also give rise to a classic Gricean informativity 
implicature about B’s knowledge state. The main point, however, is that different truth-
conditions arise because of the different contents of the D-trees, derived from distinct 
licensing QUDs, and if these truth-conditions are not relevant, resolving answers to a 
licensing “How many…” question, then infelicity – or worse false-hood – arises. 
That distinct truth-conditions can be derived from the same semantic denotation, 
simply by assuming different D-trees, can be seen by tracing the complete composition of 
the many-phrase with POS, as shown as in Figure 2-6.  
 
Figure 2-6. The LF composition of Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prizes. Note that in this LF, 
unlike those posited by Romero 2015b (see Section 2.1), many undergoes QR – one consequence of 
assuming that many is indeed a generalized quantifier-typed determiner which she does not explore.  
Following the denotation of POS in Romero 2015b, this account assumes that POS 
contains a function L that operates over Q (the value of which is anaphorically bound to 
~ 
 - 70 - 
the set of degree sets in the context ⟦𝐶⟧, via ~), and returns what Romero calls the neutral 
segment10, which can intuitively be thought of as a measure of central tendency over the 
full comparison class. This formulation of POS means that a many-utterance evaluates to 
true just in case P is a superset of the degree set returned by L(Q), i.e. P must meet or 
exceed upper bound the neutral segment. These truth-values are visually illustrated on the 
number lines below each derivation, which assume degrees in the set of rational numbers 
that would make each utterance true. First, consider the derivation of the truth-conditions 
for the regular interpretation in (2): 
(37) Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize F/CT. 
LF: [ [POS C] ] [1[t2-many Scandinavians] [2[t1] have won NPF/CT]]] ~C] 
⟦𝐶⟧  ⊆ 
{𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|)
≥ 𝑑, 
𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}
∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑙, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑 … } 
𝐿(⟦𝐶⟧)  ⊆ 
𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|)
≥ 𝑑 
                                                 
10 Solt 2009 specifically addresses the correct way to conceptualize this neutral segment, noting that it must 
be capable of representing fine-grained, point-wise differences in distributions (e.g. it must convey both the 
central tendency and the variance). A more subtle consideration of this issue is left aside and this proposal 
assumes the neutral segment is described by the mean and standard deviation of the sets in the comparison 
class. 
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Next, consider the derivation of the truth-conditions of the reverse interpretation in 
(38): 
(38) Many Scandinavians F/CT have won the Nobel Prize. 
LF: [ [POS C] ] [1[t2-many Scandinavians F/CT] [2[t1] have won NP]]] ~C] 
⟦𝐶⟧  ⊆ 
{𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|)
≥ 𝑑, 
𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝐴𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝐴𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑 … } 
c. 𝐿(⟦𝐶⟧)  ⊆ 
𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|)
≥ 𝑑 
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These derivations show how simply changing the licensing QUD (which changes the 
D-tree), in turn changes the contents of the comparison class. The contents of the 
comparison class provide different degree sets to the semantic composition and thereby 
derive distinct truth-conditions using the same sematic denotation. 
Given this fully developed account of the proportional interpretations of many, this 
section closes with a novel proposal that shows how the cardinal – reverse and regular – 
interpretations can similarly be derived using the same pragmatic-semantic machinery, 
instead of positing a completely different denotation. This account of many is also 
tentatively extended to most in the section that follows. 
2.3.1. Extension to the cardinal interpretation 
In order to derive the cardinal interpretation within this framework, recall that the 
contents of the comparison class are constrained not only by the licensing QUD but also 
by the participant’s world knowledge and discourse-specific goals. Imagine an ignorant 
participant who knows nothing about what kinds of people win the Nobel Prize or 
anything about Scandinavians. Once the utterance in (39) is uttered to this ignorant 
participant, the derivation of the truth-conditions would proceed as in (39) and their D-
tree will look like Figure 2-7. 
(39) Many Scandinavians F/CT have won the Nobel Prize. 
LF: [ [POS C] ] [1[t2-many Scandinavians F/CT] [2[t1] have won NP]]] ~C] 
⟦𝐶⟧  ⊆ 
{𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|)
≥ 𝑑} 
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c. 𝐿(⟦𝐶⟧)  ⊆ 
𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥
𝑑  
 
Figure 2-7. The D-tree of an ignorant participant after the question How many people of each nationality 
have won the Nobel Prize? is asked. 
Note that the degree scale is now depicted as whole numbers – the critical difference 
here. The degree scale is being calculated in a different way because the participant has 
no knowledge about Scandinavians; they have no way of representing what proportion of 
all Scandinavians they are dealing with here. This in turn affects the way the neutral 
segment is calculated. Following Aloni, et al. (2002; see also Rooth 1992; Tomaszewicz 
2016 a.m.o.) this proposal assumes that the licensing QUD for (39) presupposes 
𝜆 𝑑 . {|𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛 (𝑁𝑃′, 𝑥)| ≥ 𝑑} ≠ ∅, so the participant can incorporate that into their D-
tree, but the degree value of the set 𝜆𝑑. {|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}| ≥ 𝑑} is still unknown. 
This proposal also assumes that the utterance of (39) presupposes that 
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𝜆𝑑. {|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}| ≥ 𝑑} ≠ ∅. This is illustrated as a single terminal node in 
the D-tree. Critically, given these presuppositions, this D-tree and singleton comparison 
class, the proportional meaning of 𝐿(⟦𝐶⟧)  ⊆ 𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩
{𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑 is just 1/1. Moreover, this utterance 
would evaluate to true, because the function L has only the one degree set to operate over, 
and so the neutral segment and the degree set have the same range, and therefore 𝐿 (𝑄) ⊆
𝑃 holds. 
Now, imagine that we told this ignorant participant that three Scandinavians and two 
Andorrans had won the Nobel Prize. Critically, though, we did not tell them anything 
about how many total Scandinavians or Andorrans there are in the world. This means that 
the denominator in the proportion of each degree set is still just 1, which means that the 
degree scale is still being calculated in whole numbers rather than proportions. The 
resulting derivation and D-tree after this small amount of information is told to this 
ignorant participant is shown in (40) and Figure 2-8 respectively: 
(40) Many Scandinavians F/CT have won the Nobel Prize. 
LF: [ [POS C] ] [1[t2-many Scandinavians F/CT] [2[t1] have won NP]]] ~C] 
⟦𝐶⟧  ⊆ 
{𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|)
≥ 𝑑, 
𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝐴𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝐴𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑} 
𝐿(⟦𝐶⟧)  ⊆ 
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𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥
𝑑  
 
Figure 2-8. The tree after the ignorant participant has been told that three Scandinavians and two 
Andorrans have won the Nobel Prize. 
In short, only once this ignorant participant learned something about the populations of 
Scandinavia and Andorra would their interpretation become proportional. To summarize, 
the cardinal interpretation – both the reverse and regular – arise when participants lack 
the knowledge that would specify the elements of the degree sets in the denominator of 
the proportional denotation of many. Therefore, we do not need to posit a distinct 
denotation, we only need to carefully consider the discourse context and knowledge state 
of the participants, in order to principally derive all four observed interpretations of 
many.  
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The account developed here draws on previous literature that strongly motivates a 
deterministic role for information structure in Focus-marking, and the role of information 
structure in pragmatic disambiguation generally. Using structured meanings to denote 
licensing QUDs in the discourse context, the account developed here posits that 
association with Focus, implemented via the ~ operator at LF, brings the contents of the 
comparison class into the composition, in order for it to compose with the degree 
morpheme POS. Thus, the information structure denoted by ~ in the composition gives 
rise to and disambiguates between the regular and reverse interpretations of many-
utterances without needing to posit a distinct denotation for the quantifier. As Table 2-2 
summarizes, carefully characterizing the structure of the licensing QUD, and the 
comparison class it generates, further allows the derivation of a cardinal interpretation 
using an inherently proportional denotation of many, simply by accurately modeling the 
discourse information structure of an ignorant participant. 
Table 2-2. This table summarizes the derivation of the four interpretations of many that have been observed 
in the literature, using the degree-based context sensitive approach developed in this Section 2.3. 
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2.3.2. Preliminary extensions to most  
To evaluate the generality of the account developed in this chapter, this section 
compares and contrasts the predictions of previous accounts of most to an account 
suggested by the machinery proposed above, and explores what, if any, additional 
explanatory power the current account has over those previous. Ultimately, this 
discussion points to certain improvements to the account developed above that would be 
required in order to capture the observed data for most, but leaves a full implementation 
of these to future work. 
Most does not appear to be sensitive to Focus in the same way many is, i.e. there is no 
reverse interpretation of (41) (i.e. where (41) would mean that ‘Nobel Prize winners are 
Scandinavians for the most part’). Rather (41) can only convey that ‘the majority of 
Scandinavians have won the Nobel prize’ (Romero 2015b). 
(41) Most Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize.  
Therefore, the question arises as to why the reverse interpretation is blocked, if we 
assume, like Romero 2015b, Hackle 2009, and others, that most is built from a denotation 
of many, and that many is Focus-sensitive. Romero 2015b claims that most is focus-
sensitive, citing data from Pancheva and Tomaszewicz 2012 and Tomaszewicz 2013 
from Bulgarian and Polish to demonstrate that the reverse interpretation does in fact 
surface, with a cardinal interpretation of most. However, it seems that in English the 
Focus mechanism is blocked by some element that is not present in these Slavic 
languages.  
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First, a sketch of Romero’s 2015b account is provided, then the differences between 
Romero’s account and the current one are explored, before considering limitations of the 
current account revealed by most. Recall from Section 2.1 that Romero 2015b also 
extends her degree-based approach to most, following on from work by Hackl 2009 (see 
also Solt 2015), claiming that most is the result of composing ⟦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦⟧ with the 
superlative morpheme ⟦−𝑒𝑠𝑡⟧ (the denotation repeated here as (42) for convenience) 
instead of the positive morpheme ⟦𝑃𝑂𝑆⟧. 
(42) ⟦−𝑒𝑠𝑡⟧ =  𝜆 𝑄〈𝑑𝑡,𝑡〉. 𝜆 𝑃〈𝑑,𝑡〉: 𝑃 ∈  𝑄. ∀𝑄 ∈ 𝑄[𝑄 ≠ 𝑃 → 𝑄 ⊂ 𝑃] 
Assuming this denotation, and that of many, repeated here as (43), the derivation of the 
truth-conditions for a most-utterance with Focus on Nobel Prize (i.e. the regular 
interpretation pattern) would proceed as in (44). 
(43) ⟦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝⟧ =  𝜆 𝑃〈𝑒,𝑡〉. 𝜆 𝑄〈𝑒,𝑡〉. 𝜆 𝑑𝑑 . (|𝑃 ∩ 𝑄|: |𝑃|) ≥ 𝑑 
(44) Most Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize F/CT. 
a. LF: [ [POS C] ] [1[t2-many Scandinavians] [2[t1] have won NPF/CT]]] 
~C] 
b. ⟦𝐶⟧  ⊆ 
{𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}
∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑, 
𝜆𝑑′. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}
∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑
− 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑙, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑, … } 
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c. ∀𝑄 ∈  ⟦𝐶⟧ [𝑄 ≠  𝜆𝑑. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}| ∶
 |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑 →  
𝑄 ⊂  𝜆𝑑. (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩
{𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}| |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}| ∶
|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑]  
The utterance and derivation in (44) assumes emphasis on Nobel Prize, which according 
to the account developed here would be licensed by a discourse in which the information 
structure is structured by a comparison class containing degree sets cataloging all the 
relevant, resolving alternatives to the Nobel Prize, e.g. other prestigious international 
prizes like the an Olympic gold medal, and others. This derivation can be visualized as in 
the number line below. 
 
This account predicts that (44) will be true just in case the proportion of Scandinavians 
that have won Nobel Prizes is a proper superset of all the other degree sets in the 
comparison class.11 Note that this derivation assumes the proportional interpretation of 
                                                 
11 Given that the proper superset relation entails that the Quantified Set is the uniquely largest set in the 
Comparison Class, these truth conditions more closely capture the for the most part sense of most (c.f. 
Tomaszewicz 2013), rather than the majority sense that Romero 2015b uses in her paraphrases. This 
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many, but that under the regular interpretation, the proportional and the cardinal 
interpretations are both true in the same situations. Therefore, to fully test the extension 
of this account to most, we must also consider a most-utterance with the reverse pattern of 
Focus/emphasis. However, English does not appear to allow this pattern of Focus-
marking; as Romero 2015b states (citing Pancheva &Tomaszewicz 2012 and 
Tomaszewicz 2013), English does not allow -est, in its raised position, to associate with 
an element inside its base generated DP (see Figure 2-6). However, this blocking may be 
specific to English, because Polish and Bulgarian do allow this association, as the 
contrast between the acceptability of the paraphrases in (45a) and (46a) illustrates. 
(45) John has the best album by U2 F. 
a. # ‘John has the better albums by U2 compared to any other band.’ 
(46) Ivan ima naj-bodri albumin na U2F.    [Bulgarian] 
Ivan has -est-good albums by U2. 
b. ‘Ivan has the better albums by U2 compared to any other band.’ 
c. # ‘The proportion of albums by U2 that Ivan has is larger than the 
proportion he has by and other band.’ 
By extension then, the reverse reading of most is in principle possible, just not 
specifically in English. Moreover, Romero 2015b claims that a sentence like (46) in 
Bulgarian (and Polish) does not allow for the proportional interpretation paraphrased in 
(46b), suggesting that most is built from a cardinal many. 
                                                 
distinction is relevant for interpreting the results of Experiment 4 in Chapter 5, but a full exploration of 
this distinction is beyond the scope this dissertation. 
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The account developed in Section 2.3 above departs from Romero’s account in one 
critical way. By assuming structured meanings as the denotations for licensing QUDs in 
the discourse, the distinction between the regular, reverse, cardinal and proportional 
interpretations of many are reduced to distinct information structures of distinct 
discourses. This powerful mechanism therefore allows all these interpretations to arise 
from one single denotation of many, which is assumed to be proportional. Therefore, the 
account in Section 2.3 would simply posit an ignorant interlocutor in the discourse in 
which (46) is uttered. Similarly, this account would imply that discourses that license an 
utterance like (45) never occur in English, but do in Bulgarian or Polish. Therefore, the 
account in Section 2.3 fails to fully capture these observed cross-linguistic differences 
and the clear role that syntactic mechanisms play in the regular-reverse ambiguity and the 
cardinal-proportional ambiguity. 
A full account of Focus-dependent most is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, the data above demonstrate that most provides data that may provide critical 
constraints on how information structure in the discourse contributes to the derivation of 
the regular-reverse ambiguity in many. Whereas, pragmatic machinery has been the focus 
of the account developed in this dissertation, most demonstrates that pragmatics alone 
cannot be taken to fully determine the interpretational ambiguities in ambiguous, vague 
quantifiers. Whatever is responsible for blocking the effects of Focus with the superlative 
morpheme in English must also be accounted for; and this is unlikely to be a pragmatic 
factor, as briefly reviewed below. 
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Following work by Pancheva and Tomaszewicz 2012 and Tomaszewicz 2016, the 
relative position of the quantifier, degree morpheme, and the Focus operator at LF likely 
interact to determine the regular-reverse ambiguity. According to Tomaszewicz 2016, 
superlative adjectives like most expensive are ambiguous between the so-called absolute 
reading ((47a)) and two relative readings (47b) & (47c) (adapted from Tomaszewicz 
2016). 
(47) John bought Mary the most expensive cake. 
a. John bought Mary the cake F that was more expensive than any other 
(relevant, alternative) cake.    absolute reading 
paraphrase 
b. John F bought Mary a more expensive cake than any other (relevant, 
alternative) person did.        ‘external’ relative reading 
paraphrase12 
c. John bought Mary F a more expensive cake than he did for any other 
(relevant, alternative) person.   ‘internal’ relative 
paraphrase 
As the paraphrases in (47) illustrate, the different interpretations arise due to distinct 
patterns of Focus-marking, just like with many, except that the Focus-marking in (47b) 
and (47c) does not completely rule out the interpretation in (47a).  
                                                 
12 This term is borrowed from Tieu and Shen 2015, and comes from the fact that Focus is either NP-
external or NP-internal, where the NP in question is the object NP, here the most expensive cake. 
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Drawing on cross-linguistic data from Polish, Pancheva and Tomaszewicz 2012 (and 
Tomaszewicz 2016) claim that definiteness in the modified NP blocks the QR of the 
degree morpheme -est out of its base generated NP. Since Polish does not have definite 
articles, -est can QR outside of the NP, allowing for either NP-internal or NP-external 
scope, and the ambiguity in (47b) and (47c), unlike English. Thus, in Polish Focus-
marking serves to disambiguate between these two possible relative interpretations, and is 
therefore obligatory in a way that is not observable in English. Therefore, Pancheva and 
Tomaszewicz 2012 and Tomaszewicz 2016 argue that the scope of -est determines which 
interpretations are possible, and the Focus-marked constituent determines which reading 
arises (i.e. either John or Mary in (47)). This account likely generalizes to ambiguous, 
vague quantifiers, helping to explain why the reverse reading may be blocked for most in 
English, but not Polish and Bulgarian. Therefore, a full account of the class of 
ambiguous, vague quantifiers should consider both the pragmatic factors explored in this 
chapter and these syntactic factors. 
2.4. Implications for accounts of ambiguity and vagueness 
Acknowledging that there is still work to be done towards developing a fully unified, 
comprehensive account of ambiguous, vague quantifiers, the account developed in this 
chapter does provide some insight into how formal linguistics can address the challenge 
of adequately capturing both ambiguity and vagueness, by working out a fragment for 
many. 
Recall that Kennedy 2019 characterizes ambiguity as the case in which a lexical item 
can be mapped to multiple, different meanings. Various formal tools are used to capture 
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ambiguity, e.g. scope, type-shifting, or under-specification. Critically, all these 
approaches attempt to offer principled explanations that predict or constrain the many-to-
one mappings between meanings and lexical items; this strengthens the standard semantic 
assumption that truth-conditions are lexical items can be unambiguous referents to 
meanings, and that these meanings can be captured by a two-valued logic. In the data 
reviewed in this chapter, at least four different meanings for many were observed. 
However, in the account developed in Section 2.3, these apparently distinct 
interpretations were instead attributed to distinct interpretations that arise from distinct 
discourses with distinct information structures. That is, many is not actually ambiguous in 
the sense that this account posits one single semantic denotation, and uses pragmatic 
machinery to derive these different interpretations. The experiments in Chapter 3 look 
for evidence that Focus, via prosodic emphasis, does indeed determine the interpretation 
of many that arises.  
Recall that Kennedy 2019 characterizes vagueness as tolerance or boundary-less-ness, 
giving rise to the Sorites Paradox, in which we find it difficult to identify the particular 
point at which the second premise becomes false (e.g. if a $5 coffee is expensive, and 
iteratively a $4.99 coffee is expensive, why do we erroneously accept the conclusion that 
a $0 coffee is expensive, in the context of this iterative of syllogism). This paradox holds 
a central role in reasoning about vagueness because it demonstrates this boundary-less-
ness, but also because it highlights in turn the potential inadequacy of either a traditional 
two-valued logic or the assumption of sharp boundaries in capturing vagueness (Kennedy 
2011; 2019, citing Fara 2000). For example, if we admit more than two truth-values in 
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our logical system, we can explain how a $3 coffee described as expensive can be super-
true but not precisely true, or we could say that a $3 coffee is at the fuzzy, or unknowable 
edge of the boundary between expensive and not-expensive. However, supervaluationist 
accounts still fail to explain how world knowledge can affect judgments of super-truth 
and truth, i.e. at what point a coffee goes from being expensive to not-expensive. On the 
other hand, accounts that invoke epistemic uncertainty fail to explain why we continue to 
accept the second premise of the paradox at each successive iteration, and yet clearly 
reject the conclusion in isolation.  
In the context of ambiguous, vague quantifiers like many, according to the account 
developed in Section 2.3 there is no change to the standard logical specification of two-
valued truth-conditions; many itself it not vague, but many-utterances appear vague 
because their interpretation shifts depending on the context and they can be evaluated 
relative to vague or imprecise contexts. Vagueness is captured by the fact that the 
comparison class changes depending on the context of utterance. Therefore, there is no 
one universal boundary, or point where many ceases to be true or becomes true – that 
boundary is defined anew in each context of utterance. Moreover, because the denotation 
for many requires the representations and comparison of cardinalities or proportions, it 
can be verified via the noisy, approximate representations of magnitude in the ANS 
(Carey, 2009; Dehaene 1997). The experiments in Chapter 4 find evidence that this 
content-dependent aspect of many is present and is the default interpretation. 
Thus, the semantic-pragmatic account of many developed in this chapter is not a 
complete account of ambiguous, vague quantifiers. However, the innovation of denoting 
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licensing QUDs as structured meanings provides a transparent, fully compositional 
mechanism that bridges the role of information structure in determining the regular-
reverse ambiguity, and for capturing the apparent vagueness of many-utterances. The 
experiments that follow in the next two chapters probe these issues further and suggest 
further factors that will be integral for a complete account of ambiguous, vague 
quantifiers. 
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3. Does Focus determine the interpretation of many?: Looking 
for the regular and reverse interpretation by manipulating 
Focus and the context 
3.1. Introduction 
The account laid out in Section 2.3 leads to the hypothesis that there are two truth-
conditionally distinct interpretations many-utterances (the regular and reverse 
interpretations), licensed by the structure and the content of the preceding discourse, 
which in turn licenses the prosodic Focus-marking; in short, Focus-marking 
disambiguates between the regular and reverse interpretations of many-utterances. For an 
illustration, consider the data in (1), where emphasis is marked by the subscripted F/CT 
and bold type-face, the truth-conditions that arise based on this Focus-marking are 
paraphrased below the sentence (adapted from Herburger 2000, Partee 1988, Romero 
2015b, and Westerståhl 1985), and the name for the interpretation is provided in italics.  
(1) Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize. 
a. Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize F/CT. regular 
proportional 
Paraphrase: Of all Scandinavians, the proportion that have won the 
Nobel Prize in Literature is larger than the proportion of them that 
have won other things. 
b. Many Scandinavians F/CT have won the Nobel Prize. reverse 
proportional 
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Paraphrase: Of all the people that have won the Nobel Prize, the 
proportion of them that have been Scandinavians is larger than the 
proportion of winners from other countries. 
According to the account in Section 2.3, a particular discourse uniquely gives rise to 
either (1a) or (1b) via distinct QUDs (the question under discussion, or the point of the 
discourse; Büring 2003; Ginzburg 1995; Roberts 1996/2012). The information in any 
discourse is structured by the (successive) QUD(s) in that discourse (Büring 2003; 
Ginzburg 1995; Roberts 1996/2012) and the goals of the interlocutors (Ginzburg 1995); 
this information structure licenses, or gives rise to, specific Focus patterns (e.g. Krifka 
1995; Rooth 1992; Schwarzschild 1999; von Fintel 1994 for various accounts of this 
mechanism), which can be prosodically marked by the so-called B-accent (Büring 2003; 
Jackendoff 1972). In short, the Focus-marking that appears on a particular many-
utterance signals the specific discourse that would license that particular pattern of Focus-
marking and derives distinct truth-values. Therefore, the discourse in which (1a) is 
uttered is fundamentally distinct from the discourse in which (1b) is uttered; it is in this 
sense that the two interpretations are thought of as having distinct truth-conditions.  
The experiments in this chapter aim to demonstrate the validity of the claim that the 
information structure of the preceding discourse sufficiently determines the interpretation 
of a many-utterance, as marked by the prosodic B-accent emphasis pattern. To do so, the 
proportion of the quantified degree set in a contextualizing paragraph was manipulated in 
such a way that made only either the regular or reverse interpretation of the many-
utterance true. These experiments measure the rate at which participants select a many-
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utterance with a Focus-marking pattern that gives rise to truth-conditions that evaluate to 
true given the facts in the paragraph, and their confidence in that choice. If the account 
developed in Section 2.3 is correct in hypothesizing that the distinct truth-conditions of 
many-utterances arise dependent on the Focus-marking on many-utterances and the 
information structure of the context in which they are uttered, then the results should 
show that participants systematically select the many-utterance with the Focus-marking 
that evaluates to true, given the facts in the context, and that they are more confident on 
average when they do so. 
In Experiment 1, Focus-marking across the two relevant variants of a many-
utterance was realized by italicizing the word intended to carry prosodic emphasis. 
Contrary to predictions based on the account in Section 2.3, participants were at chance 
in selecting between the two many-utterances. This finding is perhaps not surprising 
given the numerous different ways that italics can be interpreted (e.g. contrastive 
emphasis, importance, idiosyncratic usage, technical or definitional usage, etc.), only one 
of which is the critical B-accent prosody (c.f. Büring 2003) required, by hypothesis, to 
disambiguate between the regular and reverse interpretations of many-utterances. 
Moreover, Herburger 2000 suggests that the predicate in a many-utterance further 
constrains the interpretive possibilities of many-utterances, suggesting that the 
information structure of the discourse may not be the strongly deterministic cue to 
interpretation that the account in Section 2.3 suggests. To address these two possibilities, 
Experiment 2 presents a subset of the trials from Experiment 1, auditorily, manipulating 
the prosodic contour on each many-utterance, while also manipulating the predicate type 
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in the many-utterance. However, the results of Experiment 2 did not replicate the 
expected effect of predicate type. 
The Discussion briefly explores one potential explanation of this failure to replicate, 
and to find a reliable effect of context, using Optimality Theory (OT; Prince & 
Smolensky, 1993). Considering a broader range of constraints on the semantic and 
pragmatic interpretation of many-utterances, and how they may interact, a preliminary 
sketch of relevant constraints, within an OT framework, sheds light on why participants 
did not show a clear preference for either the regular- or reverse many-utterance, 
depending on the contextual information they received – as the account in Section 2.3 
would predict. This preliminary OT analysis suggests that without any explicit control or 
manipulation of the interpretation of the subject of the utterance, subjects may have been 
faced with an interpretive choice, and chose somewhat randomly, thereby decreasing the 
sensitivity of the experiment to hypothesized effect of context and prosody. 
The results of these two experiments and the preliminary OT analysis in the 
Discussion taken together suggest that the semantic, prosodic, and pragmatic factors that 
determine prosodic Focus-marking, and thereby give rise to either the regular or reverse 
interpretation of a many-utterance, also interact semantic constraints on the interpretation 
of the subjects in those utterances. In short, the acceptability and felicity of the regular or 
reverse interpretation depends on more than just the information structure of the 
preceding discourse; emphasis and information structure cannot fully determine the 
interpretation of a many-utterance. Therefore, in addition to these factors that the account 
in Section 2.3 highlights, the results of these experiments motivate further investigations 
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of how the information structure may also determine the interpretive possibilities of 
plural subjects, and how their interpretation interacts with the critical information 
structure posited in Section 2.3.  
3.2. Experiment 1: Aims 
The aim of this first experiment was to validate the claim made by the account in 
Section 2.3: that there are two, distinct interpretations available for the relative, 
proportional quantifier many and that these two interpretations are derived via a process 
in which the contents of the preceding discourse context categorically determines the 
semantic interpretation of a many-utterance. The critical claim being tested in 
Experiment 1 in this chapter is that truth-conditionally distinct interpretations arise by 
virtue of emphasis on one of the two possible constituents that can associate with Focus 
in the composition of many-utterances; i.e. there is a regular interpretation emphasis 
pattern and a reverse interpretation emphasis pattern. 
To test for the availability of these two distinct, context dependent interpretations, 
paragraphs were constructed that contained facts about the proportion of subsets of items 
(e.g. fish that live in a lake that either hide in deep or shallow locations). These 
proportions were such that only one of the two possible truth-conditions of a many-
utterance would evaluate to true given the facts in the paragraph. Using a between-
subjects design, such that each participant only ever saw paragraphs that either made the 
regular or reverse interpretation of many-utterances true, participants were asked to 
choose which of the two possible emphasis patterns on a many-utterance they felt best 
summarized the information in the paragraph, and provide a confidence rating on a 10-
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point scale. If there are indeed two available and distinct truth-conditions, that are in fact 
distinguished via emphasis marking in a many-utterance, participants should be above 
chance and on average more confident at selecting the emphasis pattern that gives rise to 
the interpretation that evaluates to true given the information in the paragraph. Such a 
pattern of results will be taken as support for the proposed information structure-
dependent account of the regular-reverse ambiguity in Section 2.3. 
3.3. Method 
3.3.1. Participants 
Seventy-one undergraduate students (26 males) at Johns Hopkins University 
participated in this study in exchange for course credit. To ensure that participants were 
native, or near-native (White & Genesee, 1996) speakers of English, participants were 
screened using a survey adapted from Freed, Dewey, Segalowitz, and Halter (2004)13, 
after completion of the task. Native and near-native speakers were conservatively14 
defined as people who began acquiring English from at least age 3, and who currently 
speak English at least 70% of the time with both friends and family over the course of ‘a 
typical week’ in the preceding 6-month period. This allows for simultaneous bilinguals 
who have grown up in multilingual households but excludes people for whom English is 
not their first and dominant language, for example those who only started learning 
English in school or later, and those who do not use English, even at school. Based on the 
                                                 
13 An online version of this survey can be seen here: https://forms.gle/haEFoyy4VPpaW5sk6 
14 Based on the extensive literature on second language acquisition, critical periods, and ultimate attainment 
(c.f. White, (2003) for an overview), this method followed White & Genesee (1996) and assume that near-
native English speakers have attained similar underlying representations as monolingual English speakers. 
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results of this survey, data from eight participants were excluded from analysis. Data 
from two further participants were omitted from analysis because of technical issues 
saving their data files. This resulted in data for analysis from 30 participants (10 males) in 
the Regular condition, and 30 participants (9 males) in the Reverse Condition. This study 
was approved by the Homewood Institutional Review Board. 
3.3.2. Design and Materials 
This experiment followed a between-subjects design with the type of contextualizing 
paragraph (regular-inducing context, reverse-inducing context) as the between-subjects 
factor. Two dependent measures were recorded: response type (regular- or reverse-
marked many-utterance) and confidence rating (on a scale from 1-10, with 1 = not at all 
and 10 = very confident).  
In order to ensure the ecological validity of the results of this experiment, the topics 
of the paragraphs in this experiment were based on instances of many and their 
surrounding context in COCA, a large (560 million word) and balanced corpus comprised 
of spoken and written American English from news, drama, fiction, popular magazines, 
and academic texts (Davies, 2008). Only determiner uses of many were selected.15 The 
first 20 search results containing a determiner use of many, excluding two results 
containing potentially sensitive or triggering themes (sexual identity and gun violence), 
                                                 
15 Following Herburger (2000), Solt (2015), and others this dissertation distinguishes semanto-syntactically 
defined determiners and adjectival uses of many. It considers only determiner uses here, by applying tests 
of ordering (determiners must come before adjectives in English, e.g. thedet redadj car) and iterability 
(adjectives but not determiners can typically be iterated, e.g. thedet bigadj redadj car, vs. *thedet thatdet bigadj 
redadj car). Under the assumption that distinct semantic types would be required for these distinct syntactic 
distributions, this account assumes that these two uses of many are in fact distinct lexical items. However, a 
fuller analysis of how and whether the account developed in Section 2.3 can account for this adjectival 
many is left for future work. 
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were minimally altered to create a many-utterance of the general form “Many X Y,” 
where X is a constituent phrase (e.g. noun, adjective or prepositional phrase) and Y is 
predicated of X. One version of this sentence was Focus-marked using italicized text, so 
as to give rise to the regular interpretation of many (e.g. “Many X are Y.”): the regular 
response; the other was marked so as to give rise to the reverse interpretation of many 
(e.g. “Many X are Y.”): the reverse response. Only one word in the focused phrase was 
emphasized.16 Next, the surrounding context of each instance of many in COCA was 
reviewed as inspiration for a contextualizing paragraph. 
Each of the 20 paragraphs consisted of three sentences: a preamble, and two 
paraphrases of the truth-conditions of both the regular and reverse interpretation. In order 
to limit the influence of variable background knowledge between different participants, 
about different topics discussed in the paragraphs, the preamble provided context, and 
gave explicit comparison classes for each of the sets mentioned in the following two 
sentences. Referring back to the paraphrased truth-conditions in (1) the paraphrase of the 
regular interpretation of many is taken to follow the frame “of all the X, some proportion 
[that counts as many] are X that Y,” and the paraphrase of the reverse interpretation of 
many is taken to be “Of all the Y, some proportion [that counts as many] of those Y are 
X.” Simplified versions of these paraphrases were used as the frames for the two main 
sentences in the paragraphs. To create the paragraphs for the Regular condition, the 
proportions in each sentence were manipulated such that the larger proportion appeared 
                                                 
16 In cases where X and Y contained more than one word, the main content word that contrasted with the 
comparison class as given in the preamble was emphasized. For example, “heliotrope trees” contrasted 
with “different kinds of native trees…on Hawaiian golf courses.” 
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in the regular paraphrase and the smaller proportion appeared in the reverse paraphrase 
(this pattern was reversed for the Reverse condition). In order to create variety across 
trials, the magnitude of the proportions varied (with the larger proportions ranging over: 
2/3, 3/4, 4/5, 9/10), such that five paragraphs used each proportion. The preamble always 
appeared first. Two versions of every paragraph were created, one with the regular 
paraphrase appearing first, and the other with the reverse paraphrase appearing first. The 
final sentence always began with “But…” to make the paragraph cohere. An example 
trial screen is shown in Error! Reference source not found. 
 
Figure 3-1. Example of a trial screen in Experiment 1, from the Regular condition. The expected response 
would be “Many surgeries result from diabetes,” because the information in the paragraph tells us that 
diabetes (as opposed to other chronic illnesses) are the leading cause of surgeries. 
3.3.3. Procedure 
This experiment was presented in JavaScript using the jsPsych (de Leeuw, 2015) API 
library and plugins, and run in a Chrome v68 browser in full-screen mode.  
 - 96 - 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the Regular or Reverse condition. As 
described above, participants either saw 20 paragraphs that made the regular 
interpretation true, or they saw 20 paragraphs that made the reverse interpretation true. 
For each participant, half of the paragraphs appeared with the regular paraphrase as the 
second sentence in the paragraph, and the reverse paraphrase as the final sentence; for the 
other half of participants, the reverse paraphrase preceded the regular paraphrase. The 
presentation of this sentence order was pseudo-randomized across all the trials in each 
version of this experiment using a Latin square design, so that there were an even number 
of regular-first and reverse-first trials. Paragraph presentation order was randomized 
between participants within each block, and block presentation order was 
counterbalanced across participants. Each trial consisted of the paragraph, at the top of 
the screen. Below the paragraph, the two response options were shown with radio buttons 
to the left of each. The confidence rating scale was shown at the bottom of the screen. 
Trials were split into four blocks of five, and the order of each block was pseudo-
randomized across 16 block-order versions. 
Participants were instructed to read the paragraph, then decide which many-utterance 
best summarized the information in the paragraph. Participants were explicitly told that 
the italicization was meant to indicate which word would be emphasized if the sentence 
were to be said out loud, and they were reminded to make a choice based on the 
information as stated in the paragraph, rather than their outside, background knowledge, 
if they had any. Participants were instructed to then indicate on the scale below the two 
button choices, how confident they were about their choice, on a rating scale with 10 
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points displayed as radio buttons (with 1 = “not at all confident” and 10 = “very 
confident”). Participants had to make a response and give a rating before they could click 
the ‘continue’ button at the bottom of each screen. In between each block of five trials, 
participants were shown a simple maze or a visual search task, to encourage them to take 
a break. Participants were allowed to move at their own pace, taking on average 20 
minutes to complete the whole task. During the debrief, participants were informed that 
the information in these paragraphs had been manipulated, and therefore should not be 
taken as fact. 
3.3.4. Predictions 
The account of many in Section 2.3 posits that there are two available interpretations 
for many-utterances and that these two interpretations arise by virtue of the information 
structure of the preceding discourse context, signaled via information structure-licensed 
Focus-marking. In short, different truth-conditions arise in many-utterances depending on 
the emphasis (orthographically marked, here) that the utterance (or sentence) carries. If 
there are in fact different truth-conditions, results should show that participants select the 
version of the many-utterance that evaluates to true given the facts in the contextualizing 
paragraph they read, i.e. participants in the Regular condition should show systematically 
higher regular interpretation selection rates, and participants in the Reverse condition 
should show systematically lower regular interpretation selection rates.  
Confidence rating responses are predicted to mirror the selection responses. Thus, 
higher ratings on average are predicted when participants do select the interpretation that 
is congruent with their condition. 
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3.4. Results 
Response type – whether the participant selected the regular or reverse interpretation 
on a trial – was recorded for each trial for each participant. From these raw responses, a 
regular response variable was then coded (1 = regular response, 0 = reverse response), 
from which a regular response rate was calculated. Recall, that the rate of selecting the 
regular response was predicted to be significantly higher in the Regular condition. In the 
Regular condition, the mean regular response rate was 0.523 (SD = 0.451), and in the 
Reverse condition it was 0.471 (SD = 0.471). While the magnitude of the rates is in the 
expected direction, the fact that they are both so close to chance with such large standard 
deviations suggests that there is no reliable distinction between the rate at which 
participants across the two conditions chose the regular response. A logistic regression 
with condition as the fixed factor and subject and trial as random factors corroborates this 
finding: there is no significant difference in regular response rates between the two 
conditions (p = 0.244). These mean regular response rates, then, do not support the 
hypothesis that distinct truth-conditions arise by virtue of emphasizing different elements 
of a many-utterance.  
Participants also provided a confidence rating on each trial, indicating how confident 
they were about the response choice they made. Recall that mean ratings were predicted 
to be higher on trials where participants selected the response that would evaluate to true 
given the facts in the paragraph (the congruent response). Therefore, as shown in Figure 
3-3, mean rating values split by condition were compared to the average rating value on 
trials where participants selected the regular or reverse response.  
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Figure 3-2. A histogram showing the distribution of confidence rating responses made by participants in 
Experiment 1, across both conditions. The mean rating was 7.382 and the median was 7. 
As Figure 3-2 shows, rating values ranged from 1 to 10, and were normally 
distributed but shifted towards the upper range of the scale (centered at 7 instead of 5). 
Referring to Figure 3-3, these differences in ratings appear to depend on which condition 
the participant was in, with participants in the Regular condition showing little difference 
in their confidence ratings regardless of which response they selected (regular response: 
M = 7.567, SD = 1.532; reverse response: M = 7.378, SD = 1.584), but participants in the 
Reverse condition showing higher confidence ratings when they chose the reverse 
response (M = 7.540, SD = 1.638) compared to the regular response (M = 7.010, SD = 
1.678). ). When participants chose the regular response, their mean rating value was 
numerically smaller (M = 7.299, SD = 1.627) compared to when they chose the reverse 
response (M = 7.464, SD = 1.614). There was also a difference in mean rating value 
Regular Cond. Reverse Cond.
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between the conditions, with lower mean ratings in the Reverse condition (M = 7.290, SD 
= 1.676) compared to the Regular condition (M = 7.477, SD = 1.559).  
 
Figure 3-3. Mean rating values split according to whether the participant selected the regular or reverse 
response on that trial, across the Regular and Reverse conditions in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 
standard error. 
To test whether these numerical differences are statistically significant, these data 
were entered into an ordinal logistic regression with condition and response type, as well 
as their interaction term, regressed on the rating value, with both participant and item as 
random effects, using the ordinal package in R (v3.5.1). Based on the results of this 
model, the interaction between condition and response type was significant ( = 0.562, z 
= 2.487, p = 0.013); neither the difference in mean rating values depending on response 
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corroborates what can be observed by inspecting Figure 3-3: the difference in rating 
value between response types depends on the condition, with this effect being driven by a 
difference in mean rating value in the Reverse condition. So, these results only partially 
support the hypothesis: participants were on average more confident when they chose the 
congruent response, but only in the Reverse condition.  
While this pattern of response choices and rating values are not wholly consistent 
with the predictions, it does offer some support for the hypothesis that there are two 
possible interpretations for many that arise in a context-dependent way. 
3.5. Experiment 1: Discussion 
Contrary to predictions, there was no statistically significant difference in the rate at 
which participants chose the regular response across the two conditions. However, 
participants’ confidence ratings were significantly lower when they chose the incongruent 
response, but only in the Reverse condition, partially confirming the predictions. 
Participants’ confidence did seem to distinguish between a congruent and incongruent 
response, but only when attempting to summarize facts that made the reverse 
interpretation of many true. However, it is possible that participants were not able to 
reliably distinguish the unique meanings communicated by the regular and reverse 
response simply because the Focus-marking manipulation – using just italicized text – 
was not powerful enough. Italicized text is used to convey a number of things in written 
text, including importance, but also technical, formal, or idiosyncratic meanings, 
loanwords and much more. Therefore, it is possible that some participants on some (or 
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all) trials were unable to reconstruct the intended meaning of the many-utterances, and 
therefore made selection responses based on unintended meanings. 
The fact that participants’ confidence ratings only differed in the Reverse condition 
suggests, however, that when the facts in the context make the reverse response the 
intended interpretation, participants can use emphasis to distinguish the two response 
options, but when the facts in the context make the regular response the intended 
interpretation, emphasis is not a sufficient cue to distinguish these two response options. 
Thus, emphasis, and perhaps information structure itself (modulo the fact that emphasis 
can mark other things besides Focus, c.f. Hendriks 2004, a.o.), are not the categorical 
determinants of the interpretation of many that the account in Section 2.3 predicts.  
3.5.1. Additional determinants of the regular-reverse ambiguity 
In her account of the interpretive possibilities of few, Herburger 2000 observes that 
the reverse interpretation can only surface with stage-level predicates, and suggests that 
this may be related to semantic factors that determine the interpretive possibilities of 
plural subjects with certain predicate types, and syntactic factors that constrain how focus 
interacts with these interpretations. For example, a specific-generic ambiguity arises with 
plural subjects (e.g. Many students publish poetry.). According to Diesing (1988; see also 
Carlson 1977) bare plural NPs that are subjects of stage-level predicates (e.g. stampeded, 
think, eat, etc.) can be interpreted either specifically or generically (e.g. (2)). In contrast, 
bare plural NPs that are subjects of individual-level predicates (e.g. live, be, etc.) can only 
be interpreted generically (e.g. (3)).  
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(2) Emanuel Feuermann played the cello. 
a. Generic interpretation: in the general case, Emanuel Feuermann 
played the cello. (i.e. cello playing defines general case of EM) 
b. Specific interpretation: there was a particular instance we have in 
mind in which Emanuel Feuermann played the cello. 
(3) Albino rats have red eyes. 
a. Generic interpretation: in the general case, albino rats have red eyes. 
(i.e. having red eyes defines the general case of albino rats). 
b. Specific interpretation: # there is a particular set of albino rats that 
have red eyes. 
Diesing’s account, critically relies on whether a predicate’s subject is base generated 
in the ‘inner’ or ‘outer’ subject position at LF. Diesing draws a comparison between these 
two possible subject positions and the tripartite structure of quantifiers (e.g. Q(domain, 
scope); as well as the ~ operator, e.g. ~(focus, background), see Rooth 1992), and claims 
that stage-level predicates allow both the generic and specific interpretation because their 
subjects are base generated in the ‘inner’ position (associated with the specific reading) 
and can move up to the ‘outer’ position (associated with the generic reading), whereas the 
subjects of individual-level predicates are base generated in the ‘outer’ position. Diesing 
further claims that Focus can only project from the ‘inner’ position, thereby predicting 
that only stage-level predicates can have Focus-affected readings (i.e. the reverse 
interpretation of many).  
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The account in Section 2.3 does not address the generic-specific ambiguity in plural 
subjects at all. However, since the sister phrases of many are plural NPs in the many-
utterances in this experiment, this kind of ambiguity could be interacting in the current 
set of stimuli. If this is the case, that would mean that the reverse interpretation is 
grammatically illicit for any many-utterances containing an individual-level predicate 
subject (e.g. Many holes are defined by heliotrope trees, eight of the 20 trials). To 
investigate whether this could be an alternative explanation of the results found in 
Experiment 1, each many-utterance was categorized as either an individual- or stage-
level predicate, by two trained linguists17, using the following definitions taken from 
Herburger 1997 (p. 55; adapted from Carlson 1977 and Milsark 1977): 
Individual-level predicates: some trait possessed by the entity and which is assumed 
to be more or less permanent, or at least to be such that some significant change in the 
character of the entity will result if the description is altered. 
Stage-level predicates: conditions in which an entity finds itself and which are 
subject to change without there being any essential alteration of the entity. 
Using this new predicate-type variable, the response and rating data from 
Experiment 1 were re-analyzed. The regular response rate was entered into a logistic 
regression with condition and predicate type, as well as their interaction, as fixed effects 
and participant and trial as random effects. Based on this model, as Figure 3-4 shows, 
there was a significant interaction between condition and predicate type ( = 0.894, z = 
                                                 
17 The two coders agreed on all but one utterance (Many surgeries result from diabetes.); this was coded as 
an individual level-predicate for the purposes of this analysis, reasoning that it is an intrinsic fact about 
diabetes that it causes many conditions which require surgery. 
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3.034, p = 0.002) driven by the difference in regular response rates on trials with 
individual-level predicates which depended on the condition, whereas response rates did 
not differ depending on condition for trials with stage-level predicates. Moreover, 
participants in the Reverse condition selected the regular response at a significantly lower 
rate overall (M = 0.471, SD = 0.500) compared to those in the Regular condition (M = 
0.523, SD = 0.500) ( = -0.964, z = -2.776, p = 0.006). In addition, the regular response 
rate is significantly lower within stage-level predicates (M = 0.461, SD = 0.498) than 
individual-level predicates (M = 0.579, SD = 0.494;  = -1.234, z = -2.480, p = 0.013).  
 
Figure 3-4. Mean regular response rates in Experiment 1, split by the type of predicate type in the many-
utterance, in each condition. Error bars represent standard error. 
Confidence rating values were also re-analyzed with the new predicate-type variable 
using an ordinal logistic regression with condition, response type, and predicate type, as 
individual stage
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well as all their two- and three-way interaction terms, with both participant and item as 
random effects. The three-way interaction was not significant, so it was removed and the 
model was re-run. The results of the model corroborate the pattern that is evident in 
Figure 3-5. As before, the interaction between the condition and the response type was 
significant ( = 0.565, z = 2.471, p = 0.013). This suggests that participants in the 
Reverse condition were significantly more confident when they chose the reverse 
response (M = 7.540, SD = 1.638) compared to when they chose the regular response (M 
= 7.010, SD = 1.678), and compared to participants in the Regular condition, who were 
more confident when they chose the regular response (M = 7.567, SD = 1.533) compared 
to when they chose the reverse response (M = 7.378, SD = 1.584), regardless of the kind 
of predicate type. Neither the interaction between condition and predicate type (p = 
0.914), nor between response and predicate type (p = 0.147) were significant. In addition, 
there was no significant difference in mean rating values depending on whether the 
regular response was chosen (M = 7.300, SD = 1.627), compared to the reverse response 
(M = 7.465, SD = 1.614; p = 0.364); between the Regular condition (M = 7.477, SD = 
1.559) and the Reverse condition (M = 7.290, SD = 1.676; p = 0.235); nor between trials 
with stage-level predicates (M = 7.389, SD = 1.602) compared to individual-level 
predicates (M= 7.366, SD = 1.669; p = 0.527).  
 - 107 - 
 
Figure 3-5. Mean rating values from Experiment 1 split by condition, comparing the average rating value 
on trials where participants selected the regular or reverse response. Error bars represent standard error. 
In short, the semantic constraints introduced by the difference between stage- and 
individual-level predicates do appear to play some role in participants’ ability to select 
between the many-utterances on a trial, but not in how confident they were about that 
selection. Thus, selection rates may well reflect the combined effect of semantic, 
prosodic, and pragmatic constraints on the regular-reverse ambiguity in many (based on 
the interaction between condition – the pragmatic factor – and predicate type – the 
semantic factor). More subtly, confidence ratings reflect the influence of contextual 
constraints, but only when the response choice being rated adhered to the prosodic and 
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Based on the possible import of prosody and the predicate-type considerations, 
Experiment 2 entertains the hypotheses that: (i) auditory prosodic contours are critical 
for the accurate reconstruction of the intended interpretation of a many-utterance; and (ii) 
the semantic constraints hypothesized to play a role in plural subjects may also be 
interacting with the originally hypothesized effect of the information structure of the 
discourse context (provided in the paragraphs). Each of these hypotheses is addressed in 
Experiment 2 in an attempt to tease apart the effects of pragmatically determined Focus, 
semantic constraints from the predicate type, and prosody on the interpretation of many. 
3.6. Experiment 2: Aims 
Experiment 2 addressed the limitations identified in the materials of Experiment 1, 
and further probed the hypothesis that the Focus-marking involved in the regular-reverse 
ambiguity is a particular prosodic contour (Büring’s 2003 B-accent) that cannot 
unambiguously be signaled typographically. Experiment 2 also investigated the 
hypothesis that the influence of Focus interacts with semantic constraints introduced by 
predicate type in the many-utterance.  
Experiment 2 presented both the context and the alternative many-utterances 
auditorily, while balancing the number of stage- and individual-level predicates across 
trials. With clearer prosodic Focus-marking, intuitive judgements about the meaning of 
each many-utterance seemed more robust, and so a more robust effect of context was 
predicted (i.e. the condition manipulation). The post-hoc analysis of data from 
Experiment 1 and Herburger’s 2000 account, predict that with the predicate type 
carefully manipulated here, an effect of predicate type should interact with the 
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prosody/context manipulation, such that a difference in selection rate should only arise 
where the semantics of the predicate allows the regular-reverse ambiguity to arise (i.e. 
stage-level but not individual-level predicates). 
Experiment 2 used a subset of trials from Experiment 1, balanced for stage-level 
and individual-level predicates, and presented both the same contextualizing paragraphs 
and many-utterances auditorily. All other aspects of the task remained the same.  
3.7. Method 
3.7.1. Participants 
Sixty-three members of the Johns Hopkins University community with normal or 
corrected to normal vision participated, and were paid $5 in exchange for participating. 
The participants in this experiment also participated in Experiment 4 (see Chapter 5), 
always participating in Experiment 4 before participating in Experiment 2. Thirty-two 
people (12 males) participated in the Regular condition and 31 people (14 males) 
participated in the Reverse condition. To ensure that participants were native, or near-
native (White & Genesee, 1996) speakers of English, participants were screened using 
the same survey as in Experiment 1, after completion of the task. The participation 
criteria were the same; based on these criteria, three participants’ data were excluded 
from analysis. This procedure was approved by the Homewood Institutional Review 
Board. 
3.7.2. Materials and Design 
Ten trials from Experiment 1, indicated in bold in Appendix A: Experiment 1 & 2 
Stimuli, were re-used in this experiment: five trials had many-utterances with individual-
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level predicates and the other five had stage-level predicates (see the Discussion for 
Experiment 1 above for how these were categorized). Nothing in the paragraphs or the 
many-utterance options was changed. However, in this experiment, participants were 
required to listen to the pre-recorded audio of each paragraph and each many-utterance 
being read aloud. The contextualizing paragraph was read in a neutral tone of voice, 
carefully avoiding any emphasis on any particular elements. Each many-utterance was 
carefully articulated with the B-accent falling on the contrastive element (the word 
italicized in Experiment 1). This audio was recorded in a sound attenuated room.18  
3.7.3. Procedure 
As in Experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to either the Regular or 
Reverse condition, and the same counter-balancing measures were taken to ensure that 
the order of the sentences within each paragraph and the order of the many-utterance 
options were evenly balanced across participants. With the smaller number of trials there 
were only two blocks of five trials in each, but the order of these blocks was also counter-
balanced across participants, and the order of trials in each block was randomized across 
participants. In between the two blocks there was a simple maze to encourage participants 
to take a quick break.  
                                                 
18 To hear examples of the audio used in the experiment, follow these links: 
Paragraph 1(Reg. cond., order 1): 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IT1gYiOxaEwZs7kPFiXTCAp_iulZzoSk/view?usp=sharing 
Regular many-utterance 1: 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CJmxI8GcRrACUQpYa1GoD33DSLKWTroP/view?usp=sharing 
Reverse many-utterance 1: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eI9ij5J9_L0jNlpsuvsxkavfF_BQ-
L4q/view?usp=sharing 
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Figure 3-6. An example screen of a trial in Experiment 2. Participants could click the html buttons (the 
grey boxes around the response options and at the start of the paragraph) as many times as they liked to 
hear the audio for those stimuli. This was the only change to the presentation that was made between 
Experiment 1 and 2. 
An example screen from this experiment is shown in Figure 3-6. On a trial in this 
experiment, participants were instructed to first play and listen to the audio recording of 
the paragraph, and were invited to read along if they wished. After the paragraph audio 
finished, they were instructed to listen to the audio for each of the two versions of the 
many-utterance in turn. They were allowed to listen to these audio clips as many times as 
they liked. As in Experiment 1, they were then instructed to choose which many-
utterance they felt best summarized the information in the paragraph, and finally rate how 
confident they were about that choice on a 10-point scale. This task took participants 
about 10 minutes to complete on average. During the debrief, participants were informed 
that the information in these paragraphs had been manipulated, and therefore should not 
be taken as fact. 
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3.7.4. Predictions 
Based on the new auditory presentation, if prosodic Focus-marking, via the discourse 
information structure that it signals, serves to sufficiently disambiguate between the 
regular and reverse interpretation of many, then there should be a much clearer, stronger 
effect of the condition manipulation here compared to Experiment 1. That is, 
participants’ selection rates should track closely with the condition they were randomly 
assigned to.  
Moreover, if the availability of the reverse interpretation is blocked by some 
mechanism that only operates over the semantics of individual-level predicates (Diesing 
1988; Herburger 2000; a.o.), but not stage-level predicates, the rate of selecting the 
regular response should be significantly higher on individual-level trials, especially in the 
Regular condition, since the context and the grammar both push participants towards this 
response. In comparison, because stage-level predicates in theory allow both 
interpretations, the regular response rate should track with the condition the participant is 
in, but there should be an overall lower regular response rate compared to individual-
level predicate trials, given this possible variability. Confidence ratings were expected to 
again track roughly with congruent responses – when a participant selects the regular 
response in the Regular condition, they should be more confident than when they select 
the incongruent response; like response rates, confidence may also see a boost on trials in 
the Regular condition with individual-level predicates since the regular interpretation is 
both grammatically and pragmatically licit. 
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3.8. Results 
Response type was coded, and a regular response rate was calculated, as in 
Experiment 1. Referring to Figure 3-7, participants in the Regular condition appear to 
have selected the regular response at a higher rate overall (M = 0.441, SD = 0.498) 
compared to those in the Reverse condition (M = 0.379, SD = 0.486). Moreover, as 
predicted, the regular response rate appears to be much higher within individual-level 
predicates (M = 0.453, SD = 0.499) than stage-level predicates (M = 0.364, SD = 0.482). 
However, when these data were entered into a logistic regression with condition and 
predicate type, as well as their interaction, as fixed effects and participant and trial as 
random effects, the interaction term was not a significant predictor. When the interaction 
was removed and the model was re-run, neither of these main effects was significant 
(condition:  = -0.341, z = -0.986, p = 0.324; predicate type:  = -0.439, z = -1.867, p = 
0.0619). Thus, unlike data from Experiment 1, the type of predicate type does not appear 
to have any effect on response choice in Experiment 2. This unexpected failure to 
replicate the post-hoc results from Experiment 1 could either be because: (i) the results 
of Experiment 1 are spurious, due to the uneven number of each predicate type in that 
original stimulus set, or (ii) because the smaller number of stimuli here (only five trials 
for each predicate type) reduced the statistical power of Experiment 2. These two 
possibilities are discussed further in the General Discussion below. 
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Figure 3-7. Mean regular response rate split by predicate type, across both conditions in Experiment 2. 
Error bars represent standard error. 
As in Experiment 1, participants again provided a confidence rating on each trial, 
indicating how confident they were about the response choice they made. Recall that 
mean ratings were predicted to be higher on trials where participants selected the 
response that would evaluate to true given the facts in the paragraph, and larger 
condition-dependent differences were expected on trials with individual-level predicates 
because both the grammar and the context push them towards the same response. 
Therefore, Figure 3-9 considers mean rating values split by condition, comparing the 
average rating value on trials where participants selected the regular or reverse response, 
across both predicate types. 
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Figure 3-8. A histogram showing the distribution of confidence rating responses made by participants in 
Experiment 2, across both conditions. The mean rating was 7.281 and the median was 8. 
As Figure 3-8 shows, unlike Experiment 1, rating values ranged from 1 to 10, but 
were not normally distributed, skewing toward the upper end of the scale across both 
conditions (with a mean of 7.281 but a median of 8). Mirroring the results of Experiment 
1, mean rating values appear lower when the regular response was chosen (M = 7.277, SD 
= 2.412), compared to the reverse response (M = 7.635, SD = 2.020). However, unlike 
Experiment 1, mean rating values were slightly higher in the Regular condition (M = 
7.595, SD = 2.019) compared to the Reverse condition (M = 7.386, SD = 2.348). Finally, 
contrary to predictions, mean rating values were also slightly higher on trials with stage-
level predicates (M = 7.533, SD = 2.214) compared to individual-level predicates (M= 
7.444, SD = 2.177). Considering Figure 3-9, these differences in mean confidence ratings 
appear to depend largely on the much lower mean confidence rating for trials with 
Regular Cond. Reverse Cond.
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individual-level predicates in the Reverse condition when participants chose the regular 
response. 
 
Figure 3-9. Mean rating values split by condition, comparing the average rating value on trials where 
participants selected the regular or reverse response, across both predicate types for Experiment 2. Error 
bars represent standard error. 
To test which of these differences are reliable, the confidence ratings were entered 
into an ordinal logistic regression with condition, response type, and predicate type, as 
well as all their two- and three-way interaction terms, with both participant and item as 
random effects. None of these terms were significant, so the three-way interaction term 
was removed and the model was re-run. Based on the results of this second model, 
neither the interaction between predicate type and response type ( = -0.293, z = -0.786, p 
= 0.432), nor condition was significant ( = 0.541, z = 1.548, p = 0.122), however, as in 
Experiment 1 the interaction between response type and condition was ( = 0.913, z = 
individual stage
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2.248, p = 0.025). There was no simple effect of condition ( = -1.101, z = -1.903, p = 
0.057), response type ( = 0.106, z = 0.324, p = 0.746), nor predicate type ( = -0.012, z 
= -0.032, p = 0.975). These results suggest that just as in Experiment 1, participants 
were more confident when they chose the response congruent with their condition, 
especially participants in the Reverse condition, regardless of the predicate type. 
3.9. Experiment 2: Discussion 
To summarize, Experiment 2 used auditorily presented many-utterances in order to 
more directly test the hypothesis that the regular-reverse ambiguity in many is 
disambiguated by context-dependent Focus-marking. Experiment 2 also manipulated the 
type of predicate contained in the many-utterances to further investigate the role of these 
semantic factors, and whether they interact with pragmatic factors, in determining this 
regular-reverse ambiguity. While a more robust effect of context (i.e. condition) was 
predicted in Experiment 2 based on this auditory presentation, a reliable difference in 
either selection rates or confidence ratings was not found as a function solely of 
condition, suggesting that prosody, and therefore possibly the preceding discourse 
context is not the strongly deterministic disambiguating influence that the account in 
Section 2.3 predicts. Alternatively, prosody may not be the best or clearest way to 
indicate information structure-derived Focus (an abstract marker of new information). 
Indeed, Hendriks (2004) notes that emphasis is not always a reliable indicator of Focus. 
Accepting that Focus may not have a one-to-one mapping with the particular prosody 
used in Experiment 2, this fact alone cannot explain the results in Experiment 2, 
because paragraphs containing contextualizing information and the predicate type in the 
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many-utterance choices were both manipulated. These paragraphs provided the 
information structure of a proceeding discourse. Therefore, participants should have had 
enough information to reconstruct the intended information structure that would license 
the intended Focus-marking. Thus, participants received two cues to the intended 
information structure and meaning: context and prosody. Therefore, while some 
participants, some of the time may have had lapses in attention, and were therefore 
unable to re-construct the intended meaning, it is hypothesized that both the information 
structure provided by the context and the prosody are only part of the set of factors that 
determine or give rise to a particular interpretation of a many-utterance in a given 
context.  
The replicated effect of predicate type and condition in the mean confidence ratings 
across Experiment 1 and 2, suggests that semantic constraints, such as how the sister NP 
of many is interpreted (Diesing 1988; Herburger 2000) may inform the degree of 
acceptability or felicity of a particular interpretation of a many-utterance. However, the 
inconsistent effect of predicate type, and the lack of the effect of condition, in the binary 
response choice data, suggest that these pragmatic and semantic constraints may not be 
the only factors that are involved in determining the regular-reverse ambiguity of many-
utterances. In the General Discussion below, this possibility is explored in a preliminary 
OT-based analysis (Prince & Smolensky, 1993). A fully articulated OT account of the 
regular-reverse ambiguity in many-utterances is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but 
one account of a closely related phenomenon is reviewed below, which provides the 
beginnings of an explanation for the experimental results found here. 
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3.10. General Discussion 
Synthesizing across the results from Experiments 1 and 2, consistent evidence was 
found in the mean confidence ratings that the information structure (as provided by the 
contextualizing paragraph) did have an effect on which pattern of Focus-marking 
participants used to summarize that information (i.e. whether they selected the regular or 
reverse utterance). This data alone would suggest that information structure, along with 
some aspect – semantic or pragmatic – of the regular or reverse interpretation, are strong 
determinants of Focus-marking and thereby the interpretation of the many-utterance that 
surfaces. However, the conclusion that the information structure is the sole determinant 
of emphatic marking (and thereby the interpretation of many-utterances) is qualified by 
the absence of the hypothesized context effect in the response rate data from both 
Experiments 1 and 2. The fact that response rates did not appear to differ at all between 
conditions, in contrast with confidence ratings, could be due to the fact that this effect is 
not strong enough to be detected by a binary forced choice task, or the effect of the 
context on Focus-marking is determined by a more complex set of interacting factors, and 
therefore more easily detected with the gradable confidence rating responses, given the 
current experimental design.  
In addition, an effect of predicate type was found in the response rate data from 
Experiment 1 but not Experiment 2. The lack of a reliable effect between stage- and 
individual-level predicates raises the possibility that certain methodological limitations 
could be compromising the reliability of the results; perhaps there are further factors that 
need to be controlled or manipulated in order to detect the hypothesized effect of context. 
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The discussion that follows describes in turn the two possible explanations for the 
different patterns of context and predicate type effects across response rate and 
confidence rating data between Experiment 1 and 2; it speculates on possible constraints 
and rankings that could offer useful insight into the true nature of this regular-reverse 
ambiguity; and, finally, considers how such constraints and their rankings might inform 
follow-up experiments that could offer stronger evidence for the interactive role of 
pragmatic, semantic, and prosodic constraints in the interpretation and use of vague, 
ambiguous quantifiers. 
The first possible explanation for why an effect of predicate type was found in 
Experiment 1 response rates and not in Experiment 2, could simply be that the effect 
observed in Experiment 1 was spurious, i.e. this could be an erroneous rejection of the 
null hypothesis, perhaps because the number of individual- and stage-level predicates was 
not balanced in Experiment 1 (only eight of the 20 trials contained individual-level 
predicates), and once there was an equal number of both predicate types in Experiment 
2, this effect correctly disappeared. To confirm this explanation, Experiment 1 should be 
replicated, while maintaining its larger number of trials (e.g. 10), but also carefully 
balancing predicate type, prosody and information structure. If the effects remain reliable, 
this should be taken as further support for the hypothesis that the regular-reverse 
ambiguity does indeed exist and depends on prosody, information structure, and the 
lexical semantics of the predicate type. 
However, confidence ratings were reliably and consistently lower when participants 
in the Reverse condition chose the regular utterance across both experiments. In addition, 
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an effect of predicate type was found in Experiment 1 regular response rates but not in 
Experiment 2. This observation leads to a second explanation of the results: the design 
of these experiments, in particular Experiment 2, is not sensitive enough to detect the 
effect of predicate type and context, i.e. this could be an erroneous acceptance of the null 
hypothesis, since there are only five trials with each predicate type in Experiment 2. 
Indeed, the context had a reliable effect on confidence ratings, suggesting that it does 
play some role in this ambiguity. Thus, if we continue to entertain the hypotheses that 
both the discourse context and the semantics of the utterance have real effects on how 
emphasis in a many-utterance is realized and therefore the interpretation that surfaces, 
then it follows that the current experimental design simply failed to detect these effects. 
This explanation suggests that the manipulation of context and predicate type are simply 
not the correct parameterization of the factors that indeed underlie this ambiguity. This 
possibility is tentatively formalized with an OT analysis below. 
The goal in the remainder of this discussion is to explore a potential, preliminary19 
OT-based explanation of why the results failed to show an effect in response rates, in 
particular why they only showed a regular response rate significantly different from 
chance in the Regular condition on trials with an individual-level predicate. 
In the optimizations below, I follow Hendriks (2004) in assuming that the participant 
has already constructed an information structure from the paragraph and recognized the 
                                                 
19 This analysis is preliminary because the full set of logically possible output candidates has not been 
exhaustively listed and harmonically bounded. Therefore, the tableaux below are meant for illustrative 
purposes only as a demonstration that the constraints developed based on the relevant literature could in 
principle yield an explanation of the results of Experiments 1 and 2. 
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utterance, i.e. read the sentence with italics or heard speech sounds, and assigned a global 
syntactic structure to the many-utterance response choice being considered; together these 
form the input. Thus, the discussion and tableaux below are presented as uni-directional 
optimizations where the input is taken to be the information provided on a trial: the 
licensing QUD (reflecting the content of the contextualizing paragraph), the surface 
syntax of the many-utterance, along with the lexical semantics of the quantifier, the Focus 
operator and the predicate type (individual- or stage-level), as well as the prosodic 
contour of the many-utterance presented (marked with boldface in the tableaux below). 
Correspondingly, the output is taken to be pragmatic-semantic interpretations: the 
meaning that participants thought was the best way to summarize the information in their 
paragraphs. Thus, each tableau below explores the possible optimization process a 
participant undertook as they decided to select either the regular or reverse utterance, 
with either a stage- or individual-level predicate, given the information in the 
contextualizing paragraph. 
Hendriks (2004) has developed an OT-based analysis of the focus-sensitive 
interpretation of sentences containing the quantificational determiner only and contrastive 
emphasis (e.g. (4) below). Only is both a determiner with quantificational structure (i.e. 
two arguments forming the domain and scope, respectively), and a focus particle (i.e. 
with two arguments forming the focus and the background, respectively), and therefore 
closely related to the phenomenon of interest here (see Herburger 2000). According to the 
literature on the interpretation of quantificational determiners like only, the N’ in their 
sister phrase (e.g. ships, in (4) below) restricts the domain of quantification (i.e. saturates 
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their first argument) while the rest of the clause forms the scope of quantification (i.e. 
saturates their second argument). According to the literature on the interpretation of the 
quantificational structure of focus particles like only (and, by assumption, operators like 
~), only elements in the XP they are adjoined to can form their focal content, all the other 
elements they c-command must form the background (see also Herburger 2000). This 
predicts that any focused elements will be in the scope of the quantifier, while any 
backgrounded information will be in the domain of quantification. Indeed, there is also a 
noted preference for placing new or contrastive information in the scope of a quantifier. 
However, there is also a common pattern of emphasizing – referred to more formally as 
accenting – new or contrasting information (c.f. Büring 2003), resulting in the anaphoric 
deaccenting of the other material, which should then, by default, go into the background 
of Focus and the domain of quantification. These semantic and prosodic characterizations 
of the interpretation of only are at odds in sentences like (4). For example, based on the 
accent pattern in (4) (boldface), unload should be in the domain of quantification, but 
according to the syntax ships should be. 
(4) Only ships unload at night. 
Hendriks (2004) proposed four constraints to account for the interpretive possibilities 
of sentences containing only and prosodic emphasis. This analysis adopts three of 
Hendriks’ (2004) constraints, and propose two new constraints largely motivated by the 
data presented Chapters 1 and 2. The first new constraint posited here is a Faithfulness 
constraint that captures the claim from Chapter 2 that information structure strongly 
influences the interpretive possibilities of many-utterances. The second is a faithfulness 
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constrain that captures the close relationship between prosody and information structure, 
inspired by Büring 2003. Together these constraints, within an OT framework begin to 
explain why participants in the Reverse conditions of both experiments were particularly 
uncertain about selecting the regular many-utterance but only showed an elevated regular 
response rate on trials with individual-level predicates in the Regular condition in 
Experiment 1 but not 2. 
In her analysis of only, Hendriks proposed DEACCENTING and FOCUSING. 
DEACCENTING (DEACC) 
If a constituent is anaphorically deaccented, it must contribute to the domain 
of quantification of a quantifier. 
This constraint captures the fact that if an element carries contrastive accent, its sister is 
necessarily anaphorically deaccented (distinct from default accent or no accent; see 
Büring 2003; Hendriks 2004; reminiscent of the interaction between Schwarzschild’s 
1999 GIVENNESS and AVOIDF constraints). Accenting and deaccenting go hand in hand, 
one cannot occur without the other. Therefore, according to the formulation of this 
constraint, a violation is incurred each time the sister of the accented element does not 
contribute to the domain of the quantifier. For example, the first output candidate in 
Tableau 1 incurs a violation because win, the sister of the accented phrase Nobel Prize, 
should be in the domain of many. 
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FOCUSING20 
If a constituent contributes to the focus of a focus particle, use this constituent 
to restrict the scope of the quantification, and use the rest of the clause to 
restrict the domain of quantification. 
This constraint captures the communicative preference against interpreting new or 
salient, focused, information as contributing to the domain of quantification, since the 
domain can be thought of as similar to the background or given information, from which 
some subset is being described by the quantifier (e.g. Scandinavians out of all people who 
have won Nobel Prizes). This constraint is an output-output constraint, because it 
evaluates one aspect of an output candidate (the interpretation of ~) against another (the 
interpretation of many). A violation is incurred each time an element in the first argument 
of the focus operator ~ is not also interpreted in the domain of many. For example, the 
first candidate in Tableau 1 incurs two violations because Scandinavians and win appear 
in the focus of ~, but only win, not Scandinavians, appears in the scope of the quantifier, 
and Nobel Prize, because it is not part of the focus of ~ should appear in the domain of 
many but appears instead in the scope. 
To these constraints, a newly formulated constraint motivated by the account in 
Chapter 2 is added which describes the (apparently) deterministic role of information 
structure in this regular-reverse ambiguity: 
                                                 
20 In Hendrik’s 2004, FOCUSING is conceived as markedness constraint on how the interpretation of the 
focus structure of only maps onto the interpretation of its quantificational interpretation. The formulation of 
this constraint was altered to more generally apply to any focus particle, not only one that is also 
quantificational. 
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INFORMATIONSTRUCTURE (INFOSTRUC) 
The interpretation of a focus operator must be faithful to the denotation of the 
licensing QUD in the discourse context.  
This Faithfulness constrain captures the notion that one must faithfully interpret the 
licensing information structure of a given utterance. Formally, one must interpret the 
value derived by applying the background function (e.g. 
𝜆𝑑′.  (|{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)} ∩ {𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑃, 𝑥}|: |{𝑥: 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑥)}|) ≥ 𝑑 for 
the reverse utterance) to the restrictor set as the focus of ~ (i.e. first argument), and the 
background function of the licensing QUD (e.g., 𝜆𝑑 . ({|𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛 (𝑁𝑃′, 𝑥)|) ≥ 𝑑} for the 
reverse utterance) as the background (i.e. second argument). A violation is incurred for 
every element in the interpretation of ~ that does not correspond to the denotation of the 
QUD as described by its structured meaning. For example, given the input in Tableau 1, 
any output candidate with an interpretation of ~ as ~(win & Nobel Prize, Scandinavians) 
would incur three violations. Because this analysis assumes this is the highest ranked 
constraint, any possible candidates that violate this constrain are ruled out. 
The next new constraint is motivated by the observation that the lexical semantics of 
the predicate, and the syntactic movement that results from those semantics, in a many-
utterance also appears to play a role in determining their interpretive possibilities. In 
Herburger’s 2000 account of the regular-reverse ambiguity, many either undergoes QR, 
which raises the whole DP containing many and its sister NP, or many undergoes Q-
raising, which raises only the quantifier leaving the sister phrase in situ, meaning that 
intermediate elements (like ~) can operate over that sister. Therefore, Herburger predicts 
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that the reverse interpretation of many can only surface when many undergoes Q-raising 
(a kind of A-movement introduced by Herburger that allows only the determiner to raise 
without its sister phrase), but not QR, implying that the reverse interpretation can only 
surface when QR is blocked, which Herburger suggests is the case in so-called 
Definiteness Effect environments, of which stage-level predicates are one. Correlatedly, 
Herburger proposes that anti-Definiteness Effect environments, of which individual-level 
predicates are one, require scope taking by QR (whereas optional and obligatory 
Definiteness Effect environments allow either QR or Q-raising). The constraint below 
formalizes this observation as a constraint on the semantic interpretation of the quantifier, 
thereby remaining theoretically neutral on the syntactic effects of the predicate type.  
ANTIDEF 
Determiners in the subjects of individual-level predicates must undergo QR, 
and therefore must be interpreted as the background of the quantifier. 
This is an OT formulation of Herburger’s 2000 observation that the subjects of 
individual-level predicates, i.e. the sister NP of many, must be interpreted as the 
background, and not the scope of the quantifier. Therefore, a violation is incurred 
whenever any element of the sister NP appears in the scope, and not the background of 
many in the tableaux below. For example, the tied winners in Tableau 4 both incur three 
violations of this constraint because Scandinavians is not interpreted in the background, 
but be and Nobel Prize are. Note however that this constraint is vacuously satisfied, and 
therefore omitted, when a stage-level predicate appears in the input. 
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Finally, both typographically and auditorily emphasized many-utterances were 
presented, following the claim in Büring 2003 that the contrastive accent, or B-accent, 
signals a particular strategy in discourse, i.e. it signals critical information about what the 
speaker takes the information structure of the discourse to be. In the specific case of the 
B-accent it signals that the accented element is new or newer, i.e. contrastive, 
information. This idea is formalized in the following novel OT constraint: 
FAITHPROSODY 
If an element carries a B-accent, interpret as contrastive information. 
This constraint could be thought of as the interpretive counterpart to constraints that force 
new or focused information to be marked in pronounced output (in an optimization where 
interpretations form the input, see the NEW constraint in Choi 1996 or the MARKFOCUS 
constraint in Lutken 2019; see also GIVEN from Schwarzschild 1999). This constraint is 
violated when an interpretive output candidate interprets an element other than the one 
emphasized in the input as contrastive information. For example, this is the critical 
constraint that eliminates the two next best output candidates in Tableau 1 (the 
candidates right above the two winners). 
Tableau 1 and Tableau 2 below show the optimization process that derives the 
reverse and the regular interpretation of a many-utterance with a stage-level predicate in 
the input, and Tableaux 3 and 4 show the optimization with an individual-level predicate 
in the input. Using these six constraints, we can deduce one possible relative ranking 
from which we can derive a pattern of optimal candidates that helps clarify the response 
rate results found in Experiments 1 and 2. 
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INFOSTRUC >> FOCUS >> ANTIDEF >> FAITHPROS >> DEACC 
Note that this ranking assumes that pragmatic constraints outrank semantic and prosodic 
constraints. This assumption is consistent with the view developed in Chapter 2: that the 
interpretive possibilities of many depend on the information structure of the preceding 
discourse (but see Herburger 2000 for an exclusively semantic-syntactic account). 21 
 
Figure 3-10. Response rate data repeated from Experiment 1. Each group of data is labeled according to 
which tableau in the preceding discussion captures the interpretive possibilities (or lack thereof) that arise 
for either the regular or reverse many-utterance (Tableaux 1 & 3 or Tableaux 2 & 4, respectively), for 
stage- and individual-level predicate trials (Tableaux 1 & 2 or Tableaux 3 & 4, respectively). In short, the 
mean rate at which participants’ regular selection responses significantly differed from chance is also the 
only case where the optimization predicts one optimal candidate instead of two (Tableau 4 compared to 
Tableaux 1, 2, & 3). 
Recall that the interaction between predicate type and condition was significant for 
selection rates in Experiment 1, shown in Figure 3-10. Assuming that the results of 
                                                 
21 Indeed, the syntactic constraint is in fact superfluous in these optimizations and has been left in merely to 
illustrate this point. 
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Experiment 1 reflect a real effect, and that the null result in Experiment 2 was due to 
the smaller number of trials (i.e. a reduction in power), the goal the following 
optimizations and discussion is to explore why an effect of context was not detected, and 
what factors can explain the pattern of confidence ratings across both experiments. Each 
optimization is discussed in more detail below. 
Considering the case of stage-level trials first, the tied output winners in Tableaux 1 
and 2 demonstrate that regardless of whether the regular or reverse utterance is selected, 
the participant is faced with a choice between interpreting the subject of the predicate 
generically or specifically. Thus, these optimizations suggest that participants may have 
been at chance in selecting the regular response on these trials because the stimuli in 
these experiments do not systematically constrain the interpretive possibilities of the 
subjects; each subject may have made an interpretive choice based on factors that were 
not controlled or manipulated here. However, these optimizations do not provide a 
complete explanation of why only participants in the Regular condition showed no 
difference in their confidence ratings based on which response they chose. If anything, 
these optimizations suggest that participants in both conditions should have showed 
flatter or lower overall confidence on stage-level predicate trials. 
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Tableau 1. This tableau shows how the interpretation of the regular utterance response would be derived. It 
demonstrates that with a stage-level predicates the interpretive constraints on the quantifier compete with 
the interpretive constraints introduced by contrastive emphasis, how the emphasis is pronounced and the 
semantics of the predicate, but that the interpretive constraints of the Focus operator ~ and information 
structure are the strongest determinants of the interpretation that arises. Recall that the denotation of the 
licensing QUD posited to give rise to this utterance is 𝜆 𝑑 . ({|𝑥: 𝑤𝑜𝑛(𝑥, 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠)|) ≥ 𝑑}.  
Input:  
QUD: How many Scandinavians have won 
different honors? 
Utterance: [ [POS C] ] [1[t1-many Scandinavians] 






many(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
~(Scandinavians & win, NP) 
Contrasted element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Specific 
***! ** * * 
many(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
~(NP, Scandinavians & win) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Specific 
 * *! * 
✌️ many(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
~(NP, Scandinavians & win) 
Contrastive element: Nobel Prize 
Subject: Specific 
(regular interpretation) 
 *   * 
many(win & NP, Scandinavians) 
~(Scandinavians & win, NP) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Specific 
(reverse interpretation) 
***! * *  
many(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
~(NP, Scandinavians & win) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Generic 
 * *! * 
✌️  many(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
~(NP, Scandinavians & win) 
Contrastive element: Nobel Prize 
Subject: Generic 
(regular interpretation) 
 *  * 
many(win & NP, Scandinavians) 
~(Scandinavians & win, NP) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Generic 
(reverse interpretation) 
***! * *  
etc. 
    
 
 - 132 - 
Tableau 2. This tableau shows how the interpretation of the regular utterance response would be derived. It 
demonstrates that with a stage-level predicates the interpretive constraints on the quantifier compete with 
the interpretive constraints introduced by contrastive emphasis, how the emphasis is pronounced and the 
semantics of the predicate, but that the interpretive constraints of the Focus operator ~ and information 
structure are the strongest determinants of the interpretation that arises. Recall that the denotation of the 
licensing QUD posited to give rise to this utterance is 𝜆𝑑 . ({|𝑥: 𝑤𝑖𝑛 (𝑁𝑃′, 𝑥)|) ≥ 𝑑}. 
Input:  
QUD: How many people of each region have won 
the Nobel Prize? 
Utterance: [ [POS C] ] [1[t1-many Scandinavians 






many(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
~(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Specific 
 ***!  * 
many(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
~(win & NP, Scandinavians) 
Contrastive element: Nobel Prize 
Subject: Specific 
(regular interpretation) 
*** !  * * 
✌️ many(win & NP, Scandinavians) 
~(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Specific 
(reverse interpretation) 
   * 
many(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
~(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Generic 
 ***!  * 
many(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
~(win & NP, Scandinavians) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Generic 
***!   * 
many(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
~(win & NP, Scandinavians) 
Contrastive element: Nobel Prize 
Subject: Generic 
(regular interpretation) 
***!  * * 
✌️ many(win & NP, Scandinavians) 
~(Scandinavians, win & NP) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Generic 
(reverse interpretation) 
   * 
etc. 
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Turning to individual-level predicates, Tableaux 3 and 4 demonstrate the importance 
of the anti-Definiteness Effect environments, since the ANTIDEF constraint eliminates the 
interpretive ambiguity of the plural subjects on trials with individual-level predicates, but 
critically only when the input contains the regular QUD. Thus, these optimizations help 
explain why only participants in Regular condition showed significantly higher selection 
rates on trials with many-utterances that contained an individual level predicate. 
Specifically, this analysis and participants’ responses in these tasks suggest that, contra 
Herburger 2000, individual-level predicates are not absolute anti-Definiteness Effect 
environments; ANTIDEF only blocks the generic-specific ambiguity of plural subjects of 
individual-level predicates when the information structure of the discourse gives rise to a 
reverse interpretation. 
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Tableau 3. This tableau shows how the interpretation of the regular utterance response would be derived. It 
demonstrates that with an individual-level predicates the interpretive constraints on the quantifier compete 
with the interpretive constraints introduced by contrastive emphasis, how the emphasis is pronounced and 
the semantics of the predicate, but that the interpretive constraints of the Focus operator ~ and information 
structure are the strongest determinants of the interpretation that arises. Recall that the denotation of the 
licensing QUD posited to give rise to this utterance is 𝜆 𝑑 . ({|𝑥: 𝑏𝑒(𝑥, 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠)|) ≥ 𝑑}.  
Input:  
QUD: How many Scandinavians have each 
different hair color? 
Utterance: [ [POS C] ] [1[t1-many 








many(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
~(Scandinavians & be, blonde) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Specific 
***! **  * * 
many(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
~(blonde, Scandinavians & be) 
Contrastive element: blonde 
Subject: Specific 
(regular interpretation) 
 ** !   *  
many(be & blonde, Scandinavians) 
~(Scandinavians & be, blonde) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Specific 
(reverse interpretation) 
***! * *** *  
many(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
~(Scandinavians & be, blonde) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Generic 
***! **  * * 
many(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
~(blonde, Scandinavians & be) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Generic 
 **  *! * 
�  many(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
~(blonde, Scandinavians & be) 
Contrastive element: blonde 
Subject: Generic 
(regular interpretation) 
 *   * 
many(be & blonde, Scandinavians) 
~(Scandinavians & be, blonde) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Generic 
(reverse interpretation) 
***! * *** *  
etc. 
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Tableau 4. This tableau shows how the interpretation of the regular utterance response would be derived. It 
demonstrates that with an individual-level predicates the interpretive constraints on the quantifier compete 
with the interpretive constraints introduced by contrastive emphasis, how the emphasis is pronounced and 
the semantics of the predicate, but that the interpretive constraints of the Focus operator ~ and information 
structure are the strongest determinants of the interpretation that arises. Recall that the denotation of the 
licensing QUD posited to give rise to this utterance is 𝜆𝑑 . ({|𝑥: 𝑏𝑒 (𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒, 𝑥)|) ≥ 𝑑}. 
Input:  
QUD: How many people of each region are 
blonde? 
Utterance: [ [POS C] ] [1[t1-many 








many(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
~(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Specific 
 ***!   * 
many(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
~(be & blonde, Scandinavians) 
Contrastive element: blonde 
Subject: Specific 
(regular interpretation) 
***!   * * 
✌️  many(be & blonde, Scandinavians) 
~(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Specific 
(reverse interpretation) 
  ***  * 
many(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
~(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Generic 
 ***!   * 
many(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
~(be & blonde, Scandinavians) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Generic 
***!    * 
many(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
~(be & blonde, Scandinavians) 
Contrastive element: blonde 
Subject: Generic 
(regular interpretation) 
***!   * * 
✌️  many(be & blonde, Scandinavians) 
~(Scandinavians, be & blonde) 
Contrastive element: Scandinavians 
Subject: Generic 
(reverse interpretation) 
  ***  * 
etc. 
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Taken together, these optimizations suggest that manipulating or controlling for the 
interpretive possibilities of the plural subjects of the many-utterances used here could 
have resulted in clearer results, i.e. if the interpretation of stage-level trials and 
individual-level trials in the Reverse condition were limited to only specific 
interpretations, reliable differences in response choices and confidence ratings that 
tracked with those selection choices may have been found, as they were individual-level 
predicate trials in the Regular condition.  
Considering the experimental stimuli, it may be the case that the interpretive 
possibilities of the subjects are conflated within the stage-level trials, thereby 
compromising our ability to detect a context-dependent difference in selection rates in 
these many-utterances. Indeed, this seems to be the case considering these example 
stimuli in (5)-(8): 
(5) Many bass hide in shallow areas.   Stage-level, generic 
interpretation 
(6) Many students publish poetry.   Stage-level, generic 
interpretation 
(7) Many pundits thought Perlmutter would win. Stage-level, specific 
interpretation 
(8) Many economists predicted a raise in interest rates. Stage-level, specific 
interp. 
Perhaps with stage-level stimuli balanced for specifically and generically interpreted 
plural subjects, a clearer interpretive preference between the regular and reverse 
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utterances may have been detected. That is, context may prove to be a strong determinant 
in the interpretation of many-utterances, when a particular interpretation is grammatically 
licit, based on the interpretation of a plural subject. 
To summarize, the preliminary OT analysis has yielded some valuable insight into the 
regular-reverse ambiguity, demonstrating first and foremost that the interpretive 
possibilities of a many-utterance arise from the interaction with the semantics of the 
predicate, as well as the information structure and the prosody on the utterance. Further, 
they suggest the generic-specific ambiguity in plural subjects is another critical factor to 
manipulate or control for in further experiments. However, other methodological issues 
may also warrant consideration in further research. For example, in an effort to reduce the 
complexity of the paragraphs, the structure and contents of the comparison class was not 
explicitly manipulated (e.g. how many Andorrans or Germans have won the Nobel 
Prize). This left the full specification of the information structure up to each individual 
participant. More closely controlling this may reduce some of the unaccounted-for 
variance in response rates, and enhance the experiment’s ability to detect the 
hypothesized effect of context on selection rates. 
However, because this is just a sketch of an OT analysis, several other issued remain 
to be worked out. For example, the exhaustive list of logically possible output candidates 
would need to be generated and evaluated against the proposed ranking of constraints 
here to ensure that only the winners identified here are indeed the optimal candidates. 
After that, a complete OT-based account of the regular-reverse ambiguity could confirm 
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that the constraints posited here and the ranking assumed, do indeed derive the same 
interpretive possibilities as those sketched above.  
In conclusion, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 taken together, partially support the 
main claim that discourse-licensed Focus marking does play a role in disambiguating 
between the regular and reverse interpretations of many-utterances. The regular response 
selections rates and confidence ratings recorded in Experiment 1 and 2 did not fully 
support the hypothesis that the information structure of the discourse context is signaled 
by emphasis (italics or prosody), and categorically licenses either the regular or reverse 
interpretation. Instead considering this phenomenon through the theoretical framework of 
OT, suggested that the generic-specific ambiguity in plural subjects also plays a role. 
Further investigations of ambiguous, vague quantifiers like many should attempt to define 
the pragmatic factors that determine this generic-specific ambiguity, and align them with 
those that determine the regular-reverse ambiguity. 
So, to return to the question posed in the title of this chapter, neither Focus, nor the 
prosodic contour thought to signal new information, alone fully determine the regular-
reverse ambiguity in many. The regular and reverse interpretations of many, instead arise 
out of a complex interaction of semantic, prosodic, and pragmatic constraints on the 
interpretive possibilities of all the elements in a many-utterance.  
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4. Is the default meaning of many relative and proportional? 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes two experiments designed to demonstrate that a relative, 
proportional interpretation is the default meaning of many; specifically, that the 
comparison class is a critical part of calculating the truth-values of a many-utterance in a 
given context. To do so, participants were instructed to verify a many-utterance with 
respect to carefully constructed arrays of different colored dots in a speeded judgement 
task. Following Lidz, et al. (2011) and Pietroski, et al. (2009), these experiments assume 
that the linguistic truth-conditions for many, like most, interface with domain-general 
quantity representations, i.e. the approximate magnitude representations of the 
Approximate Number System (ANS; Carey, 2009; Dehaene, 1997), and perceptual 
representations of sets of objects, i.e. parallel individuation processes(Carey, 2009; 
Halberda, Sires & Feigenson, 2006). These experiments leverage what psychologists 
know about the ANS and parallel individuation to look for evidence that participants 
attempt to track all the sets in the context, as the proposed denotation of many predicts. 
First, the nature of this interface and the ANS are briefly described. Then previous work 
confirming the validity of this assumption is reviewed. Next, each experiment is 
described in detail. Finally, the importance of these experimental results is related back to 
the account developed in Chapter 2, and the broader literature. 
4.1.1. Interfaces with the Approximate Number System 
First, let us consider what it would take for a human to understand and use many 
according to the semantic denotation proposed in Section 2.3. First, we must consider the 
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nature of the representations that would underpin the meaning of the degree sets over 
which the critical neutral segment22 function operates, and then we must consider the 
nature of the cognitive system that underlies those meanings, to ultimately understand 
how the truth-conditions of such a semantic denotation are computed in a particular 
context. 
Language is not a completely isolated cognitive system. In order to produce and 
comprehend the meanings that language attempts to convey, the linguistic system must 
interface with a multitude of other cognitive systems. For example, quantifiers like many 
and most must be understood as comparisons between quantities or magnitudes. 
Therefore, they offer an ideal illustration of this claim because they may be verified with 
recourse to some representation of quantity and some process of differentiating the 
relevant sets in a given context. In the case where the interlocutor does not have the time 
or ability to count, quantity can be represented as approximate magnitudes, i.e. the 
representations of the ANS (Carey, 2009; Dehaene, 1997; Feigenson, Dehaene & Spelke, 
2004) and different sets can be individuated and tracked by the visual attention system 
and visual working memory (Carey, 2009).  
The experiments described in this chapter leverage what psychologists know about 
the ANS and the parallel individuation process to look for evidence supporting the 
relative proportionality of many posited in Chapter 2. Specifically, the relative aspect of 
the denotation predicts that the quantity of elements in the quantified set must be 
                                                 
22 Recall from Chapter 2 that the notion of ‘neutral segment’ (Romero 2015b), is likely some kind of 
central tendency over the whole comparison class (Solt 2009). In this chapter it is operationalized as the 
mean for clarity and simplicity. 
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compared to the neutral segment, which is calculated over the quantity of elements in 
each of the relevant sets in the comparison class – the proportional aspect. Extensive 
previous research (reviewed by Carey, 2009; Dehaene, 1997; Feigenson, Dehaene & 
Spelke, 2004) has demonstrated that when two approximate magnitudes are compared in 
the ANS, the accuracy with which this comparison process can be accomplished depends 
on the ratio of difference between the two magnitudes; as the ratio approaches 1:1, 
discriminability – the ease and accuracy with which the two magnitudes can accurately 
be differentiated – decreases. For example, both 2 vs. 3 and 8 vs. 12 can be discriminated 
with the same degree of difficulty by educated adults, but both 8 vs. 9 and 16 vs 18 are 
considerably more difficult, and may even not be discriminable for some adults – 
meaning that 8 and 9 are perceived as the same quantity (Dehaene, 1997). Moreover, 
since the denotation proposed in Chapter 2 posits that a mean and standard deviation 
must be computed over the whole comparison class, the cardinality of each individual set 
must be represented and tracked somehow. Research (reviewed by Carey, 2009) has 
shown that the perceptual system has the capacity to individually track the cardinality of 
about three sets in parallel, after which accurate magnitude estimation of multiple sets 
rapidly decreases (Halberda, Sires & Feigenson, 2006).  
Given these limitations on comparing magnitudes in the ANS and parallel 
individuation in of attention and working memory, Lidz, et al. (2011), Pietroski, et al. 
(2009), and the experiments described in the rest of this chapter use the magnitude 
discrimination and parallel individuation as tools for investigating the proposed semantic 
denotations of quantifiers. By rapidly presenting arrays of dots and manipulating the 
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number of different colored sets, these experiments are able to determine the nature of the 
relative comparison being computed (ratio-dependent effects), and how and whether the 
different sets are used to compute the magnitudes being compared (set number-
dependent effects).  
4.1.2. Experimental validation of the Interface Transparency Thesis: The 
verification of the quantifier most can be supported by ANS representations 
The Interface Transparency Thesis (ITT; Lidz, et al., 2011) states that competent 
speakers of a language are biased towards verifying the truth-values of a given linguistic 
utterance in a way that is consistent with a “canonical specification of truth-conditions” 
(p.227) (i.e. a semantic denotation). In a series of experiments described in more detail 
below, Lidz and colleagues find support for this thesis by showing that when asked to 
verify most-utterances, people seem to rely on enumerating objects in a scene, even when 
the scene makes a rapid perceptual strategy, like one-to-one matching, extremely salient 
and easier (e.g. the difference between panel (a) versus (b) and (c) in Figure 4-1 below). 
The experiments in this chapter assume the validity of the ITT, and first replicate Lidz, et 
al. and then extend these findings to a new experimental design to demonstrate that the 
comparison class is a critical piece of information when verifying a many-utterance, as 
the pragmatic-semantic account of many in Section 2.3 posits. 
In an initial experiment, Pietroski, et al. (2009) posited two possible verification 
strategies for the sentence “Most of the dots are yellow.”  
(1) Greater-than [#{x: Dots(x) & Yellow(x)}, #{x: Dots(x) & Yellow(x)}] 
(2) One-to-one-plus [{x: Dot(x) & Yellow(x)}, {x: Dot(x) & Yellow(x)}] 
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The critical difference between these possible strategies is that (1) requires a count of 
yellow dots and non-yellow dots, while (2) only requires that the set of yellow dots 
correspond in a one-to-one relation, to the set of non-yellow dots. While both strategies 
would result in the same pattern of true and false judgements, Pietroski, et al. (2009) note 
that only (1) corresponds to the proposed formal semantic truth-conditions of most 
(Hackl, 2009; c.f. Romero 2015b). Moreover, the ANS can only support the processing 
required by the strategy in (1), because the ANS cannot represent unity (i.e.1), so some 
other representational system, e.g. an object tracking system, would be required to 
support the strategy in (2). They presented participants with randomized trials, each 
Figure 4-1. Example array types from Pietroski, et al., (2009). (A) Unpaired Scattered; (B) Paired Scattered; 
(C) Unsorted Column. Participants were shown an array of dots for 200ms and then asked whether the 
sentence “Most of the dots are yellow,” was true or false in relation to the screen they had just seen. 
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containing one of the array types shown in Figure 4-1. The array had either random 
dispersed dots ((a)) or grouped dots ((b) and (c)), in either scattered locations ((c) and (b)) 
or aligned in columns ((c))23 and asked them to indicate whether or not the sentence 
“Most of the dots are yellow,” was true or false with respect to the array they had just 
seen. Note that grouped arrays (e.g. (b) and (c)) in particular lend themselves to the 
strategy given in (2), because the set of dots that has more items can be easily perceived 
by just looking for the dots that do not have a pair from the other set. Despite this 
seemingly more efficient strategy, they found that accuracy decreased as the ratio 
between yellow and blue dots increased across all three of these array types, suggesting 
that participants were in fact attempting to discriminate the yellow (Quantified Set) dots 
from the blue (Comparison Class) dots (a ratio-dependent effect). Moreover, participants 
could only have pursued this enumeration strategy using their ANS since the rapid 
presentation (200ms) of the arrays precluded any overt, exact count of the dots. Pietroski 
et al. thus concluded that participants follow the verification strategy given by a word’s 
semantic truth-conditional denotation.  
In a subsequent study, these researchers pursued this issue further asking if the 
denotation of most in fact requires the enumeration of two sets (e.g. the yellow dots and 
the non-yellow dots) or whether it requires the enumeration of more sets (e.g. each color 
                                                 
23 In a fourth array type, the dots were sorted by color into vertical columns. With this array type 
participants’ responses were significantly more accurate, even with extremely difficult to discriminate 
ratios (based on the properties of the ANS). Critically, simulated data derived from a model of the ANS fit 
the response data from all but this column-sorted trial type suggesting a completely different strategy was 
employed – one that could not have employed ANS representations (Lidz, et al., 2011). These results offer 
a caveat to the ITT – the context (i.e. visual display) can override a linguistic specification of meaning in 
some extreme cases. This point becomes relevant in the Discussion of Experiment 4. 
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of dots) (Lidz, et al., 2011). These hypothesized verification strategies are schematized in 
(3) and (4). Note that (3) is functionally equivalent to the meaning sketched for most in 
Section 2.3.2 because, unlike (3), it only predicts ‘true’ responses when the yellow set is 
the single largest set, requiring participants to individuate in parallel more and more sets 
as the number of colors in the array increases.24 Lidz, et al. (like Pietroski, et al., 2009) 
posited that (3), rather than (4), represents the preferred verification strategy for 
participants prompted with “Most of the dots are blue.” 
(3) # of yellow dots > # of all dots - # of yellow dots 
(4) # yellow dots > # of red dots + # blue dots 
                                                 
24 As Tomaszewicz (2013) demonstrates, some languages, e.g. Polish and Bulgarian, have lexically distinct 
terms for these two meanings. However, these two different mosts are not clearly lexicalized in English, but 
can informally be thought of as the difference between most (meaning majority, relative to the whole) and 
the most (meaning for the most part, relative to the other subsets of the whole) (Romero 2015b; 
Tomaszewicz, 2013). 
Figure 4-2. An example array from Lidz, et al., (2011). Participants were shown this screen for 150ms 
and then asked whether the sentence “Most of the dots are yellow,” was true or false in relation to the 
screen they had just seen.  
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Lidz, et al. (2011) briefly presented (150 ms) arrays of different colored dots and 
asked participants to verify whether a most-utterance was true with respect to the display. 
Figure 4-2 shows an example of their experimental stimuli. They reasoned that if 
participants follow the verification strategy in (4), accuracy should decrease as the 
number of sets increases due to the limits on parallel individuation: the adult attentional 
system and the ANS cannot enumerate more than about three sets in parallel (Halberda, 
Sires, & Feigenson, 2006), predicting significantly worse performance overall on trials 
with more than three different colored Sets. 
Lidz, et al. (2011) found that participants’ ability to correctly accept or reject the 
sentence relative to the array did not differ as a function of the number of different 
colored Sets in the array (no set number-dependent effect), suggesting that (3), not (4), is 
the preferred verification strategy for most. They further found that a psychometric model 
of the ANS, reflecting the ratio-dependent effects inherent in its noisy magnitude 
representations, closely fit their participants’ acceptance patterns. Specifically, 
participants’ accuracy increased as the ratio of yellow dots to non-yellow dots increased 
(i.e. as the distance between the two magnitudes got larger). Lidz, et al., like Pietroski et 
al. thus concluded that participants follow the verification strategy given by a word’s 
semantic truth-conditional denotation, and in the case of the quantifier most, this requires 
enumeration that can be supported by the ANS. 
In summary, Pietroski, et al. (2009) shows that formal semantic denotations proposed 
by linguists on the basis of intuited truth-conditions do appear to constrain peoples’ 
default or preferred verification strategies, somewhat independently of whether specific 
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physical properties of context lend themselves to such a strategy or not. Lidz, et al. 
(2011) further shows that this paradigm can be used to adjudicate between competing 
hypothesized verification strategies, offering an experimental way to uncover the various 
ways in which meaning can be specified in the semantic system. Moreover, these results 
suggest that the non-linguistic ANS can provide magnitude estimates to the semantic 
system in order to compute the truth-value for a most-utterance. In short, these 
experiments demonstrate how researchers can leverage their understanding of a particular 
cognitive system, in this case the limits of the ANS and visual attention system, to 
evaluate linguistic proposals. Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 described below attempt 
to demonstrate that the relative and proportional aspects of the denotation posited in 
Section 2.3 do indeed arise as a verification strategy for many-utterances, extending and 
further validating the ITT, and offering experimental support for the account of many 
developed in Chapter 2. 
Let us now consider a possible verification strategy based on the semantic denotation 
of many proposed in Section 2.3. The denotation, repeated here as (5), is relative in the 
sense that is compares two quantities, and proportional in the sense that the values of 
those quantities are defined by the quantified set and each of the alternative sets in the 
comparison class as well; all of which depends on the immediate context25. 
(5) ⟦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝⟧ =  𝜆 𝑃〈𝑒,𝑡〉. 𝜆 𝑄〈𝑒,𝑡〉. 𝜆 𝑑𝑑 . (|𝑃 ∩ 𝑄|: |𝑃|) ≥ 𝑑 
                                                 
25 As opposed to a so-called absolute interpretation (e.g. Partee 1988 summarized in Chapter 1) which 
might compare the Quantified Set to some value not derived from the immediate context. 
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In the context of the experiments described in this chapter, the relative nature of the 
denotation proposed in Section 2.3 suggests that representing the proportions of the main 
Quantified Set (e.g. the numerosity of dots that are blue; P in (5)) and Comparison Class 
(the numerosity of each set of each color; Q in (5)) in a context is critical for calculating 
the truth-value of a many-utterance. Following the reasoning of the ITT, that the semantic 
denotation does strongly bias competent speakers towards verifying words in a 
functionally equivalent way to the truth-conditions, then a participant asked to verify a 
many-utterance in a paradigm like Lidz, et al.’s (2011) will need to estimate the 
magnitude of each alternative set in the Comparison Class and the Quantified Set, and 
compare the magnitude of the Quantified Set to the mean magnitude of all the sets 
present in the context. This proposed strategy, schematized as (6) below is in contrast to 
the much simpler strategy for most found by Lidz, et al. (2011), which only requires the 
magnitude estimation of the quantified and non-quantified sets26, as schematized in (7) 








(7) Most: |𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷| > |𝐴𝐿𝐿| − |𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷| 
Four illustrative examples are described below, to prime the readers’ intuitions about the 
meanings of these quantifiers, especially the cases in which their truth-values are 
predicted to differ.  
                                                 
26 The strategy proposed by Lidz, et al., (2011) was inspired by Hackle’s (2009) degree-based account of 
most, and is consistent with Romero’s (2015b) findings that the cardinal interpretation of most may be the 
only available interpretation in English. 
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Referring to the contexts in Figure 4-3, consider the truth-values of both (8) and (9) 
for each context. 
(8) Most of the dots are yellow. 
(9) Many of the dots are yellow. 
Assuming the schematized verification strategies in (6) and (7) above, the predicted 
verification responses are indicated for each context (true = ✓ and false = #).  
First, consider the context in which there are only two different colors of dots: 6 
yellow and 5 blue (Figure 4-3 A). According to the denotation proposed in Section 2.3, 
many is true here. Adopting the denotation proposed by Lidz, et al. (2011; adapted from 









Figure 4-3. Example stimuli to illustrate contexts with just 2 Sets where (a) many and most are both 
true, and (b) are both false; and contexts with 3 Sets where (c) many and most are both true, and (d) 
many but not most is true. 
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✓ ⟦𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡⟧= 6 > (11 – 6)  
✓ ⟦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦⟧= = 6 ⁄ 11 > μ (5 ⁄ 11)  
Now consider the context with 5 yellow dots and 6 blue dots (Figure 4-3 B). In this case, 
neither most nor many would be acceptable.  
# ⟦𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡⟧= 5 > (11– 5)  
# ⟦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦⟧  = 5/ 11 > μ (6 ⁄ 11)  
So far, it seems like most and many are interchangeable. But the real distinction 
between most and many appears with contexts with more than two sets. To demonstrate 
this, consider the minimally more complex situation where there are now three different 
colors of dots, 10 yellow, 3 blue, and 4 red dots (Figure 4-3 C). In this context, both 
sentences are correct according to the denotations. 
✓ ⟦𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡⟧= 10 > (17– 10)  
✓ ⟦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦⟧= 10/ 17 > μ (3 ⁄ 17 + 4/17)  
Finally, consider the context with 7 yellow dots, 5 blue and 5 red dots, now many is true, 
but most is not, illustrated in Figure 4-3 D.  
# ⟦𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡⟧= 7 > (17– 7)  
✓ ⟦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦⟧= 7/ 17 > μ (5 ⁄ 17 + 5/17)  
In summary, the size of the other sets in the context affects the truth-values of many, 
unlike most which is only sensitive to the total number of the remaining, unquantified 
items. 
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The difference in these two verification strategies predicts that in a paradigm like that 
used in Lidz, et al. (2011), participants who are asked to verify many would show a 
decrease in accuracy as the number of different sets increased, unlike participants asked 
to verify most. If this predicted difference in response behavior is observed, simply by 
varying the number of sets and keeping all else equal, this will be taken as support for the 
relative, proportional denotation of many. 
4.2. Overview of Experiments 
Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 aim to validate the relative, proportional 
denotation of many proposed in Section 2.3. In particular, these two experiments 
investigate the claim that in order to calculate the truth-conditions and verify a many-
utterance, one must perform an averaging operation over all the sets present. As 
described in Chapters 1 and 2, this relative proportionality of the denotation is the 
critical semantic machinery that gives rise to the apparent vagueness of many; because 
proportions must be compared and these magnitudes depend directly on the context: there 
is no one threshold value between many and not-many. Moreover, the magnitudes can be 
represented by the ANS. Thus, the very representations of the magnitudes themselves are 
noisy and approximate. This all results in the apparent indeterminacy of the truth-
conditions, i.e. vagueness, of many-utterances.   
Experiment 3 begins by replicating the Lidz, et al. (2011) experiment described in 
the previous section, and then aims to show that participants’ verification responses to 
many, unlike most, differ depending on the number of different alternative sets present on 
a given trial. To that end, arrays of dots of varying colors were briefly presented and 
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participants were asked to verify many-utterances in relation to those arrays. Asking 
people to either accept or reject a many-utterance as a description of the array, whilst 
manipulating the ratio value involved in the hypothesized verification strategy and the 
number of sets, and comparing results between subjects asked to verify many and those 
asked to verify most will offer further validity to the proposed denotation for many in 
Section 2.3. However, as discussed in more detail in the Discussion of Experiment 3, 
the design of the stimuli in Experiment 3 limited the validity of the conclusions. 
To strengthen and further validate the conclusions from Experiment 3, Experiment 
4 strongly biased participants towards a relative strategy by grouping the dots by color 
and using the partitive construction in the prompt to be verified. It also improved on the 
design of Experiment 3, by manipulating the ratio and set number orthogonally, 
allowing us to more clearly interpret differences in response curves and compare 
responses across the many- and most-conditions directly.  
The results of both these experiments demonstrate that people do in fact interpret 
many in a relative, proportional way – showing differences in their acceptance behavior 
as a function of the relative proportion of the Quantified Set compared to the other Sets in 
the context – a trial in these experiments. Indeed, evidence was also found for a similarly 
relative verification strategy when participants were prompted to verify most in a context 
that strongly biased them toward a relative, proportional strategy, supporting the posited 
critical role of context in the interpretation of ambiguous, vague quantifiers. 
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4.3. Aim 
Experiment 3 aims to find support for the relative, proportional denotation of many 
proposed in Section 2.3, which predicts that participants must enumerate the alternative 
sets in the Comparison Class when verifying many. This experiment first replicates 
findings from Lidz, et al. (2011), where participants are prompted with most, and then 
compares those results to an identical condition where participants are prompted with 
many. 
4.4. Background and Hypotheses 
Following Lidz, et al.’s (2011) ITT, the denotation of many proposed in Section 2.3 
gives rise to the following hypothesized verification strategies and predictions, with 
respect to Lidz, et al.’s experimental paradigm: 
Hypothesized verification strategy for most (adapted from Lidz, et al. (2011)): 
according to some semantic accounts (c.f. Hackl, 2009; Romero, 2015b; c.f. also 
Tomaszewicz’s (2013) Most1) the denotation of most gives rise to a verification strategy, 
schematized below, which proposes that the cardinality of the Quantified Set is compared 
to the difference of the cardinality of the Quantified Set and the total cardinality of all the 
Alternative Sets; if the cardinality of the Quantified Set is at least one greater than this 
difference, then the utterance should be judged true in that context. 
|𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷| > |𝐴𝐿𝐿| − |𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷| 
Hypothesized verification strategy for many: according to the proposed semantic-
pragmatic account in Section 2.3, the denotation for many gives rise to a verification 
strategy, schematized below, that considers the proportion of the Quantified Set to every 
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relevant entity in the context, and compares it to the mean proportion of each of the 
Alternative Sets in the Comparison Class (i.e. to every relevant entity in the context) 27; if 
the proportion of the Quantified Set is greater than or equal to the average proportion of 




𝜇(|𝐴𝐿𝑇1|, |𝐴𝐿𝑇2|, … )
|𝐴𝐿𝐿|
 
The critical factor being tested in this experiment is whether many in fact requires the 
verifier to enumerate each Alternative Set, rather than simply compare the Quantified Set 
to the non-quantified sets, or alternatives, like most (which requires just enumerating the 
Quantified Set, and its superset of all relevant entities in the context). 
4.5. Method 
4.5.1. Participants 
Sixty-two undergraduate students (25 males), all with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, participated in this experiment for course credit. One participant’s data is not 
included in the analyses below because of a technical error in saving their data file. This 
resulted in data for analysis from 30 participants in the most-condition (10 males) and 31 
participants in the many-condition (15 males). This procedure was approved by the 
Homewood Institutional Review Board. 
                                                 
27 Based on the consensus in the semantics literature (Cohen 2001; Romero, 2015; Solt 2009; 2015), this 
includes the Quantified Sets itself (see Cohen 2001 for discussion of why); intuitively, the items in the 
quantified set are a member of the whole class of those like items. In the account developed in this 
dissertation, this is captured by the neutral segment function L(Q), which operates over the whole set Q, 
which contains the Quantified Set. 
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4.5.2. Design and Materials 
In order to test the hypothesis that many, unlike most, requires the verifier to 
enumerate each Alternative Set, the same experimental design as Lidz, et al. (2011) was 
used, except for a few small changes. This experiment follows a mixed design with 5 
(Ratio Bin: 1:2, 2:3, 3:4, 5:6, 7:8) x 4 (Sets: 2, 3, 4, 5 color sets) within-subjects factors, 
and quantifier type as a 2-level (many, most) between-subjects factor. Ratio Bins 
contained a range of ratio values, calculated as the cardinality of the Quantified Set 
divided by the summed cardinalities of all the Alterative Sets, centered around the 
nominal ratio value of the Bin (e.g. the 1:2 Ratio Bin contained ratio values ranging from 
0.41 to 0.57 with a mean value of 0.5). Sets refers to the number of sets of different 
colored dots on a trial. For example, there may be 2 Sets (5 blues dots and 7 yellow dots) 
or 5 Sets (7 blue dots, 2 red dots, 2 yellow dots, 2 green dots, and 1 purple dot).  
To prevent the total area of a set (in pixels) or the size of a dot from being cues to set 
cardinality, on half of trials the size of each dot varied so that the total number of pixels 
for all blue dots was equal to the total number of pixels for non-blue dots on the screen 
(Area-controlled trials). On the other half of trials, the sizes of all dots were randomly 
varied up to ±35% of the average dot size in a set, such that the size of the average blue 
dot was made equal to the average non-blue dot (Size-controlled trials). This design 
yielded 5x4x2=40 unique trial types. Sample trials from different Ratio Bin x Set number 
levels are shown in Figure 4-4.  
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Figure 4-4. Examples of displays generated according to the trial design for Experiment 3. 
Participants were presented with 10 of each trial-type for a total of 400 actual trials. 
An additional 12 practice trials were randomly generated from the set of possible trial-
types, but were not include in the final data analyzed. Across all trials, the number of 
possible dots in the Quantified Set ranged from 5 to 17 (with the number of total possible 
dots on any given trial ranging from 10-32), where the cardinality of the Quantified Set 
was at least one greater than the cardinality of all Alternative Sets combined. In the other 
half of the trials, the total cardinality of all the Alternative Set(s) was at least one greater 
than the cardinality of the Quantified Set (i.e. half of all trials were true, and the other 
half were false, according to Lidz, et al.’s (2011) verification strategy for most). 
4.5.3. Procedure 
Using the design described above, all trials were randomly generated at the start of 
each participant’s run using the purpose-written Java package from Lidz, et al. (2011). 
Trials were presented in a unique, random order for each participant. At the start of each 
trial, the participant was shown the remaining number of trials, and instructed to press the 
space bar when they were ready to begin the trial. Once they did so, the prompt 
2 sets 
8:12, Ratio Bin: 2:3, size controlled 
 
 


























10:3:3, Ratio Bin: 2:3 size controlled 
 
 


























11:4:4:4, Ratio Bin: 5:6, size controlled 
 
 


























7:2:2:2:2, Ratio Bin: 7:8, size controlled 
 
 
17:2:2:3:2, Ratio Bin: 1:2, area controlled 
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disappeared, and an array of dots was presented for 150ms. After the dots disappeared, 
unlike in Lidz, et al., a prompt appeared (“Many/Most dots were blue.”28) depending on 
which quantifier condition the participant had been randomly assigned to. Below this 
prompt were reminders to press the ‘J’ key if they thought the sentence was true given the 
array of dots just seen, or ‘F’ if not. There was no time limit for this response. Once they 
pressed either key, the next trial would begin. Participants completed the task in roughly 
20 minutes on average. Figure 4-5 shows a schematic of this task flow. 
 
Figure 4-5. A schematic of the screens and task flow used in Experiment 3. 
4.5.4. Analysis 
In Lidz, et al.’s (2011) original experimental design, the ratios in the Ratio Bins were 
constructed to reflect the hypothesized verification strategy for most, so that the 
                                                 
28 This prompt was used rather than the original “Most/Many of the…”, reasoning that a stronger case 
could be made if evidence of a relative, proportional verification strategy was found in the absence of the 
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magnitude of the ratio reflected the degree of ‘true’-ness or ‘false’-ness of most. 
However, that original ratio space does not reflect the hypothesized truth-conditions of 
many, because increases in that ratio magnitude do not necessarily correspond to an 
increase in ‘true’-ness of many. For example, if we consider the display in Figure 4-4 E 
with 13 blue dots and 6 red dots, this display sits in very different locations in the two 
quantifier-specific ratio spaces. For most, which compares the Quantified Set to the total 
cardinality of all the Alternative Sets, the ratio would be calculated as 13/6=2.167. 
Whereas many, by hypothesis, compares the cardinality of the Quantified Set to the mean 
cardinality of the Sets29, so the ratio would be calculated as 13/mean(13,6)=13/9.5=1.368. 
Assuming that the participants are considering each array in the ratio space derived from 
these verification strategies, the known ratio limit for distinguishing two cardinalities in 
the ANS, predicts that verifying a “Most…” prompt on this kind of trial would be much 
easier than verifying a “Many…” prompt. Therefore, to analyze the results of this 
experiment, two different Ratio scales were calculated:  
i) A most-Ratio derived from the hypothesized verification strategy of most. 
This ratio reflects the cardinality of the Quantified Set divided by the total 
cardinality of all the Alternative Set(s)30, following Lidz, et al. (2011).  
                                                 
29 Because the total cardinality of all the items in the context is known for all trials in this experiment, and 
these items are not being contrasted with any other kind of item, the proportional aspect of the many-
verification strategy is set aside for now. The calculation in these contexts with and without the 
denominator are equivalent: 
13
19






) = 13 >  𝜇(6,13) 
30 This ratio was calculated as |Blues| / |Alternatives| for True trials (i.e. when |Blues| > |Alternatives|), and 
2 – (|Alternatives| / |Blues|) for False trials (i.e. when |Blues| < |Alternatives|), for the same reason as above. 
This was to achieve roughly symmetric data around the hypothesized threshold with a minimal gap 
between True and False trials. 
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ii) A many-Ratio derived from the proposed verification strategy of many, 
such that the ratio reflects the cardinality of the Quantified Set over the 
total number of dots divided by the mean cardinality of all the Alternative 
Set(s) over the total number of dots31;  
Both of these ratios were then binned in increments of 0.1.  
Our aim is to determine whether the rate of acceptance responses differs depending 
on the number of Sets on a trial, specifically if participants were asked to verify 
“Many…” but not if they were asked to verify “Most….” To answer this question, 
sigmoid curves derived from a psychometric beta-binomial model of a participant in this 
kind of perceptual Yes-No judgement task were fitted to the data, using the python 
package psignifit 432 (see Schutt, Harmeling, Macke and Wichmann (2016) for more 
details on this package). This package estimates the posterior distribution over five 
parameters that describe a sigmoid curve33, and confidence intervals (CIs) around each 
parameter value, using Bayesian inference given a prior over these parameter values 
derived from a beta-binomial observer model (see Fründ, Haenel & Wichmann (2011) for 
                                                 
31 Like most, this ratio was calculated as |Blues| / mean(|alternative 1|, |alternative 2|,…) for True trials (i.e. 
when |Blues| > mean of the alts), and 2 – (mean of the alts / |Blues|) for False trials (i.e. when |Blues| < 
mean of the alts).  
32 The package and a wiki are available on the Wichmann Lab’s github: https://github.com/wichmann-
lab/python-psignifit 
33 Assuming the function in (i), adapted from Fründ et al. (2011): 






) (𝑥 − 𝜃)−1 
Where  (the increments of the stimulus intensity) was always 0.1, based on the bins of the ratio bins.  
A fifth parameter is also estimated, , with values between 0-1, where values close to 0 indicate little 
to no over-dispersion in the data (a measure of variability). The results of this fitting procedure become less 
reliable with severely over-dispersed data. However, because all estimated  values from the data were 
between 1x10-5, 1x10-10, eta values are not reported or discussed here.  
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more details on this model). According to their conventional interpretations in the 
psychometric function literature (c.f. Kingdom & Prins, 2016), two parameters are 
critical for evaluating the hypothesized set number effect34. Width, w, measures the range 
of the curve where the velocity – the rate of change – is greatest (has steepest slope). 
Steeper slopes are taken to indicate more precise or categorical judgements because the 
range of stimulus intensity between unanimous rejection rates and unanimous acceptance 
rates is relatively narrow. In the context of this experiment, lower width values are an 
indication that participants’ responses more closely approximate the idealized binary 
truth-conditions (true, false), suggesting that perceptual, pragmatic, or other cognitive 
factors are less influential, relative to the semantic meaning itself. Threshold, , measures 
the point where the sigmoid tips from mean 'reject' responses to mean 'accept' responses. 
In the context of this experiment, the threshold is the lowest ratio value that participants 
judged ‘true’ on average (e.g. average acceptance rate > 0.5), given the trial-type and the 
prompt. This parameter can reflect the difficulty of discrimination, since it reflects the 
                                                 
34 Two other parameters are typically considered:  
: lapse rate – the shift down in acceptance rate (from 1) for stimuli that should be judged ‘true’ 
but are rejected as a result of factors independent of the stimulus itself, e.g. a 
lapse in attention.  
: guess rate – the shift up in mean acceptance rate (from 0) for stimuli that should be judged 
‘false but are judged ‘true’ as a result of stimulus properties, a guess when a 
ratio is perceptually difficult to distinguish.  
These are nuisance variables in the sense that higher values for the lapse and 
guess rates would indicate the degree to which the range of average acceptance 
rates is compressed as a result of perceptual noise or uncontrollable variance, e.g. 
the participant ‘giving up’ and making a random response. Little variation in 
these parameters appears in the data as a function of the Set factor, and therefore 
they are not discussed at length. 
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point in the ratio space referred to as subjective equality – or where ratios are perceived 
as 1:1. 
Thus, each of these parameters indicates a different aspect of the participants’ response 
behavior in this kind of Yes-No judgement task.  
In the psychometric modeling approach, if the fitted parameter values of the sigmoid 
curve different datasets are distinct, the researcher can reliably infer that those data were 
generated by a distinct cognitive or perceptual process. With the fitted parameter 
estimates in psignifit 4, the degree to which one curve is distinct from another is defined 
by the degree of overlap in each parameter value’s CI. In the results presented below, the 
CIs – estimated via the same Bayesian Inference procedure as the parameter values – 
indicate the range that contains 95% of all estimated values of each parameter, given the 
data and the beta-binomial prior distribution over these parameters. Thus, the more 
overlap between two CI ranges for the same parameter, the less likely those data can be 
characterized by truly different psychometric functions. To the extent that different 
parameter values describe different sigmoid curves, these CIs can therefore indicate the 
degree to which the data underlying each parameter estimate is in fact the result of a 
distinct psychometric model, i.e. whether the participant is completing the task in a 
different way. In addition to the interpretation of these CIs, a sigmoid curve to the 
response data from each participant in each Quantifier condition, for each level of the Set 
factor was estimated, and entered these values into linear regression models to test for 
statistical differences between w and   values across each level of the Set factor, in each 
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Quantifier condition. The figures that follow present response data and the CI ranges 
estimated by psignift4, and tables summarize the results of these linear regressions.  
4.5.5. Predictions 
First, because this is a direct replication of Lidz, et al. (2011), no effect of number of 
Sets is expected in the most-condition data. That is, the width w and threshold  
parameter values and their CIs should overlap, suggesting that the sigmoid curves, and 
therefore the way participants respond in this task, does not depend on the number of Sets 
on a trial. Instead only an effect of Ratio is expected, such that as the trials move away 
from 1:1 in most-ratio space, acceptability should steadily increase and plateau in the 
positive direction, and steadily decrease and bottom-out in the negative direction – i.e. the 
sigmoid curve itself.  
Critically, an effect of number of Sets is expected in the many-condition data, because 
the hypothesized verification strategy requires the magnitude of each set to be estimated. 
That is, the width w parameter values should reliably and significantly increase between 
trials with 3 or fewer Sets and trials with more than 3 Sets, due to the limits of parallel 
individuation (Halberda, Sires & Feigenson, 2006). The interpretation of threshold  
values is complicated by the way the data is distributed in the many-ratio space, but 
threshold  values may increase systematically, reflecting the need for increasing 
distinctiveness between the magnitudes to be compared (larger ratio values) as the 
number of Sets increases, due to the additional noise introduced by the increased 
difficulty of tracking ever more sets (Dehaene, 1997). These predictions are depicted 
visually in Figure 4-6. 
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If participants do indeed require more distinctive ratios on trials with more Sets when 
asked to verify “Many…”, but not “Most…” – as inferred from the fitted curves as just 
described – this will be taken as evidence in support of the hypothesized verification 
strategies for these two different quantifiers, because it would suggest that simply by 
increasing the number of Alternative Sets, response behavior in the task is altered. The 
effect of Set number can be intuited by tracing a vertical line from any point on the x-axis 
in Figure 4-6, the points at which that vertical line crosses each of the hypothesized 
curves would represent trials with the same ratio value. In the case of most, the 
hypothesized curves nearly overlap, and therefore all trials with the same most-ratio value 
are predicted to receive roughly the same mean acceptance rate. In the case of many, on 
the other hand, the hypothesized curves are successively less steep and shifted along the 
x-axis, depicting the change in width w and threshold  values dependent on the number 
of Sets, reflecting the prediction that each in a given ratio bin is predicted to receive 
systematically lower mean acceptance rates as the number of Sets increase, in other 
words as the number of Sets increase participants show greater imprecision in their 
acceptance responses and require larger ratio values to assent to “Many….”  
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Figure 4-6. This figure illustrates the expected differences in mean acceptance rate as a function of the 
number of different colored Sets and Ratio (as defined by the verification strategy for each quantifier 
respectively) in Experiment 3. 
4.6. Results 
The average acceptance rate for each quantifier-specific Ratio bin, across all 
participants are plotted in Figure 4-7. The point in each ratio space at which each 
quantifier hypothetically shifts from being true to being false is depicted by a red vertical 
line. Each sigmoid curve was estimated and fit using the procedure described in the 
Analysis Section (4.5.4) above, for each Quantifier condition for each different level of 
the Sets factor. Estimated CIs around each width w (dashed lines) and threshold  value 
(solid line) are shown as horizontal lines, corresponding in color to the curve they are 
estimated from (See Appendix B for tables summarizing all the fitted parameter values 
and CIs). Table 4-1 summarizes the results of linear regressions for the width w and 
threshold  parameter values, with the Set factor coded as the predictor, and participant 
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First, data from the most-condition, as predicted, show no effects of Set number. 
Referring to the estimated sigmoid curves plotted in Figure 4-7, and to the results of the 
linear regression in Table 4-1, note that all the parameter values are co-extensive, and are 
not significantly different from each other (all ps > 0.01). These results suggest that the 
underlying cognitive processes that give rise to responses do not appreciably differ across 
trials dependent on the number of different colored Sets. In short, the number of 
Alternative Sets has no significant effect on the response behavior of participants in this 
task. These results replicate results reported in Lidz, et al. (2011), validating the method 
and providing further support for the hypothesized verification strategy for most: most 
does not require the verifier to enumerate each Alternative Set separately.  
 
Figure 4-7. Mean accuracy across each Binned Ratio (as derived from the hypothesized truth-conditions 
for each quantifier) for the (A) most- and (B) many-conditions in Experiment 3. Each color indicates a 
different number of Sets. Dot size reflects the number of trials in each bin. Dashed horizontal bars represent 
95% CIs around the estimated width w value for each fitted curve. Solid horizontal bars represent 95% CIs 
around the estimated threshold  value for each fitted curve. The vertical red line represents the point along 
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Table 4-1. The results of a linear regression with the fitted w and  values for each participant 
(respectively) in Experiment 3, with the number of Sets as the predictor variable, and participant entered 
as a random effect. 
 
Next, turning to data from the many-condition, recall that the hypothesized 
verification strategy for many does require the participant to estimate the cardinality of 
dots in each Alternative Set(s) in order to compute the mean magnitude of all the sets on 
the trial. Referring to the curves plotted in Figure 4-7 and the results in Table 4-1, as 
predicted, there are clear differences in mean acceptance rate as a function the number of 
different Sets in addition to Ratio, consistent with the hypothesized truth-conditions. 
Critically, some width w values differed as a function of the number of Sets: specifically, 
the width w increased between trials with 2 Sets and 5 Sets (p = .002), and 3 Sets and 5 
Sets (p = .002). This pattern of results suggests that, as predicted, when the number of 
Sets to be operated over increases beyond about three, participants’ precision at verifying 
many decreases, compared to trials with just one or two Alternative Sets. In addition, the 
predicted Set number-dependent difference in threshold  values was observed in the 
many-condition, unlike in the most-condition (all ps < .000), suggesting that verification 
Coefficient se t-value p-value Coefficient se t-value p-value
Intercept 2.653 0.267 9.939 0.000 0.666 0.090 7.374 0.000
2 vs. 3 Sets 0.103 0.377 0.272 0.786 -0.133 0.128 -1.045 0.299
2 vs. 4 Sets 0.055 0.377 0.145 0.885 -0.011 0.128 -0.085 0.933
2 vs. 5 Sets 0.091 0.377 0.241 0.810 0.147 0.128 1.150 0.253
3 vs. 4 Sets -0.048 0.377 -0.127 0.899 0.123 0.128 0.960 0.339
3 vs. 5 Sets -0.012 0.377 -0.031 0.976 0.280 0.128 2.194 0.031
4 vs. 5 Sets -0.036 0.377 -0.096 0.924 -0.158 0.128 -1.234 0.220
Coefficient se t-value p-value Coefficient se t-value p-value
Intercept 1.321 0.146 9.029 0.000 1.096 0.065 16.879 0.000
2 vs. 3 Sets 0.010 0.207 0.048 0.962 0.358 0.092 3.901 0.000
2 vs. 4 Sets 0.460 0.207 2.223 0.028 0.740 0.092 8.062 0.000
2 vs. 5 Sets 0.665 0.207 3.214 0.002 1.100 0.092 11.984 0.000
3 vs. 4 Sets 0.450 0.207 2.175 0.032 0.382 0.092 4.161 0.000
3 vs. 5 Sets 0.655 0.207 3.167 0.002 0.742 0.092 8.083 0.000
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responses require a successively higher threshold value as the number of Sets increases. 
However, this difference may be an artefact of the stimuli design as discussed further 
below. 
To summarize, the reliable difference in width and width threshold is indicative of a 
verification strategy that does require some operation over the Alternative Sets, and 
serves to differentiate the verification strategies of many and most. 
4.7. Experiment 3: Interim Discussion 
Based on the estimated parameter values, their associated CIs and the results of the 
regressions described above, there are different psychometric models that can be reliably 
inferred to underlie the observed acceptance rate data from the many-condition, and just 
one from the most-condition.  
For the most-condition, the estimated sigmoid curves suggest that when asked to 
verify “Most…” participants responded using a strategy that was insensitive to a change 
in the number of Sets on a given trial. Only the Ratio itself drove differences in 
acceptance rates in this task. This pattern of results replicates Lidz, et al.’s (2011) results 
and supports the hypothesized verification strategy for most: participants are comparing 
the cardinality of the Quantified Set to the difference of the Quantified Set and the total 
cardinality of all the Alternative Sets. They are not performing any operation over each 
individual Alternative Set. 
For the many-condition, the estimated sigmoid curves suggest that when asked to 
verify “Many…” participants responded using a strategy that was sensitive to a change in 
the number of Sets on a given trial, specifically whether there were 2, 3, or 5 Sets on the 
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trial. The difference in width values suggests that participants’ precision decreased as 
soon as there were more than 3 or 4 Sets on a trial; as the number of Sets increases above 
about three (the known limit of the perceptual system (Halberda, Sires & Feigenson, 
2006)), participants become much less precise in their ability to verify many. The 
difference in threshold values suggests that, as the number of Sets increased, participants 
required systematically larger Ratios in order to assent to the many-utterance. The 
difference in threshold values could suggest that participants’ ability to represent the 
relevant Ratio may degrade as the number of Sets increases, and so they require larger 
and larger Ratios to assent. However, as can be seen in Figure 4-7 and discussed further 
below, the average ratio value within a given level of the Set factor also increased as the 
number of Sets increased, so this effect could be an artefact of this property of the 
stimuli. Despite this, the difference in width values, suggests that participants are 
attempting to individuate the Alternative Sets, supporting the hypothesized context-
sensitive denotation for many developed in Chapter 2.  
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Figure 4-8 and Figure 4-9 summarize these results and their implications. Figure 4-8 
illustrates the average acceptance rate for two trials in the most-Ratio space and Figure 
4-9 illustrates the average acceptance rate for two trials in the many-Ratio space. These 
two trials have different most-Ratio values, and therefore showed different mean 
acceptance rates, despite differing in the number of Sets on the trial. Moreover, two trials 
with the same ratio, but different numbers of Sets (not pictured) also had roughly the 
same acceptance rates. In contrast, these same two trials have the same many-Ratio value 
(13 blue / mean(13 blue, 6 red)= 11/9.5  1.3 and 12 blue / mean(12 blue, 7 yellow, 7 
cyan) = 12/16.67  1.3), but differ in the number of Sets present (2 vs. 3), and as can be 
seen from Figure 4-9, despite have the same many-ratio value, the trial with 3 Sets 
showed systematically lower acceptance rates compared to the trial with 2 Sets. Trials 



































Figure 4-8. Exemplar trials in Experiment 3 illustrating trials across the full range of many-
ratio bins and Set numbers, showing the relation between mean acceptance rates and trial-
types for the most-condition. 
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like most, but this Set number-dependent effect is unique to the many-condition. Because 
the number of dots in each Set, the area of each Set, and the size of each dot is controlled 
across trials in this experiment, this difference in average acceptance rate can clearly be 
attributed to the different number of Sets between these two exemplary trials. Thus, 
because participants across the most- and many-conditions were given the same kind of 
stimuli, the fact that differences in acceptance behavior were observed, in a Set number-
dependent way, supports the hypothesized verification strategy for many, developed from 
the account in Chapter 2 Section 2.3, because it demonstrates that participants who were 
asked to verify these stimuli relative to a many-prompt were sensitive to the Set number 
manipulation, whereas participants asked to verify a most-prompt were not. This 
sensitivity to the number of Sets is predicted by the verification strategy for many but not 


































Figure 4-9. Exemplar trials in Experiment 3 illustrating trials across the full range of many-ratio 
bins and Set numbers, showing the relation between mean acceptance rates and trial-types for the 
many-condition. 
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each set on a trial in order to compute a mean over all of the Sets’ magnitudes on that 
trial, whereas most simply requires participants to compute the difference between the 
Quantified Set and the rest (i.e. the Alternative Sets do not need to be individuated). 
However, as mentioned, certain limitations in the design of this experiment limit the 
validity of these conclusions. Lidz, et al. (2011) carefully constructed their stimuli so as 
to sample from the full range of most-ratio values within each level of the Sets factor. 
However, when the data were transformed into the new many-Ratio space this aspect of 
the design no longer holds. This is visually apparent by looking at the way each different 
curve, and the data from which the curve is estimated, separate along the ratio axes in 
Figure 4-9, but not in Figure 4-8. Thus, there is the possibility that the reliable 
differences in threshold values observed when considering the results in many-Ratio 
space are artefacts of those transformations, rather than real differences in the 
participants’ underlying representations of the meaning of many. While the difference in 
width values (which are less directly tied to the values on the x-axis), argue that there are 
real differences in the data collected here, Experiment 4 strengthens and extends our 
understanding of how people verify many and most in a rapid perceptual verification task. 
Experiment 4 also addresses the lack of data in the tails of the curve, especially in the 
many condition. 
4.8. Experiment 4: Aims and Background 
Experiment 3 observed Set number-dependent differences in the threshold and width 
values of sigmoid curves fit to average acceptance rates, when participants were asked to 
verify a many-utterance but not a most-utterance. However, these effects may have been 
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an artefact of the experimental design – a confounding of Ratio and Set number in the 
many-ratio space and a lack of data in the extremes of the ratio-space. While Set number-
dependent differences in width values in the many-condition offer tentative support for 
the hypothesized relative, proportional meaning of many, Experiment 4 attempts to 
address the methodological limitations of Experiment 3 and offer more conclusive 
evidence of a relative, proportional interpretation of many. 
Experiment 4 considers the same two quantifiers considered in Experiment 3 and 
develops a new design that addresses the limitations of Experiment 3. In order to be sure 
that the differences in threshold and width values are not merely artefacts, the trials in 
Experiment 4 are created in such a way that each level of the Set factor spans an 
overlapping range of Ratio values, in both the many and most conditions. 
The other modification in Experiment 4 aimed to increase the likelihood of 
participants adopting a relative, proportional strategy: on each trial, Sets were grouped by 
color and the overtly partitive construction was used in the prompts (e.g. “Most/Many of 
the…”). Pietroski, et al. (2009) found that the responses to trials with dots sorted by color 
into columns as in Figure 4-10 were not well described by estimated data derived from a 
psychophysical model of the ANS and were instead better described by responses to a 
line length estimation task, suggesting that participants were not estimating the 
numerosity of the dots, but rather comparing the extent of the columns. This 
demonstrates that in some cases, the visual stimulus clearly engenders a particular 
strategy. While it remains unclear what, if any, linguistic meaning underlies such a 
length-based verification strategy, there do exist semantic accounts of a relative most 
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(Tomaszewicz, 2013; Romero, 2015b). Following Pietroski, et al.’s results with the color-
sorted columns, and the hypothesized existence of a relative most, participants in both the 
most- and many-conditions of Experiment 4 are expected to show Set number-dependent 
effects, suggesting a relative strategy similar to many.  
 
Figure 4-10. Example of Pietroski et al.’s (2009) ‘sorted column’ trial type. Participants appeared to verify 
these trials using a length estimation strategy rather than a magnitude comparison strategy. 
As the introduction to this chapter briefly describes, Lidz, et al. (2011) propose (10) 
as an alternative possible verification strategy for most. 
(10) #yellow dots > # of red dots + # blue dots 
(11) # of yellow dots > # of all dots - # of yellow dots 
While their participants instead adopted the strategy in (11), the meaning that (10) gives 
rise to is attested in English and other languages (Romero, 2015b; Tomaszewicz, 2013). 
In English, the approximate distinction in meaning between (10) and (11) can be 
paraphrased as a majority vs the most part, and can surface (modulo certain grammatical 
constraints, c.f. Pancheva & Tomaszewicz, 2012; Tomaszewicz, 2016) as most vs the 
most. Whereas most can pick out any majority of relevant items in a context (>51%), the 
558 P. Pietroski, J. Lidz, T. Hunter and J. Halberda
(a) (b)
Figure 3 Twoarraysinwhich theyellowdotsclearly outnumber thebluedots: (a) columnpairssorted,
display, and (b) column pairsmixed
A thinker might be able to determine that some thingscorrespond one-to-one
with some other things, and hence that the former are equinumerous with the
latter, even if the thinker isunable to determine the shared cardinality in question.
Consider, for example, Figure 2b. One need not know that there are four yellow
dots, and four blue dots, in order to know that there are (exactly) asmany yellow
dots as blue dots. We return to the relevant generalization, often called ‘Hume’s
Principle’, which capturesan important truth about numbers.
(HP)#{x: (x)} = #{x: (x)} iff OneToOne[{x: (x)}, {x : (x)}]
Tacit knowledge of thisgeneralization, ranging over predicates and , may play
an important role in mature numerical competence.3 But for now, we just want
to note that recognizin equinu erosity does not require a capacity to recognize,
compare, and identify cardinalities.
Correlatively, a thinker might be able to recognize nonequinumerosity—and
determine which of two collectionshasthegreater cardinality—without being able
to recognize, compare, and distinguish cardinalities. Counting is not required to
determine if some thingsoutnumber some other things. In each scene in Figure 3,
there are more yellow dotsthan blue dots.
One c n s e that this isso, and hence that most of the dotsare yellow, without
counting or otherwise figuring out the number of yellow dots. It suffices to note
that somebut not all of the yellow dots can be put in one-to-one correspondence
with all of the blue dots.
Put another way, the yellow dotsoutnumber the blue dots— the set of yellows
has a greater cardinality than the set of blues— iff a proper subset of the yellow
3 For discussion, see Wright, 1983; Boolos, 1998; and the essaysin Demopolous, 1994. At least
prima facie, the left side of (HP) is an identity claim that logically implies the existence of
at least one cardinal number, while the right side is a correspondence claim (concerning the
elementsof the setsin question) that doesnot logically imply the existence of any number. So
while (HP) isin some sense obvious, it seemsnot to be atruth of logic; see also note 8 below.
ã 2009 TheAuthors
Journal compilation ã 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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most (likely in part due to the uniqueness presupposition in the definite article35) must 
refer to the largest subset of items in the context. It is in this sense that the meaning of the 
most may engender a relative strategy akin to many, i.e. verifying the most requires the 
hearer to enumerate each Set in the context in order to judge whether the Quantified Set 
is indeed the largest. 
After describing the new methodology of Experiment 4, predictions for the most- 
and many-conditions are briefly discussed. 
4.9. Method 
4.9.1. Participants 
Sixty-three members of the Johns Hopkins University community with normal or 
corrected to normal vision participated, and were paid $5 in exchange for participating. 
These same participants also participated in Experiment 2, described in Chapter 3, 
always participating in this experiment first. Thirty-three people (14 males) participated 
in the many condition and 30 people (12 males) participated in the most condition. To 
ensure that participants were native, or near-native (White & Genesee, 1996), speakers of 
English, participants were screened using the same survey as in Experiment 3, after 
completion of the task. The participation criteria were the same; based on these criteria, 
three participants’ data were excluded from analysis. This procedure was approved by the 
Homewood Institutional Review Board. 
                                                 
35 Although, the general explanation likely requires such a presupposition be encoded in the quantifier itself 
since some languages that lexically distinguish these meanings (e.g. Russian) do not have definite articles 
(Tomaszewicz, 2013; also thank you to Natalia Talmina for native-speaker judgments in Russian). 
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4.9.2. Design and Materials 
This experiment followed a mixed design with Ratio and Set as within-subjects 
factors, and the verification prompt (e.g. “Many of the …” or “Most of the …”) as a 
between-subjects factor.  
The number of dots in the Quantified Set was either 7, 9, or 11. Using these 
numerosities, four Ratio Bins, 9:5, 9:6, 9:9, 9:11 (average Quantified Set to average sum 
of the Alternatives) were created, comprised of trials where the Quantified Set is very 
large and should be relatively easily perceived as larger than the Alternatives (e.g. 11:6), 
to trials where that distinction is perceptually harder (9:6), to trials where the Quantified 
Set is less numerous than other trials, but the ratio of Quantified Set to Alternative Sets is 
still difficult to discriminate (7:9), or impossible (7:7). 
The Set factor manipulated the number of different colored Sets (e.g. 2 Sets as in 
Figure 4-11A or 3 Sets) and the discriminability of the numerosities of the two 
Alternative Sets. To achieve the latter manipulation, there were two different kinds of 3 
Set trials (i.e. trials where there were two Alternative Sets): ‘doubled’ and ‘halved’ 3 Set 
trials. Figure 4-11B shows a ‘doubled’ 3 Set trial (e.g. a 2 Set trial with 9 Blues and 4 
Alternatives), and Figure 4-11C shows a ‘halved’ 3 Set trial (e.g. 9 Blues, and two 
Alternative Sets with 2 dots each).  
As in Experiment 3, low-level visual features of the displays were controlled for. For 
each Ratio x Set trial type, there was a Size-controlled and an Area-controlled version, 
resulting in 72 unique Ratio x Set trials.  
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Finally, the color of the Quantified Set (e.g. whether the prompt stated “Many of the 
dots were blue,” or “… yellow.”, or “…red.”) was varied across trials, by repeating each 
of the 72 trial types, for each of the three dot colors (216 trials). This manipulation was 
intended to force participants to estimate the magnitude of all the Sets present on every 
trial, rather than fixate on only one color36. Twelve of these possible trials were randomly 
selected and presented as practice trials at the beginning of each run; data from those 
trials were not analyzed. This resulted in a total of 228 trials.  
As Figure 4-11 illustrates, Sets were grouped by color, such that each Set clustered 
around a screen-centered fixation cross that remained throughout the whole experiment. 
Each Set clustered around a center point, equidistant from the central fixation cross, such 
that all members of the Set were closer to each other than to a member of another Set. It 
is assumed that these clusters should make a strategy that relies on tracking each 
Alternative Set even more salient, so that even if there are a variety of possible strategies 
for verifying many or most, a strategy that tracks the cardinality of each the Alternative 
Sets is the most salient and easiest to pursue. 
                                                 
36 Halberda, Sires and Feigenson (2006) demonstrated that then when target color was prompted before the 
array was displayed, participants did not display the critical set-number dependent effect.  
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Figure 4-11. Examples of trials for Experiment 4 where the Quantified Set is blue, (A) 2 Set, size-
controlled, 9:4 ratio trial, (B) ‘doubled’ 3 Set, size-controlled, 9:4:4 ratio trial, and a (C) ‘halved’ 3 Set, 
area-controlled, 9:2:2 ratio trial. 
4.9.3. Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 4 is very similar to that of Experiment 3 except for 
minor differences described here. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
between-subjects Quantifier conditions. The prompt that each participant was asked to 
verify, dependent on the participant’s randomly assigned condition, was displayed at the 
bottom of the screen throughout the experiment. A central fixation cross, as pictured in 
Figure 4-11, also remained in the middle of the screen throughout the experiment. Cues 
reminding the participant of the response keys (F or J) were also displayed continuously 
at the bottom of the screen. 
On a trial, the array of dots was displayed for 600ms along with the fixation cross, 
quantifier prompt, and key cues. After the dots disappeared, the target color word was 
displayed above the fixation cross. Participants were instructed to imagine ‘plugging that 
word into’ the prompt sentence at the bottom of the screen, and then instructed to decide 
whether the sentence was a true description of the dots they just saw. They were given a 
further five seconds to make their response. After they made a response, or the response 
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were told they could take brief breaks on this screen, and press the space bar to initiate 
the next trial. 
Practice trials were presented in a random order, but were always the first 12 trials. 
All actual trials were presented after these, in a pseudo-random order across all 
participants in all conditions, such that there were never more than three trials with the 
same target color in a row. On average, participants completed this task in 10 minutes. 
4.9.4. Analysis 
The response data were analyzed using the same estimated psychometric curves and 
linear regressions as in Experiment 3. 
4.9.5. Predictions 
Recall the two hypothesized verification strategies for most and many from 
Experiment 3, repeated in (12) and (13).  
(12) Most of the… 
|𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷| > |𝐴𝐿𝐿| − |𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷| 




𝜇(|𝐴𝐿𝑇1|, |𝐴𝐿𝑇2|, … )
|𝐴𝐿𝐿|
 
As in Experiment 3, response behavior predicted by the strategy in (12) should be 
insensitive to the Ratio and Set manipulations implemented in Experiment 4 because 
(12) is insensitive to an increase in the number of Alternative Sets. Therefore, the strategy 
in (12) predicts that the Ratio values will again be the only relevant manipulation in the 
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most-condition, and no significant differences in width w or threshold  parameters 
across the levels of the Set factor are predicted. 
In contrast, the strategy in (13) for many suggests that the verifier needs to enumerate 
the Alternative Sets. So, the strategy in (13) as in Experiment 3, predicts the 
characteristic Ratio effect, and an increase in width w and threshold  values reflecting 
the increased difficulty associated with tracking an increased number of Sets. Given the 
new design of Experiment 4, this strategy also predicts an increase in width w and 
threshold  values on ‘doubled’ 3 Set trials, relative to the other two kinds of trials, 
because of the combined difficulty of representing three Sets (Halberda, Sires & 
Feigenson, 2006), and also the relative difficulty of representing the comparatively larger, 
identical Set magnitudes on this kind of trial compared to the ‘halved’ 3 Set trials 
(Dehaene, 1997). 
Finally, if the new display and prompt style in Experiment 4 do in fact invite a 
relative strategy, participants in the most-condition may also adopt a relative verification 
strategy for most. To capture the meaning of this relative most, the verification strategy in 
(14) is posited, adapted from semantic accounts of the most in the literature (c.f. Romero, 
2015b; Tomaszewicz, 2016). 
(14) “…most of the…”37 
|𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷| > 𝜄𝑀𝐴𝑋(|𝐴𝐿𝑇1|, |𝐴𝐿𝑇2|, … ) 
                                                 
37 Note that this construction cannot take subject position in English, providing clues to certain syntactic 
facts that may provide an explanation for certain scopal relations that appear to impact the Focus-sensitive 
interpretation of most and the most; at first blush, it could be that the uniqueness presupposition blocks the 
necessary QR that allows F-association. This certainly invites further analysis, perhaps using OT, given the 
apparent optionality and the hint that syntactic blocking may be at play. This is left for future work. 
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The verification strategy in (14), similar to (13), suggests that participants must represent 
the magnitude of each Set in a trial, in order to compute which is the single largest 
(𝜄𝑀𝐴𝑋). Therefore, this strategy predicts that, like participants in the many-condition, 
participants in the most-condition may show systematically higher width w and threshold 
 values on trials with 3 Sets compared to just 2. However, this strategy entails a 
comparison to the largest Alternative Set (via the 𝜄𝑀𝐴𝑋 function) rather than the average, 
meaning that ‘doubled’ 3 Set trials should not be any harder than a 2 Set trial (modulo the 
Ratio value), because the two Alternative Sets are always the same magnitude on those 
trials; this predicts that unlike responses in the many-condition, width w and threshold  
values will be higher on ‘halved’ 3 Set trials compared to 2 Set trials and ‘doubled’ 3 Set 
trials, reflecting the increased difficulty of tracking 3 Sets compared to 2, and the need to 
represent two distinct magnitudes instead of just one. 
These predictions are visually illustrated Figure 4-12 (using the estimated parameter 
values from Experiment 3 as a basis) and summarized in Table 4-2. 
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Figure 4-12. Shows predicted sigmoid curves most, many, and the most in Experiment 4, based on values 
from Experiment 3 and the hypothesized verification strategies described above. 
 
Table 4-2. Predicted parameter values for the three hypothesized verification strategies considered in 
Experiment 4. 
 
To summarize, the design of Experiment 4 tests the three hypothesized verification 
strategies by allowing us to compare changes in mean acceptance rate as a function of 
manipulating:  
(i) the Ratio of the magnitude comparison between the Quantified Set and 
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(ii) the number of individual Sets to be tracked; 
(iii) the discriminability of the Alternative Sets and the resulting comparison 
this manipulation gives rise to. 
The results of Experiment 3 are expected to be replicated the many-condition; 
finding that participants asked to verify a many-utterance do attempt to enumerate each 
Alternative Set, and consider the magnitude of the Quantified Set relative to the average 
magnitude of all the different Sets on the trial. Because the trials in Experiment 4 all 
draw from roughly the same range of many-Ratio space, the interpretation of these 
relative differences in response patterns as a function of the Set manipulation will 
strengthen support for this hypothesized verification strategy for many. 
Furthermore, because this new task is expected to engender a relative strategy, it is 
possible that responses in the most-condition pattern more like the many-condition, as 
illustrated in the far right panel of Figure 4-12 instead of the first. 
4.10. Results 
Initial analysis of the data in the most-condition revealed different acceptance rate 
patterns across the different levels of the Set factor, consistent with the hypothesis that 
the most involves a relative comparison process (i.e. between the Quantified Set and the 
largest Alternative Set). Therefore, to enable clearer comparison across the two 
conditions, the data were transformed from the most-condition into many-Ratio space, as 
shown in Figure 4-13, and consider all results in this common Ratio space (See 
Appendix B for tables summarizing all the fitted parameter values and CIs). Table 4-3 
summarizes the results of linear regressions for each parameter value, with the Set factor 
 - 183 - 
coded as the predictor, and participant as a random effect. As in Experiment 3, the extent 
to which the CIs overlap is indicative of the degree of difference in any parameter value, 
and the results of the linear regression models largely corroborate these CIs. 
 
Figure 4-13. Average acceptance rates for each Ratio bin value for each level of Set for data from the (A) 
most-condition, and the (B) many-condition in Experiment 4, both plotted in many-Ratio space. Solid 
horizontal bars indicate the CI around the estimated threshold values. Dotted horizontal lines represent the 
CI around the estimated width values. 
 
Table 4-3. The results of a linear regression with the fitted w and  values for each participant 
(respectively) in Experiment 4, with the number of Sets as the predictor variable, and participant entered 
as a random effect. 
 
Considering the most-condition first, the data clearly support the hypothesized 


























































Coefficient se t-value p-value Coefficient se t-value p-value
Intercept 0.403 0.039 10.424 0.000 0.980 0.022 43.574 0.000
2 vs. 3D Sets -0.055 0.055 -1.007 0.317 0.054 0.032 1.690 0.095
2 vs. 3H Sets 0.218 0.055 3.979 0.000 0.280 0.032 8.803 0.000
3D vs. 3H Sets -0.273 0.055 -4.986 0.000 0.226 0.032 7.113 0.000
Coefficient se t-value p-value Coefficient se t-value p-value
Intercept 0.344 0.053 6.458 0.000 0.894 0.019 47.788 0.000
2 vs. 3D Sets 0.322 0.075 4.274 0.000 -0.038 0.026 -1.433 0.155
2 vs. 3H Sets 0.038 0.075 0.503 0.616 0.315 0.026 11.910 0.000
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Pietroski, et al., 2009), but as predicted by the verification strategy posited for the most, 
width w values also differed depending on the number of Sets and their relative 
magnitudes. As expected, width w values were significantly higher on ‘halved’ 3 Set 
trials compared to 2 Set trials (p < .000), and there was no difference between 2 Set trials 
and ‘doubled’ 3 Set trials (p = .317). Unexpectedly, width w values were significantly 
lower on ‘halved’ 3 Set trials compared to ‘doubled’ 3 Set trials (p < .000). Threshold  
values also differed significantly as a function of the Set manipulation: critically 
threshold  values were significantly higher on ‘halved’ 3 Set trials compared to 2 Set (p 
< .000), and ‘doubled’ 3 Set trials (p < .000). This pattern of results suggests that when 
participants were asked to verify “Most of the dots were…,” they were least precise and 
found it systematically harder to discriminate the magnitudes to be compared when there 
were two Alternative Sets, each with a different magnitude. However, their precision also 
suffered even if the two Alternative Sets were the same size, but only relative to the 
hardest ‘halved’ 3 Set trials and not when compared to 2 Set trials.  
Turning to the results for the many-condition, the data also partly support the 
hypothesized relative, proportional verification strategy. As predicted, width w values 
were significantly lower on ‘doubled’ 3 Set trials compared to ‘halved’ 3 Set trials (p < 
.000). Moreover, width w values differed depending on the number of Sets, as expected: 
width w values were higher on ‘doubled’ 3 Set trials compared to 2 Set trials (p < .000) 
and lower on ‘halved’ 3 Set trials compared to ‘doubled’ 3 Set trials (p < .000), and were 
not significantly different between 2 Set and ‘halved’ 3 Set trials (p = .616). Moreover, 
threshold  values differed depending on the number of Sets, but contrary to predictions 
 - 185 - 
there was no difference between 2 Set trials and ‘doubled’ 3 Set trials (p = .155). 
However, there were significantly higher threshold  values on ‘halved 3 Set trials 
compared to 2 Set trials (p < .000). This pattern of results suggests that participants who 
were asked to verify “Many of the dots were…,” found it systematically harder to 
discriminate the magnitudes to be compared when there were two Alternative Sets, each 
with a different magnitude. However, their precision only suffered when there were two 
Alternative Sets and they were the same magnitude.  
4.11. Experiment 4: Interim Discussion 
To summarize, the results of Experiment 4 expanded the possible verification 
strategies available for most, demonstrating that in a context with exceedingly salient 
subsets, a relative interpretation can surface. Furthermore, the results from the many-
condition confirm that the preferred verification strategy for many is sensitive not only to 
the number of Alternative Sets in the context, but also their relative cardinalities (the 
structure of the Alternative Sets). The results across the two conditions are strikingly 
similar, supporting the initial assumption that this new experimental context would 
engender a relative strategy in the most-condition, but show some critical differences 
supporting the closely related but distinct verification strategies posited for the most and 
many, in (13) and (14) above. 
This experiment addressed the a conflation of Ratio and Set number in Experiment 
3, as can be seen by considering the distribution of data points across the three levels of 
the Set factor in Figure 4-13, resulting in stronger conclusions to be the drawn. The ease 
of discriminating the two magnitudes to be compared similarly depended on a 
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combination of the structure of the Alternative Sets and the number of Alternative Sets, 
across both Quantifier conditions. However, the precision with which participants were 
able to judge trials where the magnitude of the Quantified Set was indeed larger than the 
relevant comparison magnitude (e.g. the average or the largest Alternative Set) differed 
across the Quantifier conditions. In the many-condition, this precision depended on the 
structure and number of Alternative Sets, whereas this precision depended only on the 
structure of the Alternative Sets in the most-condition.  
These results support the hypothesized verification strategies posited above, and offer 
a more nuanced view of the underlying meaning of the most and many. Specifically, in 
the most-condition the most difficult trials to assent to were those where there were two 
Alternative Sets and those Alternative Sets were different sizes. This is consistent with 
the hypothesized verification strategy if we assume that the algorithm that implements the 
𝜄𝑀𝑎𝑥 function needs to compare the magnitudes of the two Alternative Sets first to 
identify the larger; since there is no difference between two identical magnitudes this 
would result less variable performance on ‘doubled’ trials and trials where this 
comparison process is superfluous, i.e. 2 Set trials, compared to ‘halved’ trials (i.e. higher 
threshold and width values are expected).  
In contrast, in the many-condition difficultly depended on both the number of 
Alternative Sets and their magnitudes relative to each other. This is consistent with the 
hypothesized verification strategy if we assume that the algorithm that implements the 
Average function must individuate and estimate the magnitude of each Alternative Set in 
turn; when there are two Alternative Sets and their magnitudes differ, the magnitude 
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estimation and subsequent comparison is made easier if the relative difference is greater 
(i.e. a higher threshold is observed), but even when the two Alternative Sets are the same 
size, assenting is difficult because estimating the individual magnitudes of two identical 
Sets may introduce more imprecision due to a more difficult discrimination (i.e. a larger 
width is observed). In short, assuming this difference in threshold values between 2 
‘halved’ and 3 ‘doubled’ trials is real (and not just the artefact of the distribution of data, 
which it likely is, given the lack of a reliable difference in the most-condition), it could be 
taken to suggest that the averaging process required by many results in even noisier 
magnitude representations, illustrating another underlying cause of the vagueness of 
many-utterances. This hypothesis requires further investigation to fully understand the 
correct specification and representation of the neutral segment. 
4.12. General Discussion 
This chapter described two experiments designed to demonstrate that the default 
verification strategy for many requires the relative comparison of two quantities, and that 
this comparison can be supported by the ANS. In the results of both Experiment 3 and 
Experiment 4 we found that participants altered their response behaviors depending on 
the nature of the Comparison Class – how many Alternative Sets were present on a trial 
and the relative magnitude of those Alternative Sets. Experiment 4 also demonstrated 
that the properties of the visual display, and the linguistic signal to be verified can 
influence the verification strategy that participants adopt. These results broaden the 
understanding of the interface between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive 
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representations and offer support for the relative, proportional account of many developed 
in Section 2.3. 
Experiment 3 found that participants required larger ratios and became less precise 
as the number of Alternative Sets increased, when asked to verify many, but not most. 
These results suggested that the default verification strategy for many, but not most, was 
sensitive to the context in a way consistent with a relative, proportional interpretation that 
requires some representation of the members of the Comparison Class. Then, 
Experiment 4 created an environment that aimed to increase the salience of such a 
relative, proportional strategy, and found that indeed participants asked to verify both 
most and many showed sensitivity to the Comparison Class, but in subtly different ways. 
This finding is reminiscent of participants in Pietroski, et al. (2009), who appeared to 
verify sorted column trials (Figure 4-10) using a length-comparison strategy rather than a 
magnitude comparison strategy supported via the ANS. In Experiment 4, set-based 
visual appearance similarly invited participants to use a verification strategy distinct from 
participants asked to verify most in Experiment 3, where dots were randomly scattered 
across the screen. These two findings together suggest that verification strategies for 
quantifiers like many and most can be represented via the perceptual ANS, and can be 
influenced by the visual display, and the linguistic input of the prompt. Thus, these data 
provide support for accounts of ambiguous, vague quantifiers that propose relative 
comparisons of proportionality, like that in Chapter 2, and they provide insight into the 
situations in which the optimal verification strategy differs from the default truth-
conditions, and therefore add nuance to the ITT. 
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The fact that many – and most, given the appropriate context – are sensitive to the 
comparison class in a context, is consistent with the account of many (and its extension to 
most) laid out in Chapter 2 (adopted from Romero, 2015b). Indeed, the conceptual 
implementation of the verification strategies as magnitude comparison processes 
supported by the ANS are functionally equivalent to the semantic specification proposed 
by Romero (2015b) and adopted in Section 2.3: according to the semantic denotation, 
many is true when the Quantified Set is greater than or equal to the neutral segment, 
which can be thought of as the comparison between the Quantified Set and the average 
distribution derived from the ANS-represented numerosities of all the Sets on a given 
trial; according to the semantic denotation in Section 2.3.2 (and Romero 2015b), most is 
true when the Quantified Set is a superset of all the other Sets, which can be thought of as 
the comparison between the Quantified Set and the largest distribution derived from the 
ANS-represented numerosities of all the Alternative Sets on a given trial38.  
From a linguistics perspective, the fact that the context can demonstrably shift the 
default verification strategy, as the set-up in Experiment 4 did for most, provides a clear 
demonstration of the power that pragmatic inferences – encoded in the contents of the D-
tree in the theoretical framework adopted in Chapter 2 – can have on linguistic 
comprehension and use. Specifically, the shift from verifying ‘Most of the dots are blue’ 
to instead verifying ‘The dots are blue, for the most part’ could be seen as a kind of 
context-dependent pragmatic coercion of meaning. In other words, something about the 
                                                 
38 While this captures the verification strategy adopted for most in Experiment 4, it does not describe that 
adopted in Experiment 3, suggesting that most is also ambiguous, but in a different way from many.  
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context made the latter utterance a more felicitous or salient meaning to verify, despite 
the surface syntax, giving rise to a different ‘default’ interpretation (e.g. ‘most’ not ‘the 
most’ appeared in the prompt). In the terminology of Chapter 2, the information 
structure of the preceding discourse licensed a relative interpretation of most instead of 
the majority interpretation, as in Experiment 3 and Lidz, et al. (2011); here the 
background could be informed by the prompt, with the content of restriction provided by 
the visual display (see Section 2.2.2). This strengthens the claim that pragmatic factors 
can play a major role in what possible interpretations arise. However, the current 
experiments do not, and cannot, provide any insight into the precise nature of the 
information structure of the discourse that license the most instead of most, and vice 
versa. 
Future investigations could seek further support for the account in Section 2.3 by 
introducing different shapes to test for the effects of Focus investigated in Chapter 3, 
and introduce other manipulations of the linguistic prompt and visual display to 
understand more about what triggers pragmatic coercion. The experiments in this chapter 
also leave the existence of the cardinal interpretation, described in Section 2.3.1 untested. 
In order to detect and differentiate the cardinal interpretation of many from the 
proportional, the average magnitude of the Quantified Set would need to be manipulated 
independently of the Set and Ratio manipulations. For example, the mean number of 
target-color dots across all the trials in Experiment 4 was about seven, so the cardinal 
meaning of many would predict that trials with less than seven Quantified dots should be 
judged false and ones with more than 7 should be judged true. There were a small 
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number of trials in Experiment 4 where the cardinal and proportional interpretations 
predicted different truth-values, but too few to enable reliable inferences about these 
responses to be drawn.  
In addition, the limits of the perceptual system and how it interacts with linguistic 
judgments should be further explored. For example, acceptance rates decreased when the 
number of Sets on the trial exceeded the known limit of the ANS in the many-condition, 
but not the most-condition. However, because there were only trials with 2 and 3 Sets, 
Experiment 4 did not attempt to replicate this. Perhaps visually separating the sets 
enables the perceptual system to more accurately track a greater number of sets. 
Further, there are yet subtler aspects of the ITT to be explored, and comparisons 
between the verification strategies explored in these experiments could provide 
enlightening test cases. For example, as suggested in the Discussion of Experiment 4, 
the representations derived via the averaging process in many may qualitatively differ 
from the magnitude estimation processes involved in most, or the most, i.e. noisier or 
sharper gaussians. This issue pertains to the correct specification and representation of 
the neutral segment. The nature of this potential difference could shed light on how 
different linguistic representations interact with the precision of non-linguistic systems 
like the perceptual ANS when they are supporting linguistic interpretation. This relative 
noisiness, and the way it would result in decremented discriminability with ANS 
representations of magnitude, could also be taken as a one possible implementation of 
what Kennedy 2019, following Fara 2000, refers to as interest relative properties; 
essentially, we accept each iterative step of the second premise in the Sorites Paradox 
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because in the classical formulation, the increment of change is so small it results in the 
judgement that the two degrees are “the same for present purposes” (p. 530).  
Indeed, these results of Experiment 3 and 4 provide support for the relative, 
proportional interpretation of many, and demonstrate the utility of this kind of rapid 
numerical comparison task for further investigating the meaning of ambiguous, vague 
quantifiers; informing the best formal mechanisms for capturing their context-dependent 
shifts in meaning.  
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5. Conclusion 
This dissertation sought to investigate ambiguity and vagueness in language, using 
the ambiguous, vague quantificational determiner many as a test case. Ambiguity can be 
thought of as many-to-one mapping between multiple meanings and a pronunciation of a 
lexical item (Kennedy 2011; 2019). Similar but distinct, vagueness can be thought of as 
the difficulty of determining a clear boundary between true and false (Kennedy 2011; 
2019). Ambiguity and vagueness in natural language pose a challenge for formal theories 
of linguistic meaning because by definition they challenge two core assumptions: (i) that 
a logically consistent and well-formed theory of meaning must maintain one-to-one 
mappings from meaning representations to pronounced lexical items (Kennedy 2011; 
2019; Parsons 1973); and (ii) that formal meanings can be formulated within a classic 
two-valued logic with sharp boundaries (Kennedy 2011; 2019).  
Previous accounts of many, and closely related quantifiers like few, much and little 
(Cohen 2001; Herburger 1997, 2000; Partee 1988; Romero 2015a, 2015b; Solt 2009, 
2011, 2015; Westerståhl 1985; a.o.), have described the various apparent meanings of 
many, and the ways in which its precise range of felicity and truth are difficult to 
characterize. A recurring idea in this literature is the notion that the particular 
interpretation of many that arises depends, at least in part, on the Focus-marking in a 
many-utterance (Cohen 2001; Herburger 2000; Romero 2015a, 2015b; Westerståhl 
1985). However, each of these accounts posits multiple semantic denotations for many. 
Another common idea in this literature, is that the vagueness of many can be attributed to 
a gradable scale encoding either proportions or cardinalities, and/or a comparison 
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between proportions or cardinalities to either proportions or cardinalities on that same 
gradable scale that are derived from the context, or somehow independently specified 
(Partee 1988; Romero 2015a, b; Solt 2015).  
In Chapter 2 this dissertation presented its main theoretical proposal. The pragmatic 
and semantic components used to account for the context sensitive behavior of 
ambiguous, vague quantifiers was described, including D-trees (Büring 2003; Ginzburg 
1997; Roberts 1996/2012), licensing QUDs (Roberts 1996/2012), structured meanings to 
denote those QUDs (Krifka 2001), information structure-dependent Focus (Rooth 1992), 
a Focus operator at LF (von Fintel 1994), and a de-compositional, degree-based 
denotation of many (Romero 2015b; Solt 2015). The main claim of this account was that 
the apparent cardinal-proportional ambiguity, and the regular-reverse ambiguity arise in a 
principled, predictable way depending on the information structure of the preceding 
discourse, or context, and the apparent vagueness of many arises from the context-
sensitive relative proportionality in the denotation of many itself. In short, many itself is 
neither ambiguous nor vague, but because it is context-sensitive – and the contexts in 
which it appears can contain variable, insufficient, or imprecise information – the 
interpretive possibilities of many-utterances can give rise to pragmatic ambiguity and 
variable truth-value judgements. 
Chapter 3 described two experiments designed to test whether participants have 
access to the reverse interpretation via a particular prosodic contour (c.f. Büring 2003) 
i.e. whether distinct interpretations arise by virtue of emphasis (taken to mark Focus). To 
test this, paragraphs were designed that provided discourse contexts with carefully 
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controlled information structure. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to summarize 
the information in the paragraph with either a many-utterance with italics consistent with 
either the regular or reverse interpretations, e.g. “Many Scandinavians have won the 
Nobel Prize,” or “Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize.” They are also asked 
to rate how confident they were about their choice. No reliable difference was found in 
the rate at which they chose either kind of many-utterance, and confidence rating values 
only differed when the context licensed the reverse interpretation. However, when the 
data was re-analyzed with a predicate type factor, participants’ choices followed this 
semantic constraint that suggested the reverse interpretation was ungrammatical on some 
trials. In Experiment 2, a subset of the trials from Experiment 1 were presented 
auditorily and the predicate type in the many-utterance was balanced across the stimuli. 
Despite this more careful design, no reliable difference in response choices was found, 
and again reliable differences in confidence ratings in only the reverse condition. Either 
the results in Experiment 1 were spurious, or the null result in Experiment 2 stemmed 
from a lack of power. Pending further investigation of these limitations, a preliminary OT 
analysis (Prince & Smolensky, 1993) considered other semantic constraints on the 
interpretive possibilities of plural subjects which partly capture the predicate type 
distinction. This analysis helped illuminate potential factors that could explain the pattern 
of results across Experiments 1 and 2, and suggested that a fuller account of the 
ambiguity of many must incorporate these interpretive constraints on the subjects of 
many-utterances as well.  
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Chapter 4 described two experiments designed to test whether participants who were 
asked to verify many-utterances took alternatives in the context into account, as the 
relative, proportional account of many predicted. In these experiments, participants were 
rapidly presented (150-600ms) with different colored dots (2-5 different colors depending 
on the trial) of varying sizes, either randomly scattered around the screen or grouped by 
color. They were asked to verify the truth of an utterance with respect to the trial they just 
saw. In a between-subjects design, half of all participants were asked to verify “Most of 
the dots were blue,” or “Many of the dots were blue.” Previous work had posited and 
found supporting evidence for a meaning of most that was not sensitive to the number of 
alternative sets on the trial. In contrast, the relative comparison in the denotation for many 
predicted differences in performance (acceptance rate) depending on the number of 
different colored sets present on a given trial; specifically, participants’ ability and 
therefore willingness to accept the utterance would decrease as the number of different 
colored sets to be tracked increased due to the increased attentional load, thereby causing 
a change in performance for participants asked to verify many, unlike most. Across two 
different experiments, the number of Alternative Sets and their relative magnitude to (i) 
the Quantified Set (Experiment 3), and (ii) to each other (Experiment 4) was 
manipulated. Participants who were asked to verify a many-utterance were more sensitive 
to the number of alternative sets, as predicted. However, when the context strongly biased 
participants towards a relative strategy, even participants asked to verify a most-utterance 
showed sensitivity to the number of Alternative Sets, suggesting that most also has a 
relative interpretation. Critically, the relative interpretation of most seemed to make 
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participants more sensitive to the magnitude of the Alternative Sets relative to each other, 
but not the Quantified Set, unlike the relative interpretation of many, which made 
participants sensitive to the magnitude of the Alternative Sets relative to each other and 
the Quantified Set. Thus, these results support the semantic denotation proposed in 
Chapter 2, and demonstrate that a strongly biasing context can determine which of 
multiple possible interpretations of a lexical item arise, over-riding even the surface 
syntax.  
Thus, the experimental evidence in Chapters 3 and 4 partially support the theoretical 
claims made in Chapters 1 and 2. Specifically, the fact that a clear, categorical response 
pattern was not found in Experiments 1 and 2 suggests that the pragmatic constraints 
derived from the close relationship between emphasis and information structure (derived 
from the structured meaning denotations of licensing QUDs in a preceding discourse), are 
only one part of a complex ecosystem of linguistic constraints that may ultimately be 
needed to capture the apparent ambiguity of many, especially if we want to try and 
maintain the claim that the regular, reverse, and cardinal interpretations can all be derived 
from a single relative, proportional gradable denotation. Encouragingly, such a 
denotation is supported by the results of Experiments 3 and 4. In short, many is not 
vague; the boundaries of its truth-conditions are precise and crisp. Rather, many-
utterances appear vague because they depend on contexts, which may themselves contain 
unspecified or imprecise quantities, and are interpreted via recourse to noisy, 
approximate magnitude representations. 
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The main innovation of the semantic-pragmatic account developed in Chapter 2 was 
to use structured meanings to denote the licensing QUDs in discourses. This innovation 
reduced the abstract theoretical notion of Focus to the actual information structure of the 
discourse defined by these structured meanings. This approach should be maintained to 
the extent that it simplifies the notion of Focus, making the contents of the preceding 
discourse obviously composable with an utterance. Together with semantic constraints on 
the interpretation of plural subjects, this innovative approach to Focus may prove quite 
fruitful in accounting for the apparent ambiguity and vagueness of quantifiers like many, 
without having to abandon the assumptions standard semantic theories of reference and 
truth. Frameworks that facilely allow the modeling of such complex interactions, such as 
OT (Prince & Smolensky, 1993; or even stochastic or bi-directional OT; Blutner, 2000; 
Boersma & Hayes, 2001) or Harmonic Grammar (Smolensky & Legendre, 2006), should 
be employed to further attempt to account for the kind of pragmatic ambiguity displayed 
by many. 
Furthermore, the results of the experiments in Chapter 4 demonstrate the validity of 
accounts that view vagueness as both a linguistic and meta-linguistic phenomenon (e.g. 
Fara 2000). Specifically, many and most are verified in ways consistent with the ratio-
dependent magnitude estimation and comparisons processes supported by ANS 
representations (Dehaene, 1997, Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004; a.o.) as evidenced 
by the ratio-dependent effects (the sigmoidal shape of the response data). Moreover, 
many but not most was also sensitive to the context of a trial, suggesting that the 
vagueness of many likely stems from both the noisy ANS and its context-dependent 
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relative proportionality. This further validation of the ITT (Lidz, et al., 2011) implies that 
linguistic, lexical representations interface with other conceptual systems during language 
processing. Therefore, to fully understand and account for the interpretative possibilities 
in natural language, acceptability judgements must be considered in a rich context, taking 
into account external facts about the world, and what we know about the way humans 
perceive and conceptualize that world.  
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Appendix A: Experiment 1 & 2 Stimuli 
This appendix lists the stimuli created for Experiment 1 in Chapter 3. The predicate 
type is given in parentheses next to the paragraph ID number. Bolded paragraph IDs 
indicate trials that we reused in Experiment 2.  
 
paraphrase order 1 paraphrase order 2 paraphrase order 1 paraphrase order 2
COCA extract: 
Preamble:
Of all the pundits asked, 
two thirds predicted that 
Perlmutter would win.  
But one third of all 
predictions that 
Perlmutter would win 
were made by pundits.
One third of all the 
predictions that 
Perlmutter would win 
were made by pundits.  
But of all the pundits 
asked, two thirds 
predicted that Perlmutter 
would win.
Two thirds of all the 
predictions that 
Perlmutter would win 
were made by pundits.  
But of all the pundits 
asked, one third predicted 
that Perlmutter would 
win.
Of all the pundits asked, 
one third predicted that 
Perlmutter would win.  
But two thirds of all 
predictions that 
Perlmutter would win 











Of all the fraudulent 
companies being traded, 
two thirds were shorted by 
Mr. Adrangi.  But one third 
of all companies shorted 
by Mr. Adrangi were 
fraudulent.
One third of all companies 
shorted by Mr. Adrangi 
were fraudulent.  But of 
all the fraudulent 
companies being traded, 
two thirds were shorted by 
Mr. Adrangi.
Two thirds of all 
companies shorted by Mr. 
Adrangi were fraudulent.  
But of all the fraudulent 
companies being traded, 
one third were shorted by 
Mr. Adrangi.
Of all the fraudulent 
companies being traded, 
one third were shorted by 
Mr. Adrangi.  But two 
thirds of all companies 












Of all the bass in the lake, 
two thirds prefer to hide in 
shallow areas. But one 
third of shallow areas hide 
bass at any given time.
One third of shallow areas 
hide bass at any given 
time.  But of all the bass 
in the lake, two thirds 
prefer to hide in shallow 
areas.
Two thirds of shallow 
areas hide bass at any 
given time.  But of all the 
bass in the lake, one third 
prefer to hide in shallow 
areas.
Of all the bass in the lake, 
one third prefer to hide in 
shallow areas. But two 
thirds of shallow areas 
hide bass at any given 
time.
Many bass hide in 
shallow areas.




Of all the species 
classified as endangered, 
two thirds lack genetic 
fitness.  But one third of 
all species that lack 
genetic fitness are 
classified as endangered.
One third of all species 
that lack genetic fitness 
are classified as 
endangered.  But of all the 
species classified as 
endangered, two thirds 
lack genetic fitness.
Two thirds of all species 
that lack genetic fitness 
are classified as 
endangered.  But of all the 
species classified as 
endangered, one third lack 
genetic fitness.
Of all the species 
classified as endangered, 
one third lack genetic 
fitness.  But two thirds of 
all species that lack 










Of all the Tour de France 
fans at the race, two 
thirds of them get drunk.  
But one third of all sports 
fans that get drunk at their 
venue are Tour de France 
fans.
One third of all sports fans 
that get drunk at their 
venue are Tour de France 
fans.  But of all the Tour 
de France fans at the race, 
two thirds of them get 
drunk.
Two thirds of all sports 
fans that get drunk at their 
venue are Tour de France 
fans.  But of all the Tour 
de France fans at the race, 
one third of them get 
drunk.
Of all the Tour de France 
fans at the race, one third 
of them get drunk.  But 
two thirds of all sports 
fans that get drunk at their 
venue are Tour de France 
fans.
Many Tour de 
France fans get 
drunk.
Many Tour de 
France fans get 
drunk.
Regular Condition Reverse Condition
All different kinds of election watchers were asked to predict which candidate would win.
Many people thought [Perlmutter] would run for the new 7th Congressional District.
[Tour de France fans] are knowledgeable and opinionated and many of them are drunk, even thought the real 
talent won't be here for another 26 hours.
Different kinds of sports fans find different ways to revel while watching their sport of choice.
Adrangi has skewered many Chinese companies listed in the United States.
Different hedge fund managers bet against (short) publicly traded companies that are likely to fail for a variety 
or reasons.
In many states where the species once thrived, populations are so low in number and so isolated that they 
contain a shortage of genetic information.
The conservation status of a species depends on a variety of factors related to the species' ability to reproduce 
viable offspring, or fitness.
Since impoundment, these areas have been reduced to woody snarls of downed limbs and standing stumps 
that line the old channel, creating excellent ambush points where many bass can take refuge in a small area.


































































regular response reverse response
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paraphrase order 1 paraphrase order 2 paraphrase order 1 paraphrase order 2
COCA extract: 
Preamble:
Of all the holes on the 
course, nine tenths are 
defined by heliotrope 
trees.  But one tenth of all 
the features that 
heliotrope trees define are 
holes.  
One tenth of all the 
features that heliotrope 
trees define are holes.  
But of all the holes on the 
course, nine tenths are 
defined by heliotrope 
trees.
Nine tenths of all the 
features that heliotrope 
trees define are holes.  
But of all the holes on the 
course, one tenth are 
defined by heliotrope 
trees.
Of all the holes on the 
course, one tenth are 
defined by heliotrope 
trees.  But nine tenths of 
all the features that 
heliotrope trees define are 
holes.  
Many holes are 
defined by 
heliotrope trees.





Of all the weapons 
manufacturers, nine 
tenths still received 
government funding.  But 
one tenth of all the 
manufacturers that still 
received government 
funding were weapons 
manufacturers.
One tenth of all the 
manufacturers that still 
receive government 
funding were weapons 
manufacturers.  But of all 
the weapons 
manufacturers, nine 
tenths still received 
government funding.
Nine tenths of all the 
manufacturers that still 
receive government 
funding were weapons 
manufacturers.  But of all 
the weapons 
manufacturers, one tenth 
still received government 
funding.
Of all the weapons 
manufacturers,  one tenth 
still received government 
funding.  But nine tenths 
of all the manufacturers 
that still received 














Of all the college students 
who write poetry, nine 
tenths get published.  But 
one tenth of all the poetry 
published is written by 
college students.
One tenth of all the poetry 
published is written by 
college students.  But of 
all the college students 
who write poetry, nine 
tenths get published.
Nine tenths of all the 
poetry published is written 
by college students.  But 
of all the college students 
who write poetry, one 
tenth get published.
Of all the college students 
who write poetry, one 
tenth get published.  But 
nine tenths of all the 
poetry published is written 






Of all the small 
communities in the 
Highlands, nine tenths 
were still isolated.  But 
one tenth of all the 
isolated communities 
were small6
One tenth of all the 
isolated communities 
were small.  But of all the 
small communities in the 
Highlands, nine tenths 
were isolated.
Nine tenths of all the 
isolated communities 
were small.  But of all the 
small communities in the 
Highlands, one tenth were 
isolated.
Of all the small 
communities in the 
Highlands, one tenth were 
still isolated.  But nine 










Of all the economists 
asked for predictions, nine 
tenths predicted a raise in 
interest rates.  But one 
tenth of all those who 
predicted a raise in 
interest rates were 
economists.
One tenth of all those who 
predicted a raise in 
interest rates were 
economists.  But of all the 
economists asked for 
predictions, nine tenths 
predicted a raise in 
interest rates.
Nine tenths of all those 
who predicted a raise in 
interest rates were 
economists.  But of all the 
economists asked for 
predictions, one tenth 
predicted a raise in 
interest rates.
Of all the economists 
asked for predictions, one 
tenth predicted a raise in 
interest rates.  But nine 
tenths of all those who 
predicted a raise in 
interest rates were 
economists.
Many economists 
predicted a raise 
in rates.
Many economists 
predicted a raise 
in rates.
Had Asia not come along, many analysts are convinced that the Fed would have already begun to raise short-
In 2011, several different kinds of experts were asked to predict how the Federal Reserve Bank would adjust 
short-term interest rates.
Marshall Sahlins presented his differentiation of political types, … in 1961, when the highlands of New Guinea 
In 1960, Westerners were in varying degrees of contact with communities of all sizes in the Papua New 
Guinean Highlands.
And many of these [people published in Poetry Magazine] are still in school, a lot of college and graduate 
All different kinds of people who write get all different kinds of literary work published.
Also, indecision at the top has allowed many factory managers to cling to hopes that military budget cuts will 
In Post-Soviet Russia, all different kinds of manufacturing sectors were having to look for new and different 
sources of capital.
Flowers are becoming more profuse, and planted heliotrope trees have grown in and now define many [golf] 










































Regular Condition Reverse Condition
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paraphrase order 1 paraphrase order 2 paraphrase order 1 paraphrase order 2
COCA extract: 
Preamble:
Of all the surgeries 
performed, three fourths 
are the result of diabetes.  
But one fourth of diabetes 
cases result in surgery.
One fourth of diabetes 
cases result in surgery.  
But of all the surgeries 
performed, three fourths 
are the result of diabetes.
Three fourths of diabetes 
cases result in surgery.  
But of all the surgeries 
performed, one fourth are 
the result of diabetes.
Of all the surgeries 
performed,  one fourth are 
the result of diabetes.  But 
three fourths of diabetes 









Of all the city council 
members, three fourths 
attend neighborhood 
meetings.  But one fourth 
of neighborhood meeting 
attendees are city council 
members.
One fourth of 
neighborhood meeting 
attendees are city council 
members.  But of all the 
city council members, 
three fourths attend 
neighborhood meetings.
Three fourths of 
neighborhood meeting 
attendees are city council 
members.  But of all the 
city council members,  one 
fourth attend 
neighborhood meetings.
Of all the city council 
members, one fourth 
attend neighborhood 
meetings.  But three 
fourths of neighborhood 












Of all the roads in Britain, 
three fourths were mere 
trials.  But one fourth of 
all  trails were in Britain.
One fourth of all  trails 
were in Britain.  But of all 
the roads In Britain, three 
fourths were mere trails.
Three fourths of all trails 
were in Britain.  But of all 
the roads in Britain, one 
fourth were mere trails.
Of all the roads in Britain, 
one fourth were mere 
trails.  But three fourths of 
all  trails were in Britain.
Many roads in 
Britain were mere 
trails.
Many roads in 




Of all the Chinese tourists, 
three fourths voted for 
Guilin.  But one fourth of 
tourists who voted for 
Guilin were Chinese.
One fourth of tourists who 
voted for Guilin were 
Chinese.  But of all the 
Chinese tourists, three 
fourths voted for Guilin.
Three fourths of tourists 
who voted for Guilin were 
Chinese.  But of all the 
Chinese tourists, one 
fourth voted for Guilin.
Of all the Chinese tourists, 
one fourth voted for 
Guilin.  But three fourths 




Guilin is the most 




Guilin is the most 




Of all the mobsters, three 
fourths preferred a 
flamboyant lifestyle.  But 
one fourth of wealthy 
people who preferred a 
flamboyant lifestyle were 
mobsters. 
One fourth of wealthy 
people who preferred a 
flamboyant lifestyle were 
mobsters.  But of all the 
mobsters, three fourths 
preferred a flamboyant 
lifestyle.
Three fourths of wealthy 
people who preferred a 
flamboyant lifestyle were 
mobsters.  But of all the 
mobsters, one fourth 
preferred a flamboyant 
lifestyle.
Of all the mobsters, one 
fourth preferred a 
flamboyant lifestyle.  But 
three fourths of wealthy 
people who preferred a 












Of all the job training 
programs that exist for 
blind people, four fifths 
are in America.  But one 
fifth of all job training 
programs in America are 
for blind people.
One fifth of all job training 
programs in America are 
for blind people.  But of all 
the job training programs 
that exist for blind people, 
four fifths are in America.
Four fifths of all job 
training programs in 
America are for blind 
people.  But of all the job 
training programs that 
exist for blind people, one 
fifth are in America.
Of all the job training 
programs that exist for 
blind people, one fifth are 
in America.  But four fifths 
of all job training 




blind people exist 
in America.
Many training 
programs for  
blind people exist 
in America.
Individuals who are legally blind or visually impaired in the United States have long suffered high 
Job training programs for a variety of special needs populations exist in varying amounts across the developed 
world.
In his years in power, Mr. Bonanno shunned the flamboyant styles favored by many contemporary mob bosses, 
including Charles (Lucky) Luciano, Thomas (Three Finger Brown) Lucchese and Frank Costello, who delighted in 
wearing elegant clothes and being the hosts of lavish parties in nightclubs in Manhattan and Miami Beach.
In the 90s, all kinds of wealthy people were living a range of lifestyles.
In Kosrae, 90 percent of adult surgical admissions are linked to diabetes, and of these many are for 
amputations necessitated by vascular breakdown.























































































Regular Condition Reverse Condition
regular response reverse response
That stop will follow Beijing and will accompany stops to Hong Kong: China's ancient capital, Xi'an; and a 
destination many Chinese call the most beautiful place on Earth: Guilin.
Tourists from around the world were asked which place they thought was the most beautiful place on Earth.
Although there as an extensive system of roads from Roman times that was kept in fairly good repair, many 
Across 5th century Europe the quality of roads varied greatly.
Most council members have jobs, but many attend neighborhood meetings and get calls late at night about 
In small cities like Berne, Indiana all the different public officials attend a wide variety of public meetings.
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paraphrase order 1 paraphrase order 2 paraphrase order 1 paraphrase order 2
COCA extract: 
Preamble:
Of all Pakistani citizens, 
four fifths are frustrated 
with their government.  
But one fifth of the people 
who are frustrated with 
the Pakistani government 
are Pakistani citizens.
One fifth of people who 
are frustrated with the 
Pakistani government are 
Pakistani citizens.  But of 
all Pakistani citizens, four 
fifths are frustrated with 
their government.
Four fifths of people who 
are frustrated with the 
Pakistani government are 
Pakistani citizens.  But of 
all Pakistani citizens, one 
fifth are frustrated with 
their government.
Of all Pakistani citizens, 
one fifth are frustrated 
with their government.  
But two fifths of the 
people who are frustrated 
with the Pakistani 












Of all the complications 
that arose during 
childbirth, four fifths were 
reportedly managed by 
midwives.  But one fifth of 
midwives reported 
managing complications.  
One fifth of midwives 
reported managing 
complications.  But of all 
the complications that 
arose during childbirth, 
four fifths were reportedly 
by midwives.
Four fifths of midwives 
reported managing 
complications.  But of all 
the complications that 
arose during childbirth,  
one fifth were reportedly 
by midwives.
Of all the complications 
that arose during 
childbirth, one fifth were 
reportedly managed by 
midwives.  But four fifths 
of midwives reported 
managing complications.  
Many 
complications 








Of all the activists 
involved, four fifths called 
for an aggressive policy.  
But one fifth of 
stakeholders who called 
for an aggressive policy 
were activists.
One fifth of stakeholders 
who called for an 
aggressive policy were 
activists.  But of all the 
activists involved, four 
fifths called for an 
aggressive policy.
Four fifths of stakeholders 
who called for an 
aggressive policy were 
activists.  But of all the 
activists involved, one fifth 
called for an aggressive 
policy.
Of all the activists 
involved, one fifth called 
for an aggressive policy.  
But four fifths of 
stakeholders who called 
for an aggressive policy 
were activists.
Many activists 
called for an 
aggressive policy.
Many activists 




Of all the sub-fields of 
biological science, four 
fifths will benefit from 
open-access data.  But one 
fifth of all the scientific 
fields that will benefit 
from open-access data are 
biological.
One fifth of all the 
scientific fields that will 
benefit from open-access 
data are biological.  But of 
all the sub-fields of 
biological science, four 
fifths will benefit from 
open-access data.
Four fifths of all the 
scientific fields that will 
benefit from open-access 
data are biological.  But of 
all the sub-fields of 
biological science, one 
fifth will benefit from 
open-access data.
Of all the sub-fields of 
biological science, one 
fifth will benefit from 
open-access data.  But 
four fifths of all the 
scientific fields that will 










Evolution, systematics, and taxonomy have long been well served by NHCs, but ecology, biodiversity, 
conservation biology, and many other aspects of biological science could also benefit from greater access to 
the collections' data.
In the near future, a range of scientific fields will benefit from an ever growing array of data-related 
innovations.
Many activists and politicians are calling for more aggressive policy now and many in Washington are openly 
angry with Obama's current policy to stay friendly with both sides of the conflict.
During secession talks between North and South Sudan, various stakeholders called for different kinds of 
policies from the Obama administration.
Many complications are becoming so routine that nurse midwives can manage them instead of sending 
women to high-risk care specialists.
According to a 1980 report on childbirth procedures, a wide range of medical issues were managed by a 






















































Regular Condition Reverse Condition
regular response reverse response
Already many see their leaders as kowtowing to the US by fighting militants at its behest and allowing drone 
attacks on Pakistani territory.
A range of stakeholders interested in Pakistan are frustrated with the ineptitude and corruption that plague 
their different civic institutions.
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Appendix B: Parameter values for Experiment 3 and 4 data 
The tables in this appendix give the full set of estimated parameter values and their CIs 
for the sigmoid curves fitted by psignifit to the response data from Experiments 3 and 4. 
Values for the following parameters that characterize the best fit sigmoid function for the 
many-Ratio and most-Ratio: theta – threshold; w – width; lambda – lapse rate; gamma – 
guess rate. CIs indicate the range that contains 95% of simulated parameter values 
following Bayesian inference, given the data and a beta-binomial model-based prior over 
these parameters; thus, the more overlap between two CI ranges for the same parameter, 






lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper
2 Sets 1.663 1.315 2.637 0.870 0.744 0.973 0.088 0.013 0.130 0.192 0.066 0.252 0.000 0.001 0.103
3 Sets 1.426 1.120 3.554 0.843 0.537 0.953 0.137 0.013 0.167 0.278 0.018 0.329 0.000 0.003 0.135
4 Sets 1.930 1.552 3.560 0.908 0.598 1.010 0.091 0.004 0.131 0.241 0.011 0.300 0.000 0.002 0.095
5 Sets 3.453 2.146 4.075 0.588 0.502 0.907 0.079 0.009 0.174 0.000 0.003 0.210 0.000 0.001 0.090
2 Sets 1.645 0.829 1.849 0.655 0.595 0.851 0.016 0.003 0.123 0.000 0.005 0.317 0.032 0.003 0.131
3 Sets 1.678 1.211 2.139 1.047 1.004 1.228 0.057 0.004 0.106 0.000 0.002 0.235 0.000 0.001 0.103
4 Sets 2.884 1.862 3.096 1.353 1.271 1.702 0.000 0.001 0.074 0.000 0.003 0.325 0.000 0.001 0.091










95% CI95% CI95% CI 95% CI
thetaw lambda gamma
lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper
2 Sets 0.464 0.296 0.579 0.984 0.965 1.036 0.032 0.005 0.081 0.000 0.002 0.206 0.000 0.002 0.191
3 H Sets 0.902 0.593 1.236 1.098 1.043 1.232 0.025 0.007 0.050 0.000 0.005 0.415 0.000 0.001 0.134
3 D Sets 0.623 0.448 0.965 1.067 1.006 1.128 0.101 0.005 0.161 0.124 0.004 0.201 0.000 0.002 0.165
2 Sets 0.580 0.375 0.845 0.861 0.828 0.937 0.047 0.007 0.082 0.000 0.003 0.295 0.000 0.001 0.162
3 H Sets 0.611 0.203 0.853 1.084 1.033 1.217 0.046 0.030 0.075 0.000 0.004 0.399 0.000 0.002 0.167
3 D Sets 1.293 0.631 1.428 0.813 0.744 1.039 0.000 0.002 0.111 0.000 0.004 0.433 0.054 0.013 0.207
2 Sets 0.446 0.271 0.761 0.936 0.910 1.008 0.084 0.011 0.130 0.000 0.002 0.254 0.000 0.002 0.207
3 H Sets 0.700 0.261 1.080 1.101 1.040 1.230 0.065 0.037 0.104 0.000 0.004 0.408 0.000 0.002 0.187


















95% CI95% CI95% CI 95% CI
thetaw lambda gamma
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